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Objective: This research project explores how uncertainty shapes NGOs operating in the health 
sector in relation to other institutions, and how NGOs strategize to maintain their image and 
survive under uncertain conditions, while working to improve population well-being. 
Methods: The research questions were answered through qualitative methods.  Twenty semi-
structured interviews were conducted, thirteen with the representatives of NGOs, and seven with 
high-ranking government officers at both central and provincial levels.  In addition, 
documents (decisions, proposals, reports) were reviewed.  
Results:  Numerous uncertainties internal and external to NGOs greatly influence their 
operations. As a result, they adjust their mandates, roles vis-à-vis government, accountability, 
and delivery methods to manage these uncertainties.  Although relations with government were 
sometimes difficult, in general NGOs confirmed that they supported government 
priorities.  Several lessons about operations, programming, policy making, and relationship 
building have been learned through this study, resulting in recommendations being made to the 
government, to NGOs in Vietnam (including their headquarters), and to donors, aiming to 
facilitate smooth NGO operations and benefit communities.   
Conclusion:  NGOs have no standing in the local socio-political structure, a problem arising 
from the government’s restrictive control of the civil society sector. NGOs do their best to avoid 
notice, “hiding themselves” to avoid attention or scrutiny.  As a result, government-NGO 
relations are highly problematic, and NGOs often struggle to implement sustainable programs at 
the community level. Further studies are required to identify effective modes of NGO operations 
under such circumstances, including work to identify methods for strengthening NGO capacity, 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Vietnam’s so-called Open-Door policy, which began in 1986, has increased international 
investment flows to Vietnam.  Economically, Vietnam is striving to become a middle-income 
country, as indicated by the great efforts of the government towards economic growth.  United 
Nation Agencies in Vietnam, the Delegation of the European Union to Vietnam, and the Ministry 
of Planning and Investment of Vietnam (2014) regard this country as one of the most dynamic 
economies in the developing world, especially during the period between its initial economic 
reform and the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.  This development, however, does not 
guarantee equal access to development resources among populations across the country (World 
Bank, 2014).  In addition, foreign assistance has tended to be rescheduled and redirected because 
of the nation’s wealthier status (UN Agencies in Vietnam, Delegation of EU to Vietnam, MPI of 
Vietnam, 2014).  The 1986 renovation brought the country to a new standing in the global 
economy, but it has also left the nation with several social development challenges.   
 
Before the Open-Door policy, the one-party government did not support the growth of an 
independent civil society.  The Communist Party of Vietnam would not accept any expression of 
collective identity and interests outside the Party frame (Sabharwar & Huong, 2005).  Therefore, 
although Vietnam had numerous mass organizations, associations, and several other socio-
political organizations, all these agencies were formed, funded, mandated, and controlled by 
government.  An independent civil society had not yet appeared.    
 
Since 1986, NGOs have come to Vietnam, and numerous social groupings (voluntary groups, 
self-help groups, and several other charity clubs) have formed. While NGOs deliver development 
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activities ranging from direct support to policy advocacy, these other social groups provide 
material assistance for the poor.  Recently, various local NGOs and technical associations have 
appeared, and many of them have partnered with the above social organizations or foreign NGOs 
to implement activities that target disadvantaged populations.  Together, these entities have 
organized poverty reduction and community development activities in Vietnam.     
 
In legal terms, while foreign NGOs, local NGOs, and technical associations can register their 
operations with the government, other social groups are not legally allowed to do so.  However, 
registered or not, all these organizations are considered unofficial because they are not 
government sanctioned.   In addition, government and the political party neither deny nor 
recognize the development of these organizations.  Therefore, their social status is blurred.  More 
seriously, the organizations are considered a threat to stable society (Duong, 2012), and the 
Communist Party of Vietnam does not allow their members to promote or even to discuss civil 
society. Sabharwar and Huong (2005) note that civil society in Vietnam remains in an 
“embryonic stage”.  The path ahead for this sector is unknown. 
 
This research was motivated by the author’s many years of professional and academic work with 
international Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), in which questions arose around the 
tensions between a government that wants alignment with NGOs regarding its policies, priorities, 
and directives, while at the same time NGOs commit to human rights and other priorities that 
may differ from those of government.  NGOs both complement as well as, where necessary, 




This project is motivated by two specific objectives.  First, it was undertaken to contribute to 
knowledge about the relationship between the NGO sector, governments, and other social 
sectors.  In the context of developing countries, where economic development tends to be valued 
before social development, and civil society remains unrecognized in national development, 
these relations are vulnerable and prone to instability or breakdown.  Better understanding of the 
uncertainty surrounding NGOs would support addressing such problems, and could be used to 
guide further research and organizational development.  Second, this research focused on 
presenting and evaluating critically the recommendations made by NGO practitioners. Although 
this research did not aim for generalizing to settings outside of Vietnam, the findings are useful 
to other LMIC contexts where NGOs are an important component of health governance, and 
particularly in contexts where governments have undertaken to control NGO activities. 
 
I argue here that uncertainty represents a major determinant of NGO structures and practices in 
Vietnam (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012, MacPhail, 2010).  Although current literature 
offers several solid descriptions of NGO structures and practices, there are few references to the 
concept of uncertainty as I develop it here.  This thesis explores several dimensions of 
uncertainty that together shape NGO operations within the wider socio-political context of 
contemporary Vietnam.  Ultimately, the aim of this research is to identify ways to improve 
collaboration and coordination between NGOs and the governments of emerging economies.   
 
I assume throughout the dissertation that NGOs should be supported and, in turn, can benefit 
society. But I have also learned that there is some controversy regarding the impacts that NGOs 
make on society.  For example, while several scholars note that NGOs’ relief actions contribute 
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to improving community well-being through delivering health and social projects (Beyene, 2010, 
Rondi, Sorlini, & Collivignarelli, 2015), other scholars provide criticisms of effectiveness and 
efficiency of NGO delivery, arguing that NGO projects do not respond to community needs 
(Pfeiffer, 2003, Galway, Corbett, & Zeng, 2012).  The orientation of the thesis is based on my 
experiences in NGOs in Vietnam, and my commitment to the idea that NGOs can and should 
provide important social benefits.  They deserve supports to strengthen their capacity to do so. 
 
From a social determinants of health perspective, a broad range of personal, social, economic 
and political factors influence populations’ health status.  For example, personal choices of 
nutrition and lifestyle have an important determination on individuals’ health. Broadly, social 
inequality and social justice may greatly influence communities’ health. This thesis is about 
promotion and protection of populations’ health through organization of broad societal sectors to 
generate collective actions for health.  This thesis is, therefore, principally about health 
governance in its broadest terms.  
 
Among NGOs involved in this thesis, some are health-specific organizations, and the remaining 
NGOs target other sectors such as children’s welfare, environment, and community 
development.  These NGOs all aim for improving the well-being of populations.  From a broader 
social determinants of health perspective, all these NGOs participate in the promotion and 
protection of communities’ health, and their programs contribute to improving individuals’ and 
populations’ health.  In this thesis, when I discuss examples of these NGOs’ activities and 
citations from representatives of these NGOs, I believe that these activities and citations relate to 




This research applied qualitative methods to explore several factors influential to NGO 
operations in the Vietnamese context.  Semi-structured interviews and document reviews were 
applied to fully capture data and triangulate data from different sources.  This qualitative 
approach allowed me to explore the connections of several structures and processes involved in 
NGO practices and relationships.  
 
The thesis is organized into eight chapters.  The first chapter – Introduction and Overview - 
introduces the main features of socio-economic and political contexts of the developing country 
of Vietnam.  In chapter 2 – Literature Review – I present, summarize, and evaluate the current 
literature on NGOs’ roles and mandates in the intersection of public and private sectors in 
developing countries.  This chapter also summarizes key elements of what are described as 
healthy partnerships.  Chapter 3 – Research Setting – describes the past and current situation of 
foreign health-focused NGOs in Vietnam.  Chapter 4 – Research Design, and Methods – 
describes the qualitative approach to data collection and analysis.   
 
The findings are organized into three chapters. In the first – Chapter 5 – I examine factors 
external to NGOs that affect both their mandate as well as their operations. These factors include 
government-led economic development programs, donor funding, regulatory constraints, policy 
gaps, labour market factors, issues arising from relationships with local partners, field-based 
challenges, the wider political environment, and government sensitivity about faith-based 
organizations.  In the second findings chapter - Chapter 6 – I examine factors internal to how 
NGOs operate in the context of external constraints.  These factors include uncertain funding and 
6 
 
financing, headquarters’ top-down and short-range directives, NGOs’ accountability, and NGOs’ 
alignment with government.  In the third chapter - Chapter 7 – I present and discuss high level 
and cross-cutting themes.  Here I discuss one of the central problems faced by NGOs in Vietnam 
and its consequences for how NGOs operate: lack of official social or political standing. 
 
In Chapter 8, I summarize the main findings of the research, and discuss strengths and 
limitations of the study.  I take up several threads identified in my findings that point to 
uncertainty as a critical principle to offer a conceptual model of how of uncertainty affects NGO 
operations.  I conclude by recommending several areas for future research, e.g., preferable modes 
of NGO operations, methods for strengthening NGO capacity, mechanisms for donor 
engagement, and the development of local NGOs. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE ROLE OF NGOs IN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Today’s institutions of global governance for health include states, intergovernmental 
organizations, non-state actors, and public-private partnerships (Fidler, 2010, Lee, Koivusalo, 
Ollila, et. al., 2009).  This grouping represents a significant shift compared to earlier periods of 
health development that were dominated largely by bilateral and intergovernmental 
organizations. Of particular note, non-state actors such as multinational corporations, civil 
society groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropic foundations 
currently enjoy higher profiles in global health governance than previously (Fidler, 2010). 
Questions remain, however, about the roles these newly emergent non-state actors play in global 
governance, particularly as these affect or influence health development in low- and middle-
income countries. 
 
There is no agreed-upon definition of NGOs among scholars and practitioners.  Ahmed and 
Potter (2006) simply define NGOs as not-government and not-for-profit organizations.  Watkins, 
Swidler and Hannan (2012) include in this designation all not-for-profit schools, universities, 
hospitals, social clubs, professional associations, social welfare agencies, religious groups and 
cultural institutions.  This lack of agreement creates challenges for research on NGOs insofar as 
the subjects of research or evaluation may be wrongly grouped or categorized.  In this paper, I 
define NGOs to be self-governing private, not-for-profit social organizations that are formally 
constituted to promote human rights, improve health and well-being, foster economic 
development, and/or support environmental protections, usually in a context where they seek to 
provide support to vulnerable or marginalized populations (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, Anheier 
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& Salamon, 1998).  This definition also includes religious organizations.  When religious-based 
NGOs register their operations in a developing country, they serve both religious and non-
religious populations, and in some cases, they may give up their core values that relate to 
religion.  For example, World Vision had to give up their first value in Vietnam (that they are a 
Christian organization that ascribes to Christian values).  So, while World Vision has six core1 
values globally, World Vision Vietnam has only five core values2.  The definition includes both 
organizational and programmatic objectives, as well as the day-to-day operation of NGOs, and 
also captures the long-terms effects of NGO ventures on local populations.  
 
The NGO sector in global health and development has grown substantially over the past several 
decades, occupying a governance “gap” created by structural adjustment, and the related inability 
of governments to meet the social, health and welfare needs of local communities as a result of 
challenges to fiscal capacity (Mussa, Pfeiffer, Gloyd, et. al., 2013).  The governance gap also 
results from the preferences of a new generation of donors who wish to channel funding through 
private organizations deemed to be more effective and responsible, and less prone to corruption 
(Mussa, Pfeiffer, Gloyd, et. al., 2013).  By moving into a space where NGOs are seen as reliable 
advocates for local communities, while at the same time perceived as being more accountable for 
the distribution of health aid, NGOs have come to occupy a dominant role in global health 
programs and research. In addition to representing and providing services to disadvantaged and 
vulnerable populations, NGOs also target global health policy development and engage in high-
 
1 We are Christian; We are committed to the poor; We value people; We are stewards; We are partners; We are 
responsive.   
2 World Vision in Vietnam does not have the first value (We are Christian). 
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level consultations.  As noted by Anheier and Salamon (1998), in this capacity NGOs contribute 
significantly to global development by virtue of being flexible, establishing and maintaining 
“grassroots” relationships, and affording access to human and other resources. They are also 
institutional “shape-shifters,” able to move with ease through multiple contexts, from being 
respected community advocates to high-level policy consultants.  But this successful behavioural 
repertoire, based as it is on humanitarian action, volunteerism, and the ability to respond flexibly 
to shifts in health funding priorities and fads, may also undermine the potential for NGOs to 
pursue long-term policy goals or sustainable social change.  NGOs may risk diluting their efforts 
and resources to ensure achieving strategic long-term objectives. The question remains as to 
whether NGOs can sustain their role as an effective part of the ‘unruly mélange’ of global health 
governance (Buse & Walt, 1997). 
 
Currently, the writing on the efficacy of NGOs centres on the interventions that NGOs deliver to 
populations and the methods that NGOs employ to deliver these interventions.  For example, 
Lewis and Kanji (2009), in reviewing NGOs as social organizations, organize NGO goals and 
activities into three categories of activities:  delivering service, catalysing change, and building 
local partnerships.  In this latter context, NGOs may occupy a particularly important role in 
building capacity and potentially empowering local communities (Banks & Hulme, 2012).  
Understanding these different roles is important, as each reflects a differing position vis-à-vis 
governance. It is also useful for understanding and evaluating NGO practices across different 




The purpose of this part of the thesis is to unpack and discuss these different roles in order to 
provide a critical analysis of the roles NGOs occupy in the infrastructure of today’s global health 
development landscape. This discussion will permit some consideration of an appropriate role 
for NGOs, paying particular attention to the interplay of public and private sectors as well as to 
principles of equity.  It will also provide a more general context for considering the specific 
dimensions of NGO involvement in Vietnam. 
 
In reviewing the literature on the roles of NGOs within civil society, seven major themes 
emerged.  The first theme addressed the service-delivery role of NGOs in a context of 
humanitarian relief. The authors have examined several specific projects implemented by NGOs 
and the shortfalls of those projects, and debated the impact of funding uncertainty on NGO 
projects’ breadth, intensity and sustainability.  The second theme was about the participatory 
methods NGOs applied in project delivery, including capacity building, community participation 
and empowerment, and the piloting of novel programming.  The third theme analyzed the 
advocacy role played by NGOs.  The authors focused on examining the methods NGOs 
employed to engage in advocacy projects, the specific advocacy projects NGOs deployed, the 
power NGOs possessed to change policy, and concerns over NGOs’ technical capacity to 
influence or affect policy.  The fourth theme identified, addressed and analyzed the “monitoring” 
role played by NGOs in some contexts.  The fifth theme addressed the strengths and weaknesses 
of NGOs in conducting research.  The sixth theme was the key elements of healthy government-
NGO partnerships. Lastly, I present several influences internal and external to NGO operations  




2.1. Service delivery as a relief intervention 
Among other projects that NGOs implement (such as lobbying, research), NGOs may offer basic 
primary health care, social, and financial services that contribute to improving community well-
being. This is facilitated by their closeness to a community and flexible innovations in 
implementation methods (Lewis & Kanji, 2009),   Their projects might cover aspects of elderly 
care (Ball, 1992), primary care (Jennings, 2015, Adams & Halvorsen, 2014, Dalil, Newbrander, 
Loevinsohn, et. al., 2014, Amirkhanian, Kelly, Benotsch, et. al., 2004, Barlow & Beeh, 1995, 
Dadian, 1989), surgical care (Ng-Kamstra, Riesel, Arya, et. al., 2016), agriculture (Beyene, 
2010), disaster mitigation (Benson, Myers, & Twigg, 2001), economic development 
(Humphreys, 1999, Arrossi, Bombarolo, Hardoy, et. al., 1994), and water and sanitation (Rondi, 
Sorlini, & Collivignarelli, 2015, Carrard, Pedi, Willetts, et. al., 2009), among others. 
 
However, scholars have also noted several shortcomings to NGO service delivery.  Criticisms of 
the effectiveness and sustainability of their relief actions have been raised (Watkins, Swidler, & 
Hannan, 2012, ISSEE, 2010).  For example, Abramowitz (2015) described the technical, health 
care, and managerial gaps left after Medecins Sans Frontieres withdrew from their medical 
emergency assistance in post-conflict Liberia.  Pfeiffer (2003) took many of these criticisms 
further, noting that many relief actions, intended for good, are in fact “harmful practices” (pp. 
734) because they have “fragmented the local health system, undermined local control of health 
programs, and contributed to growing local social inequality” (pp. 725).  Further, vertical, short-
term funding channelled through NGOs to support local health activities in developing countries 
challenges local government authorities to coordinate funding, leads to service imbalances within 
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the health system and a loss of key personnel from the public sector due to salary disparities 
(Mussa, Pfeiffer, Gloyd, et. al., 2013).  
 
A program may not even respond to the distribution of needs across a region, nation, or 
community.  For example, Galway, Corbett and Zeng (2012), using multiple regression analyses, 
found no association between the geographic distribution of NGOs and community health needs 
identified by morbidity and mortality indicators.  Similarly, NGOs have been noted to contribute 
to geographic inequalities, with some locations enjoying better support than others (Mussa, 
Pfeiffer, Gloyd, et. al., 2013).  However, in one study of NGOs in Vietnam, the Institute for 
Studies of Society, Economy and Environment (2010) provided a counter argument, finding that 
that NGOs’ efforts are in general responsive to identified community or population needs.  In 
this research, we will see in the following chapters that although several respondents reported 
that NGOs greatly contributed to the country’s development, their contribution has not been 
measured properly. As a result, the assumption that NGOs are invariably effective can be 
challenged.  Also, these different findings suggest that NGOs’ effects depend on several factors 
both from inside and outside the organizations.  
 
A third sub-theme addresses the impact of funding uncertainty on program breadth, intensity, 
and sustainability.  For example, in one qualitative study of collaboration between NGOs and 
public sector services in Ecuador, Biermann and colleagues found that because NGOs face 
financial uncertainties, they may be able to deliver only short-term interventions (Biermann, 
Eckhardt, Carlfjord, et. al., 2016).  A study of NGOs in Guatemala discovered that heavy 
dependency on foreign, short-term, medically-focused, single-objective funding programs may 
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reduce implementation of preventive measures, limit opportunities for health education, and in 
the long run increase the risk of iatrogenic consequences (due to lack of proper health education 
on the use of a chemical – an insecticide named Lindane - which is used to treat lice) (Berry, 
2014).  Even when taking a community-partnership approach, NGOs’ roles may remain 
restricted to a local implementation level and not have broader impact (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 
2006).  Tensions may exist between long- and short-term objectives (Adams & Halvorsen, 
2014).   
 
Funding uncertainties may affect NGOs’ grassroot mandates.  When NGOs sign contracts and 
grant agreements with funding agencies (e.g., governments and donors), they are by necessity 
moving closer to the donors in terms of addressing their priorities rather than those of the 
communities they intend to serve (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006).  Amplifying this concern, 
Jennings argues that donors are likely to fund NGOs’ projects directly, bypassing local 
government and their priorities (if identified) (Jennings, 2015).  Despite this criticism, Jennings 
also recognizes the shortcomings of the public sector in many developing-country contexts, and 
admits to the “perceived slowness of bureaucracies and the malign impact of corruption” (p. 5) in 
local government administrations (Jennings, 2015).  
 
In short, NGOs’ relief actions contribute to improving community well-being through delivering 
health and social projects.  However, criticisms of effectiveness and efficiency of NGO delivery 
exist because NGOs may not respond to community needs.  NGOs are heavily dependent on 
short-term foreign, vertical, single-objective funding streams, and this reliance may result in their 




2.2. NGOs’ methods of service delivery 
Kajese (1987) argues that human resource development and institutional capacity building are 
important roles of NGOs in developing countries.  NGOs’ capacity-building projects introduce a 
wide variety of public health interventions, including behaviour change communication, 
awareness raising campaigns, and knowledge-exchange initiatives, in contexts that range from 
HIV/AIDS prevention to the development of economic opportunities (Odhiambo, Amoroso, 
Barebwanuwe, et. al., 2017, Freed, Dujon, Granek, et. al., 2016, Roy, 2010, Ahmed, 2009, 
Bhatia, 1999, Joinet & Nkini, 1996, Allebeck, 1990). Capacity building initiatives may be 
developed to meet macro-level objectives such as democracy, gender equity, and global 
citizenship (Suleiman, 2013, Humphries, Gomez, & Hartwig, 2011, Witteborn, 2010, Mayoux, 
1993).  NGOs may help to build institutional capacity in developing countries as a means of 
responsive regulation for sustainable development (Braithwaite, 2006).  Likewise, some NGO 
activities have been shown to promote “corporate social responsibility” among businesses, 
prodding them to engage in more locally beneficial behaviours (Ghalib & Agupusi, 2014).    
 
Many of the papers addressing community capacity building suggested that NGOs have 
generally performed well in promoting community participation in several development projects, 
including environmental protection, public health, and land reform (Hoque, Clarke, & Huang, 
2016, Ghimire, 1998, Cincotta, 1994).  Indeed, community participation and hence grassroot 




The participation of communities greatly enhances the social capital of local populations in NGO 
projects’ locations.  Continuing this concern with capacity development, Islam, Siti Hajar, and 
Haris (2013) argue that local participation in designing, managing and evaluating initiatives is a 
key to success.  Pillai and colleagues’ quasi-experimental study found that social capital in 
communities working with the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) in four Latin 
American countries was higher than that of other communities (Pillai, Wei, & Maleku, 2013).  
The authors argue that ADRA projects increased communities’ social capital because they 
promoted the interests and needs of the poorest and stimulated community engagement in 
providing social services through which significant positive socio-economic impacts were 
generated. 
 
In addition, NGOs may pilot care and governance project designs that include sustainable 
development concepts.  For instance, the Bangladeshi Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 
piloted a comprehensive community development model rooted in close partnership agreements 
among several sectors to target the root cause of urban poverty (Chowdhury, Jahan, & Rahman, 
2017, Chowdhury, Alam, & Ahmed, 2006).  In the context of primary health care, the models 
also provide recommendations for public-private partnership agreements in terms of 
supplementing the efforts of the local public health sector (Craplet, 1997), satisfying clients and 
joining government efforts (Donaldson & Cernada, 1992), facilitating access by communities to 
local services  and resources (Enahoro & Nwaobia, 2012, Levin & Kaddar, 2011, Lukaszczyk & 
Williamson, 2010, Kapur, 1996), engaging sectoral partners in coordination (Marozzi, 1998), 
fitting local situations and implementing innovations (Röper, 2000, Vivian, 1994), and enabling 




2.3. Policy advocacy 
Coupled with their direct development work, NGOs also advocate changes to international and 
local policies that relate to models of community organizing, public education, and ideal or 
ethical partnership agreements (Ohemeng, 2015, Ahmed & Potter, 2006).  They may “change the 
policies and practices of governments, corporations and institutions that negatively 
impact…development” (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, pp. 6-7).  During the past few decades, with 
the building of effective international networks and collaboration with top-level policymakers 
(Youde, 2012), NGOs have increasingly targeted global issues.  They seek to represent the 
poor’s voice in advocating poverty-reduction strategies (Thacker, 1997, Ticehurst, 1996, Agbola, 
1994, Bratton, 1990).  They have also advocated successfully for environmental protection and 
education policies (Cook, Wright, & Andersson, 2017, Foo, 2013, Arts & Mack, 2003).  Further, 
they may lobby and provide information to affect governments’ foreign aid policies in other 
countries (Stalling & Kim, 2017).  Novogrodsky (2010) describes the role of NGOs in 
successfully reducing drug prices, thereby facilitating access to life-saving, essential drugs 
among millions of the poorest people in many developing countries.  In particular, NGOs may 
link several sectors in national health research systems strengthening (Palmer, Anya, & Bloch, 
2009), immunization (Poore,1992), HIV/AIDS prevention and care (Rau, 1996), pharmaceutical 
policy (Reich, 1994), and hypertension prevention (Wilson, 2003).  Cook, Wright and Andersson 
(2017) explain that NGOs endeavour to influence governments’ policy development processes 




At a wider level, NGOs’ policy projects promote rights as a basic element of citizenship.  Berlin 
and Berlin (2004) noted that by using the press and the internet to elevate and publicize their 
information campaigns, NGOs and their allies worked collaboratively to raise the autonomy of 
local Indigenous communities in Mexico.  Moreover, the NGO-supported campaigns educated 
the public about their rights to participate in national elections (Chakanika & Chuma, 1999).  
Chapman and Fisher (2000) state that NGOs’ successful human rights promotion results from 
collaborative actions and grassroot participation, and lays foundations for advancing rights on a 
global level.  
 
Ahmed and Potter (2006) note that NGOs successfully influence global political dialogues 
because they have the power to persuade.  This power comes from their capacity to communicate 
influential messages in international negotiations (Dany, 2013) and to build capacity (Banks & 
Hulme, 2012).  The power also results from their reputation in delivering concrete and positive 
outcomes to communities and thus gaining trust and legitimacy as development actors (Youde, 
2012, Haque, 2002).    
 
NGOs may engage in advocacy as one component of a multiple-component project.  For 
example, in Honduras, development policy advocacy by NGOs was part of a comprehensive 
community development program that improved livelihoods and levels of community 
participation (Brehm, 2000). In the Philippines, NGOs advocated for community organizations in 




Despite such advocacy wins, because they may lack carefully positioned and sound arguments 
backed by quality evidence NGOs may not be recognized as official parties to decision-making 
processes (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009).  Some observers have even suggested that NGOs may 
distort data (images and messages) to achieve their objectives, compromising their legitimacy to 
conduct advocacy campaigns (Dany, 2013). As a result, Cumper (1986) notes that NGOs should 
exercise considerable care in crafting policy briefs and statements, ensuring that they rely on 
relevant scientific evidence. 
 
Atkinson and Scurrah (2009, pp. 46-49) used the term “political responsibility” to discuss the 
various stakeholders to whom NGOs are accountable in project implementation.  In the context 
of trans-national NGO advocacy campaigns, they note that the stakeholders include 
beneficiaries, funders, NGO missions, other active groups in the campaigns, and NGOs ‘alliance 
members.  Political responsibility is described as the approach NGOs employ to balance the 
interests, power dynamics among stakeholders, as well as their principles and values when 
involved in transnational advocacy.  Van Tuijl & Jordan (1999) regard political responsibility as 
a way NGOs employ to improve their legitimacy in a global governance landscape.  NGOs may 
play multiple roles with several stakeholders at a time.  For instance, when NGOs receive 
funding and sub-grant to several local partners, they concurrently play the roles of grant 
recipients and donors.  How NGOs balance responding to community needs, meeting donors’ 
requirements, and observing state’s sovereign directions, possibly requires further studies.    
 
In short, NGOs increasingly target numerous global issues, aiming for sustained changes at the 
policy level.  NGO advocacy practices may lead to structural changes in numerous contexts, and 
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through different means.  NGOs’ power to persuade explains the success of NGOs’ advocacy.  
The power results from (1) NGOs’ capacity to communicate and to build capacity, and from (2) 
their reputation in delivering positive outcomes and gaining trust.  NGOs need to rely on relevant 
scientific evidence and establish their legitimacy in order to be considered official parties to 
decision-making.   
   
2.4. “Watchdog” or monitoring role 
The recent move toward global public–private partnerships seldom emphasizes civil society 
partners’ role as watchdogs or critical voices in global-level decision-making (Storeng & 
Puyvallee, 2018).  In this role, NGOs may highlight problems associated with development, 
policy implementation, and compliance with domestic and international agreements and policies 
(Lewis & Kanji, 2009).  For example, NGOs can provide critical insights to governments 
regarding their performance, particularly in addressing poverty and vulnerability (Lewis & 
Opoku-Mensah, 2006).  In Vietnam, foreign NGOs are members of a Consultative Group that 
helps strategize the country’s development (Stallings & Kim, 2017).  The donor-government 
consultative machinery plays its role of harmonization among donors and supporting Vietnam’s 
institutional reforms through its biannual meetings (Bartholomew & Lister, 2005).  The meetings 
“provide a forum for discussions between the Government of Viet Nam and its development 
partners on economic policy issues, strategies for reducing poverty, and ODA effectiveness” 
(Government of Vietnam, 2013). In addition, NGOs play the role of environmental protection 
watchdogs globally by virtue of their ability to catalyze, propose and realize changes 




NGOs also keep governments accountable to their constituent communities.  For example, they 
have documented monitoring public water supply projects in the Philippines (Asian Forum of 
Parliamentarians on Population and Development, 1997).  In Africa, the African Population 
group (1995) noted the significant involvement of NGOs in conceptualizing, developing, and 
monitoring population policies and programs.  Likewise, Sethi and Rovenpor (2016) reported 
that NGOs monitored private companies’ compliance with locally regulated minimum wages and 
working conditions. 
 
According to Mitchell (2015), NGOs plays the monitoring role because they want to ensure the 
transparency of their work.  Mitchell (2015) argues that when transparency is not maintained, 
NGOs must consume more resources to deal with unclear or overlapping policy-related matters, 
and hence compromising their cost-effectiveness and future potential funding opportunities.  
Mitchell’s (2015) concern with transparency is driven by a question of spending.  
   
2.5. Global health research role 
NGO engagement in research may benefit decision-makers, scholars, and communities.  They 
may be knowledge creators as well as knowledge brokers insofar as they translate scientific and 
technical information generated by academic and government researchers into terms 
understandable to decision-makers, the media, and the public (Mabawonku, 2001).  Thanks to 
their expertise in stewardship (e.g., promoting and advocating research) and resource 
mobilization (e.g., building trans-disciplinary teams) (Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 2005), 
NGOs may produce evidence-based recommendations or initiatives for new or amended laws, 




However, “perceptive constraint” is among the main challenges related to NGOs’ involvement in 
global health research (Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 2005).   NGOs consider themselves 
unfamiliar with how a research is conducted.  For example, a traditional view of research might 
suggest that it is academic, top-down, and non-participative, which may be perceived to run 
against NGOs’ values and commitment to communities. The lack of strong research mandates in 
a NGO’s mission may make some NGOs reluctant to engage in research, at least in a major, 
visible way.  These perceptive constraints also come from donors.  Many donors also do not 
regard NGOs as research institutions, and will often proscribe using funds for research purposes 
unrelated to program evaluation (Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 2005). 
 
The quality of NGO-led research has also been called into question (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009).  
Because much of NGO-conducted research is linked to assessing operations or evaluating local 
programs, it may not meet global standards for academic rigor (Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 
2005).  Also, some NGOs lack the strong links with universities and research institutions that 
would enable them to access and work with academic colleagues in publishing peer-reviewed 
research reports (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016).  And those links, if they exist, may not be strong 
and established through firm, long-term agreements.  
 
Olivier, Hunt, and Ridde (2016) have advanced a framework for building effective NGO-
researcher partnerships characterized by trust, transparency, respect, solidarity, and mutuality.  
According to their framework, increased frequency of contact between NGOs and research 
institutions, enhancing the quality of two-way communications, and the development of formal 
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partnership agreements can be practical and useful for mitigating challenges and conflicts in 
academic-NGO relationships.  Further, periodic evaluations of the partnerships should use 
structural indicators (e.g., the number and characteristics of links) and process indicators (e.g., 
learning, trust, fairness, legitimacy, and power) to improve partnership performance.  However, 
how these values and indicators might be practically and effectively measured remains unclear.   
 
2.6. Essential elements of government-NGO partnerships in developing countries 
Government-NGO partnerships cannot work without trust and accountability.  Batley (2006) 
notes that factors influential to government-NGO trust include clearly-defined service standards 
and bilaterally respected policy dialogues.  These attributes ensure that NGOs have equal, 
independent roles in state-NGO ventures within the frame of a service contract signed between 
the state as donor and the NGOs as service providers.  In contrast, mistrust between governments 
and NGOs often exists in government-NGO partnerships due to discrepancies between generally 
supportive policies and unsupportive, repressive practices.   
 
Durable public-private partnerships (including NGOs) also require that partners share 
responsibilities and risks among themselves.  For instance, Solana (2014) recommends that risks 
be mitigated by a most capable party, and responsibilities should be implemented by a most 
potent partner.  Bustreo, Harding, and Axelsson (2003) argue that duty clarifications facilitate 
smooth service delivery.  A partnership agreement with clear terms and conditions, alongside 
effective methods and clear responsibilities to bridge discrepancies, supports long-term 




Partnerships also need member commitment and willingness.  For instance, in a Bangladeshi 
community development project, the partners were committed to strategizing interventions to 
improve population health (Ahmed, 1999).  Brinkerhoff (1995) notes that strong commitment to 
cross-sectoral development practices leads to sustainable natural resource management.  In 
addition, Paudel (2013) stresses the significance of governments’ willingness in partnerships.  
Strengthening state-NGO relationships necessitates stakeholder commitment to assigned tasks, 
shared roles, shared goals, and monitored processes, to ensure goal achievements.   
 
Healthy government-NGO partnerships require meaningful engagements in policy development 
(Chapuis, Flower, Wirz, et. al., 2000).  However, Hannah (2007) was concerned that NGOs still 
struggled for a formal space when they advocated policy changes in developing countries.  This 
meant that the NGOs could not have meaningful positions in the policy sphere, probably due to 
different perspectives, goals, policy development processes, and proposed outcomes between the 
governments and the NGOs.  Healthy government-NGO partnerships remained unachieved.   
   
Several factors influence government-NGO partnerships in developing countries (McLoughlin, 
2011, Roka &Fernando, 2013).  Haque (2002) evaluated local and global factors influencing 
government-NGO relations. Local factors (increased memberships, strengthened images, 
enhanced government recognition) contribute to NGO growth in a country’s development.  
Global factors include (1) an emerging neoliberal ideology, which de-emphasizes state roles and 
stresses non-state actor roles; (2) NGOs’ development alternatives, which attract donors’ funding 
and donors’ support to engage in a country’s development agenda; (3) trans-national NGO 
alliances, which offer media access, technical expertise, and financial resources to local 
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advocacy projects; and (4) donors, who may favour financing through NGOs in developing 
countries.   
 
2.7. Influences internal and external to NGO operations 
Current literature thoroughly debates and sketches out NGO practices in international politics 
and global governance.  However, the debates and sketches do not explain how NGOs wield 
power and influence while occupying a middle ground governance position.  In addition, the 
current literature occasionally makes reference to the effects of social and political uncertainty 
on NGO operations.  Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan (2012) and MacPhail (2010) state that the 
uncertainty may shape both NGO strategies as well as prospects for long term survival.   
 
Serpell (2014) notes that uncertainty has three related terms: ambiguity, difficulty, and 
indeterminacy, and may refer to either the object or the cognitive state of the observer.   
Uncertainty refers to what has not definitely been known.  Serpell (2014, pp. 9) emphasizes gaps 
in current knowledge about “the object”.  Han, Klein, and Arora (2011, pp. 830) mention “a 
subjective consciousness or awareness of one’s lack of knowledge, without which one could not 
feel uncertain”.  When applying these understandings in the NGO landscape, uncertainty is about 
the ambiguity or challenges to the several aspects of NGO operations, or unclear steps forward in 
their operations and strategies, in the perception of the NGOs’ staff as well as the stakeholders 
(e.g., governments, community groups, donors).  Knowing the unknown becomes part of 




The concept of uncertainty has recently been used during economic and political upheavals and 
public health emergencies to describe conditions that require the adoption of flexible solutions 
when scientific foundations are unclear (MacPhail, 2010). However, the use of this concept in 
international development is limited.  Watkins and colleagues (2012) offer various descriptions 
of uncertainty (vague, unpredictable, ambiguous, ineffective, unrealizable, unrealistic, and 
unknown), and state that uncertainties appear in NGO goals, delivery methods, and operating 
environment.  More practically, MacPhail (2010) addresses the “ubiquitous” (pp. 58) nature of 
uncertainty in global health, where information gaps exist in particular areas, and when solutions 
are needed to bridge these knowledge gaps.   Both Watkins and colleagues (2012) and MacPhail 
(2010) admit that many of today’s pressing policy issues require confronting unknown and 
unknowable gaps, with choices being made only with difficulty, if at all, in the face of scarce or 
uncertain information.  
 
Cooper and Pratten (2015) note that uncertainty relates to social ties, and cannot stand as an 
outside, external factor.  Picturing an African setting of poverty, oppression, violence, and pain, 
that cause uncertainty, Cooper and Pratten (2015) argue that how people think of and act against 
those uncertainties are important.  Everyday life embraces risks and unpredictability that 
generate instability and incoherence.  Several concepts are used to express uncertainty (e.g. 
insecurity, ambiguity, risk, indeterminacy, confusion, doubtfulness); all express feelings that the 
authors call a component of “lived experience”.  These feelings, on one side, refer to a lack of 
knowledge or inability of predict the outcomes of an event.  However, these feelings can also 
represent a positive source for negotiating insecurity, creating relationships, and imagining the 




Uncertainty is a product of social and environmental contingencies.  Whyte and Siu (2015) note 
that uncertainty arises when we lack protection from danger, or when our arrangements are too 
weak to support us.  In response to these conditions, we tend to apply tactics to make things more 
secure.  Whyte and Siu (2015) also suggest using the concept of “contingencies”.  An event 
exists depending on several people, institutions, resources, or circumstances, each with different 
values. Cooper (2015, pp. 55) discusses child sponsorship of a NGO operating in Kenya, where 
reliance on luck and chance of being sponsored among local children represents their 
powerlessness to engage in decision making, and populations have to learn to accept this 
disappointment without protest.  In this story, whether a child is sponsored is contingent on 
several other factors (such as sponsors’ requirements, the NGO’s screening criteria) over which 
they cannot control.  The children cannot apply any tactics to secure sponsorship; they had to 
rely on luck and chance.   Sometimes, we cannot control those contingencies, and this failure 
makes the occurrence of events contingent on other things.     
 
Kim and Lee (2018) examine uncertainty in medical practices in South Korea.  The medical 
uncertainty that they address results from two sources.  First, medical practitioners do not have 
adequate or complete scientific knowledge or data in their practices. This may be considered 
probability or risk in Samimidan-Darash’s (2016) study, as medical practitioners may not have 
confidence in providing a treatment for patients.  How to apply classroom knowledge to a real 
patient may be difficult.  Second, doctor-patient relations may be characterized by uncertainty 
because the doctors have to achieve a balance between “good science” and their patients’ 
interests.  Unfortunately, Kim and Lee (2018) note that medical uncertainty has not been 
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acknowledged in medical education and practice.  This intolerance generates stress among 
medical practitioners and represents a threat to patient safety.  The first step toward addressing 
medical uncertainty is therefore to create an environment that acknowledges it.           
 
Han, Klein, and Arora (2011) identify three sources of uncertainty in health care: probability, 
ambiguity and complexity. These three sources are represented by specific percentages of being 
able to successfully address a health problem.  However, how to apply these percentages to a 
specific individual is not clear.  For example, when an individual has a 20% probability of 
benefitting from a treatment, this represents an indeterminate outcome.  There are also likely to 
be different opinions among experts regarding the health issue, so the treatment course is less 
than clear.  This uncertainty influences several dimensions of health care, ranging from disease-
based issues (diagnosis) to person-centered issues (well-being). Han and colleagues conclude 
that this uncertainty in healthcare needs further examination in order “to understand more 
precisely what coping with uncertainty entails and how it can be promoted (Han, Klein, & Arora, 
2011, pp. 836).      
 
Zeiderman, Kaker, Silver, and Wood (2015) conducted case studies of several urban areas in the 
global South, and discovered that uncertainty is a theme that cuts across urban living, from civil 
lives to city design and governance.  The scholars note that, “when solutions to uncertainty are 
found, there is hardly ever a final resolution or fixed point of closure… and uncertainty is rarely, 
if ever, eradicated from the urban milieu; rather, it is managed, displaced, deferred, reconfigured, 
or reproduced” (pp. 299).  In this sense, uncertainty is generated continuously from actual field-
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based conditions, it generates demands for solutions, which, in turn, give rise to new 
uncertainties.   
 
Samimidan-Darash (2016) separates uncertainty from risk.  Risk refers to incidents to which 
probabilities can be assigned.  Samimidan-Darash (2013, pp. 3) also regards “possible 
uncertainty” as risk, in a sense that the risk can be mitigated through actions associated with 
knowledge available around the concerned risks. Risk control, therefore, engages measures (e.g., 
insurance) that convert obstacles to possibilities.  In contrast, uncertainty refers to events with 
unknown, non-measurable risks.  Uncertainty is not only about an unknown future, it may also 
be generated through the actual practices in real live (Samimidan-Darash, 2013, Zeiderman, 
Kaker, Silver, & Wood, 2015).  That is, new problems may arise from the events for which 
systems need to prepare.  Samimidan-Darash (2013) notes that “uncertainty denotes the opening 
for a variety of possibilities, such that no single possibility constitutes an answer for the question 
it poses”.  Governing uncertainty, therefore, requires preparedness, and “the rationality of 
preparedness addresses a seemingly inevitable future disaster that can only be managed once it 
happens” (Samimidan-Darash, 2016, pp. 362).  The concept of preparedness is also used by 
Zeiderman, Kaker, Silver, and Wood (2015) to mean resilience or sustainability in uncertain 
situations.   
 
In short, uncertainty refers to current vague and unpredictable knowledge about “the object”.  At 
times, uncertainty arises when we lack protection from dangerous life events, or when our 
arrangements are too weak to support us.  Uncertainty generates demands for solutions, which, in 
turn, give rise to new uncertainties.  The following paragraphs examine the operations of NGO 
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sector, with influencing factors vague and unpredictable in both their own operations and their 
working environment.  We will see that although NGOs’ leaders devise many ways to survive 
and to implement their projects, several dilemmas and problems arise. 
 
Uncertainty can be seen in NGO struggles to fulfil their mission across time and space.  Those 
struggles originate from forces both internal and external to NGO operations, and shape their 
strategies and survival.  Internal factors are comprised of factors or processes within NGOs that 
impact the success of their operations, such as project design and implementation.  To some 
degree, NGOs have control over these factors.  In contrast, external influences may constrain 
NGO’s abilities to achieve their goals and objectives.  These factors may range from resources 
available for project delivery to social and political conditions that constrain or skew NGO 
operations.  These are factors that are typically outside the control of NGOs. 
 
NGOs use several ways to overcome those internal and external factors.  For internal factors over 
which NGOs may have some control, they may, for instance, adjust their program designs and 
methods of program implementation.  However, the success of those adjustments heavily 
depends on several other factors, such as funding availability, community participation, and 
governments’ policies.  In contrast, for external factors (resources availability, local social and 
political conditions), although NGOs cannot control these, they can use their capacity to 
influence stakeholders and advocate for changes.  However, whether NGOs succeed in 
influencing stakeholders and advocating for changes may require good program designs and 
effective program implementation.  The above uncertain conditions, and their inter-relations, 




2.7.1. Definitional uncertainty 
There are no agreed upon definitions of NGOs and this may represent one significant 
uncertainty.  According to Ahmed and Potter (2006), Watkins and colleagues (2012), and 
Anheier and Salomon (1998), the many ways of defining what constitutes a NGO may challenge 
local authorities because they may not effectively manage the several NGOs operating in their 
regions, and may, as a result, impose obstacles to NGO operations or undermine NGO 
engagements in society.  Also, scholars and practitioners may not properly evaluate or research 
NGO operations because of mistakes in selecting NGOs for their evaluation or research projects.   
 
The study of NGOs crosses borders and disciplines.  Ahmed and Potter (2006) offer three 
different lenses with which to view NGOs. From a public administration angle, NGOs may be 
considered charity, non-profit organizations.  They may represent public interest groups if 
viewed as a dimension of social movements.  From a technical point of view, NGOs may be seen 
simply as technical advisors or service providers.   
 
Ahmed and Potter (2006) write that few studies have viewed NGOs in the context of mainstream 
international relations. They highlight two international relations theories that may explain the 
establishment, operation and development of NGOs. First, the theory of transnationalism views 
NGOs as part of larger transnational networks that include many not-state actors, including 
transnational corporations, epistemic communities of scientists and technical specialists, and 
ethnic diasporas.  NGOs may form networks or coalitions across the borders independent of 
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governments in order to target the global issues in their own way and based on their own 
interests or values.  
 
Second, the theoretical perspective of constructivism suggests that organizational identities, 
interests and roles are all socially constructed.  The interactions between governments and other 
social actors underlie the development of international systems, and these in turn influence how 
states and actors define each other’s roles. In this sense, NGOs enjoy power and their capacity to 
influence through communication media.  NGOs often undertake public education, policy 
advocacy, community empowerment, network building, and monitoring of international 
agreements. Through these activities, NGOs are able to create a shared understanding of their 
roles and functions with the key stakeholders. However, because NGOs are subordinate to 
governments’ sovereignty, states’ prejudice on NGOs’ operations remains. 
 
However, despite NGOs’ rapid proliferation and diversification over the last three decades, they 
remain poorly understood as social and institutional entities (Bernard & Grewal, 2014).  NGOs’ 
technical expertise, their operational contexts, their work disciplines and approaches, their 
communicative influence and power, have been analyzed from different perspectives and not 
without criticism and controversy.  Although poorly understood, NGOs’ influence may 
sometimes be overstated.  For instance, D'Errico, Wake, & Wake (2010) found that the “Heal 
Africa” model in the Eastern Congo might greatly contribute to local emergency health care 
services, and might be an important component of a peace-keeping mission.  However, the 
ability of this kind of organization to resolve or prevent conflict should not be overstated.  The 
authors argue that NGO roles in conflict prevention and reconstruction are often limited.  
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Overstating the power and influence of NGOs may lead to unrealistic expectations among the 
communities where they operate. 
 
2.7.2. Unclear legitimacy and accountability 
Some NGOs may claim that they directly represent disadvantaged people because of their 
commitment to delivering essential services, policy advocacy on behalf of communities, and 
provision of technical expertise to address problems.  However, Hudson (2001) argues that the 
accountability for their citizens and the authority to mobilize resources for populations’ well-
being, in this case, falls under governments.  Sovereignties do not generally allow for any 
substitutions of their authority, intention, and trust.  In contrast, Atkinson and Scurrah (2009) 
argue that NGOs do indeed have legitimacy outside of the government sphere because they 
contribute significantly to democratic debates and actively promote globally-accepted 
fundamental values (human rights principles).   
 
Legitimacy is, of course, a socially-constructed value (Hudson, 2001).  NGOs interact among 
themselves, with states, donors, and other actors in the international relations landscape.  Each of 
the stakeholders may change their views on NGOs as a category, and on individual NGOs, 
depending the state of their relationships, and this change may affect their expectations on NGO 
roles.  Therefore, Hudson (2001) suggests that NGOs gain legitimacy by having their values 
audited by stakeholders.  For example, NGOs may build creditability and increase transparency 




Institutions need to be accountable to multiple stakeholders.  One important area of 
accountability is to donors.  Governments account for decisions and laws that affect their citizens 
and residents as tax payers.  Those governments not elected through democratic processes still 
have sovereignty according to the United Nations.  Companies are generally responsible to their 
shareholders.  In this sense, NGOs are accountable to their funding agencies, which means 
upward accountability (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009).  Thus, NGOs maintain trust and good-will 
among donors to ensure funds.   
 
NGOs are also accountable to the people they intend to help.  Fox (2000) argues that this level of 
accountability is particularly weak.  High reliance on funds moves NGOs away from this kind of 
“downward” accountability.  Yet this focus on community is often articulated in their mission, 
vision, and value statements. If NGOs are to be loyal to their mission and vision, they must 
enhance downward accountability through committing to their mission and vision, ensuring that 
their values (participation, empowerment, sustainability) are reflected in programs and 
interventions that they deliver, social auditing and participatory budgeting, because these 
mechanisms allow for stakeholder participation in financing and operational assessments 
(Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, Clark, 2001).   
 
Rigotto (2009) questioned NGOs’ “real” accountability in Brazil when the NGOs there identified 
industry-associated risks in industrial zones, but undertook no social or political actions to 
mediate them.  Several behind-the-scenes factors likely inhibited NGOs from taking such 
actions, for example, availability of funding, expertise, and a hostile political climate (Rigotto, 
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2009).  If NGOs are an arm of corporate or industrial groups their missions then represent the 
interests of these groups, rather than grassroot communities.  
 
The above paragraphs reported on the various publics and stakeholders (donors, states, grassroot 
communities) to whom NGOs are accountable.  Those groups may have quite different and even 
competing interests.  NGOs themselves also have their own capacity to serve those groups, and 
their own missions, visions, and regulations to obey.  How to balance the various interests and 
values, and educate the stakeholders about NGOs’ roles, seems to have the potential to contribute 
to NGO uncertainty and overall functioning.    
 
2.7.3. Vague strategic plans 
The mission and vision statements of development-oriented NGOs often embrace principles of 
community empowerment, program sustainability and citizen participation.  However, in 
practice these principles might be applied differently by various NGOs (Watkins, Swidler, & 
Hannan, 2012, Kuhl, 2009).  In addition, funding agencies might sometimes impose their own 
understanding of these principles (Swidler & Watkins, 2009).   
 
Gilson and colleagues (1994) note that the idealistic principles of NGOs may be compromised in 
a context of resource constraints.  For instance, they may become for-profit health service 
providers and may not observe or adhere to their foundational humanitarian principles (Gilson, et 
al., 1994).  Also, NGOs may cease coordinating activities with governments, thereby leading to 




Complicating things further, NGOs may sub-contract with intermediary organizations to 
implement and evaluate activities.  These intermediary organizations likely have their own 
objectives, and this may affect the way that local activities are conducted (Watkins, Swidler, & 
Hannan, 2012), particularly in cases where NGOs depend on these organizations to deliver 
contracted services in geographically isolated or culturally different communities. NGO 
performance, as well as judgments of it, can be skewed by the behaviour of subcontracted 
organizations. 
 
Problems may emerge in NGO planning and prioritization.  Galway, Corbett and Zeng (2012) 
are concerned about the disjuncture between community health needs as identified by morbidity 
and mortality indicators and the distribution of NGOs.  For example, this study found no 
statistically meaningful association between NGO activities and populations’ general needs or 
health-specific needs, and between municipal poverty levels and NGO activities in Bolivia.  
Therefore, the study concluded that the NGO sector did not target the poorest and neediest 
regions or populations within a nation.  In a study of NGOs in Papua New Guinea, Holdsworth 
and Winkley (1990) discussed how organizations prioritized projects in populous locations rather 
than in scarcely-populated, distantly-placed islands.  NGOs considered their capacity in 
delivering project activities in, and the accessibility to remote, less-populated areas, versus the 
potential and the appreciation to serve the higher number of beneficiaries more easily in more 
densely-populated areas.  The authors concluded that although NGOs need to be flexible in 
implementing projects, they should also be careful to ensure geographic coverage.  
 
2.7.4. Financial insecurity 
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Material incentives firmly shape NGO behaviours and strategies.  Cooley and Ron (2002) show 
that donor funding is largely disbursed through private groups and NGO agreements.  Grants are 
often short-term and renewable only upon satisfactory assessment of an initial phase of activity.  
The assessments set strict conditions for competitive grant bidding among NGOs, targeting 
waste, effectiveness, and quality (Kamat, 2003).  NGO funding is always subject to these kinds 
of performance assessments.  
 
How NGOs in low-middle income countries react to donors when they shift funding priorities 
has been questioned.  Arhin, Kumi and Adam (2018) analysed qualitative data from 65 in-depth 
interviews with Ghanaian NGOs and learned that NGOs used several tactics to survive fiscal 
uncertainty.  These tactics include what they term: (1) putting “eggs-in-multiple-baskets” when 
organizations diversify sources of income, (2) cost-cutting, which means that organizations 
decrease expenses on administration and on other indirect costs as a way to demonstrate an 
efficient use of resources, (3) credibility-building, which requires special focus on systematic 
improvements in order to generate trust-worthy images to donors and supporters, and (4) 
visibility-enhancing, when NGOs apply measures to visualized their outcomes to donors and 
supporters.     
 
NGOs may change their behaviours to fit the funding environments.  For example, NGOs added 
some departments, which may normally exist in business-oriented enterprises, in their structures 
(public relations, fund raising, internal audits, accounting) (Cooley & Ron, 2002).  NGOs in 
India, in response to external pressures, shifted their concentration from broad-based 
consciousness raising, social change and political organizing, to individual-based capacity 
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building and skills training (Kamat, 2003).  In addition, the concepts of empowerment and 
participation changed from broad-based political education and community organization to 
technical assessment of need- and competency-based social and economic contributions (Kamat, 
2003).  Kamat (2003) warns that the shift to managerial and technical approaches may generally 
disconnect NGOs from the political capability to change society.  In contexts where government-
NGO relations do not support the NGOs’ operations, the lack of political capability may enable 
the NGOs to operate more freely.  However, the disconnect cannot support the fulfilment of 
NGOs’ missions and visions of transforming the lives of or generating lasting impacts for 
vulnerable populations.   
 
NGOs may satisfy their grant-awarding agencies by not reporting something.  For example, 
donors may, at times, not coordinate activities among themselves, leading to program duplication 
and overlap, and hence waste of already-scarce resources (Cooley & Ron, 2002).  However, 
NGOs might not dare to publicize such a problem because they are afraid of dissatisfying donors 
and losing funding (Cooley & Ron, 2002).   
 
Donor expectations have been shown to drive project objectives, project timeline, and 
implementation processes (Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006).  Biermann and colleagues (2016) 
argue that NGO projects are often unsustainable over the long term because of the short-term 
nature of funding coupled with changing funding priorities. Narrowness of funding objectives is 
also an issue. For example, in medical aid NGOs, dependence on foreign short-term, medically-
focused, single-objective funds may result in programs that offer few preventive measures, lack 
of educational instruction of local providers, and create risks for adverse outcomes (Berry, 2014).  
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Of course, NGOs may simply prioritize organizational survival at any cost at the expense of 
community needs.   
 
2.7.5. Local conditions  
Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan (2012) noted that after being recruited, staff may be found to be 
dishonest or unable to provide satisfactory performance. Additionally, as happening in many 
other organizations, miscommunication or corruption might occur.  In addition, project progress 
and quality may be influenced by physical challenges such as long geographic distance, 
transportation and communication difficulties, and natural and man-made disasters.  Benton 
(2016) examined the everyday practices of global health NGOs in Africa (expatriate staff 
recruitment, local staff’s reception and expectations), and reported a racialized assessment of 
expatriates in terms of their expertise, mobility and professional success.  Watkins, Swidler, & 
Hannan (2012) are concerned that NGOs may sometimes contract a third-party intermediator to 
implement several activities in local project sites.   In this case, Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan 
(2012) comment that these local conditions may be exacerbated when information is filtered 
through third-party intermediaries, who may bias or restrict access to important information.  
   
Normally, volunteers are considered a vital part of NGO operations because they contribute 
valuable time, technical capacity, money, and energy at little-to-no cost.  Examining this issue 
through the lens of social capital, Jaskyte (2017) argues that the relationship between non-profit 
organizations and volunteers is mutually beneficial.  If NGOs cannot provide the benefits that are 
expected by volunteers, or if volunteers cannot perform the activities that are required by NGOs, 





To summarize, this analysis of the current literature raises a number of questions that require 
further research and analysis.  The first has to do with how NGOs operate under the general 
umbrella of public-private partnerships. In many ways they occupy a middle-ground between the 
public not-for-profit and the private for-profit sectors, yet the inherent tensions and conflicts that 
may characterize this position are not well understood, particularly in contexts where NGOs are 
responsible for delivering critical services at the community level.  While NGOs may endeavour 
to balance the interests of various stakeholders, a question arises as to how NGOs function when 
this balance is not achieved or is unachievable.  Addressing this question may provide a fuller 
picture of how NGOs function in governance contexts.   
 
Secondly, the relationship between NGOs and government requires further examination.  It 
remains unclear how NGOs negotiate the scope of their activities with governments, who may 
not necessarily prioritize community level needs, especially those of communities that are poor 
or marginal and hence lack political power.  Also, how NGOs manage the political risks inherent 
in monitoring governments’ policy implementation has not been fully examined.  Research 
documenting the nuances of these potentially fraught relationships, especially if it includes a 
focus on wider structures, politics, and socio-economical contexts, would help us understand 
NGOs’ governance roles, as these are potentially shaped by the wider environment (Wadham & 
Warren, 2014).   
   
40 
 
Third, further research is needed as to how NGOs are able to survive over time and continue 
their program commitments at the community level in contexts characterized by funding 
uncertainties. In addition, evidence of the correlation of funding and program efforts within 
countries and regions may be needed in order to fully ascertain the effectiveness of NGOs’ 
projects.  Clarifying these issues may facilitate the assignment of better and more effective roles 
for NGOs in advancing equitable global development.  
 
Fourth, NGOs’ advocacy in support of global development goals, while promising, requires 
careful assessment and evaluation.  NGOs’ power to persuade and engage in social or policy 
change has not fully been explored.  It is also not clear how NGOs can promote and commit to 
long-term goals given what is typically unstable or changeable funding.  The roles that NGOs 
can or should play in global governance could be better supported or promoted if these areas can 
be clarified.  This is especially important because NGOs often lack management capacity to 
assume a strong position in official policy processes, actions that build NGOs’ management 
capacity are either not well-understood or only vaguely described.  Further work remains to be 
done in this area.   
 
Finally, factors internal and external to NGO operations do not stand separately.  They, instead, 
interact with each other to complicate NGO operations, particularly under unpredictable 
circumstances  However, NGOs still act to survive.  Unfortunately, the literature has not 




The attainment of sustainable development goals demands effective coordination of multiple 
stakeholders, including NGOs, and requires engagement with global institutions at many levels. 
For example, foreign NGOs are key players in the UN as well as other intergovernmental 
organizations.  This engagement highlights the potential of NGOs to help secure commitments to 
and achievement of sustainable development goals.  However, to better understand and support 
this potential, we require a fuller evaluation of how NGOs balance multiple interests in various 
social, political, and economic contexts while at the same time dealing with the vagaries of a 
constantly changing funding landscape. The literature also indicates that little attention has been 
given to understanding how NGOs wield power and influence in the complex arena of global 
governance.  Assessments that focus on the questions we have posed here may offer a path 
forward for maximizing the effects that NGOs and their partner organizations might have in 




CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH SETTING 
Vietnam declared its independence from France in 1945. Secours Populaire Francais seems to 
have been the very first NGO to land in Vietnam, in 1948 (Dang, 2009).  Only limited 
information exists on NGO operations between 1945 and 1954.  The end of the French 
Resistance War in 1954 marked the country’s separation: the north became the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, and the south became the Republic of Vietnam.  During the period of 1954 
to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, 60 foreign NGOs operated in south Vietnam, including 
Care International, Catholic Relief Services, and the International Rescue Committee, mainly 
providing relief activities to communities and immigrants from the north (Dang, 2009).  When 
the Vietnam War ended in 1975, Vietnam became a communist country with a centralized 
economy and with closer diplomatic and economic relationships with Soviet Union and 
communist block.  The political atmosphere and regulations did not allow foreign, western style 
NGOs to operate in the country.  Foreign NGOs therefore terminated their activities and 
withdrew from the country.  The period between 1975 and the period of economic reform that 
began in 1986 is marked by just a few intermittent and modest humanitarian actions.  Both the 
political control of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the economic embargo of the United 
States Government prevented non-profit relief activities.   
 
The 1986 Open-Door policy passed by the Communist Party of Vietnam reformed Vietnam’s 
economy and transformed the country from one of the world’s poorest into a lower middle-
income country (LMIC) with a GDP per capita of US$1,260 in 2011 (World Bank, 2013).  The 
higher macroeconomic status of Vietnam in the 1980s gave the country an enviable record for 
economic and infrastructure development among World Bank borrowers on one hand, but on the 
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other hand, challenged the country in terms of competitively attracting international development 
funds.  For instance, the Danish development agency (DANIDA) stopped prioritizing Vietnam in 
2018, as did the UK (Department For international Development) in 2017. Several other donors 
reduced or changed the scope of their programs. The EU and Australia have continued their 
support of Vietnam but shifted their focus to gender issues and women’s rights.  Many in the 
non-profit sector, including foreign NGOs, faced budget shortfalls.  For instance, one foreign 
NGO found their budget cut from US $20-21 million dollars in the 2012-2013 fiscal year to US 
$17-18 million currently. Foreign NGOs became seriously concerned about their levels of 
funding when Vietnam was removed from donors’ priority lists. 
 
The 1986 Open-Door policy allowed for the first time the engagement of many foreign 
organizations in the country’s development.  This policy was especially meaningful to the 
country in the context of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and several Eastern European 
countries.  Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE) landed in 
Vietnam in October 1988, followed by several other foreign NGOs.  Today, around a thousand 
foreign NGOs operate across geographic locations, and across several sectors, ranging from care 
of the aged to climate change mitigation, contributing approximate US$300 million annually to 
the country’s development (Vietnam Union for Friendship Organizations (VUFO), 2017).   
 
According to Decree No. 12/2012/ND-CP which specifies the registration and management of 
activities of NGOs in Vietnam, foreign NGOs are organizations or foundations that are 
established under foreign laws and that carry out development assistance and humanitarian aid 
activities not for profit or other purposes in Vietnam (Government of Vietnam, 2012).  The 
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Government of Vietnam issues a foreign NGO Operations Certificate of Registration, Project 
Office Certificate of Registration, or Representative Office Certificate of Registration, depending 
on how the NGO establishes their operations in the country.  This means that a foreign NGO in 
Vietnam is sponsored by another NGO (that is based overseas) to implement activities in 
Vietnam.    
 
Increasing numbers of NGOs have registered their operations in Vietnam (VUFO, 2017, Dang, 
2009).  Figure 1 shows a sharp increase in the total number of foreign NGOs officially registered 
during the period 2006-2017; the number of registered NGOs nearly doubles in more than 10 
years.  In absolute terms, over 500 new NGOs registered to operate in Vietnam during the period 
from 2006-2017.  This graph, however, does not show the currently active, function NGOs that 
are delivering projects.  The NGO Resource Center (2018) lists 151 active NGOs up to August 
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Figure 1:  NGO registrations in Vietnam during 2006-
2017 
Source: VUFO (2017), Dang (2009)
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NGO projects are scattered across sectors in Vietnam (VUFO, 2017).  The following pie chart 
(Figure 2) shows that one-third of NGO funds support the health care sector, and this figure 
doubles for assistance for economic development.  The health and social sectors together account 
for more than half of total NGO funding for Vietnam.  Other sectors receiving NGO aid include 
environmental and natural resources (11%), education and training (9%), organizational support 




In addition, NGO activities are scattered across geographic locations of the country (Figure 3), 
with each region generally accounting for 10-17% of NGO funds (VUFO, 2017).  While the Red 
River Delta and North Central provinces receive more NGO funds than other areas, the central 









Figure 2:  NGO disbursements by sector in Vietnam during 2006-
2017




































Figure 5: NGO financial figure relative to other financial resources in Vietnam during 
2006-2012 




NGO funding represents a portion of the flow of international investment into Vietnam.  
According to UN Agencies in Vietnam, the Delegation of the EU to Vietnam, and MPI of 
Vietnam (2014), Vietnamese development is financed mainly by the public sector (public 
revenue, government borrowing, Official Development Assistance (ODA)) and non-public sector 
(lending by the banking sector, foreign direct investment, foreign NGOs, and remittances from 
overseas Vietnamese).  Figure 5 shows that budget revenues constitute the most important 
financial source of development funding, followed by domestic private investments (UN 
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Agencies in Vietnam, the Delegation of the EU to Vietnam, & MPI of Vietnam, 2014).  Foreign 
NGOs contribute less than other sources.   
 
Figure 6 shows NGO assistance in Vietnam during the most recent ten years available (VUFO, 
2017).  Assistance fluctuates between US$ 250 and US$ 300 million per year.  In absolute terms, 
NGOs supported Vietnam with US$ 2.846 billion during 2006-2017.  This amount was more 
than double the total public income of a coastal province in central Vietnam for 2017 (according 
to official figures in the Decision 166/QD-UBND issued on February 23, 2017).  This means that 
although NGO assistance is modest compared to that of other development sources, their 
collective contributions may be substantial, particularly if used effectively.     
 
 
In addition to these financial impacts, foreign NGOs also bring to Vietnam human resources.  
Expatriate professionals occupy one-fourth of total NGO personnel (Institute for Studies of 
Society, Economy and Environment (ISSEE), 2010).  In addition, one out of five expatriate 
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Figure 6:  NGO financial disbursements in Vietnam by 
year during 2007-2016
Unit: US$ million - Source: VUFO (2017)
49 
 
department heads) (Institute for Labour Sciences and Society (ILSS), 2015).  The expatriate staff 
generally practices facilitative leadership skills in their careers of management and 
organizational development.  For long, Vietnam has lacked access to knowledge and skills in 
effective management and organizational development.  Therefore, this expertise has been 
significant to Vietnam’s social development, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s (ILSS, 
2015).        
 
Foreign NGOs largely deliver projects through technical support and capacity building, in fact,  
60% of NGOs consider technical support and capacity building their most significant strategy in 
Vietnam (ISSEE, 2010).  For example, several NGOs joined a technical consultative group to 
share experience in building social work with the Government of Vietnam.  Foreign NGOs also 
offer advice on various development matters in Vietnam, including ethnic minority issues, social 
protection programs, resilience in the context of climate change, gender equity, and HIV 
prevention (ISSEE, 2010).  When NGO projects end, the assumption is that this technical know-
how will remain with the local people.  However, whether the knowledge and techniques are 
relevant and specific to Vietnam context, and whether the application of those knowledge takes 
place, remain unclear.  
 
NGO operations may engage government policies, and even provide feedback to government 
when gaps are found to exist between policy development and on-the-ground implementation.  
For instance, in the past, when policies prevented projects from happening, or when government 
departments did not effectively coordinate policy enforcement, NGOs have taken the initiative to 
alert the government, or even propose alternatives.  In particular, NGOs may also advocate for 
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particular policy solutions.  However, they seldom target policy changes, but instead focus on 
sharing experiences with how policies are implemented (ISSEE, 2010).  NGOs have in fact had a 
greater impact on policy implementation than development (ISSEE, 2010).   
 
NGOs have piloted innovative poverty reduction models in response to Decision 40/2013/QD-
TTg, issued by the Prime Minister.  This Decision requests NGO assistance in poverty-
alleviation.  Several models have been shared, ranging from workplace-based HIV prevention 
models to child-centered community development approaches.  Moreover, those models have the 
potential to serve as a reference point for minimizing loss and waste in state-invested projects 
(UN Agencies in Vietnam, Delegation of EU to Vietnam, MPI of Vietnam, 2014).      
 
In addition, foreign NGOs have partnered with institutions to conduct research studies (e.g., 
base-line surveys, mid-term progress reports, end-line evaluations), mostly to meet donor 
requirements rather than population needs.  Although NGOs normally share research results as a 
project activity with local governments, they have not been able to ensure that local governments 
use or act on the findings. 
 
The significance of NGO assistance to the country remains largely unrecognized.  To date, they 
have financed numerous development projects throughout the country.  However, there has been 
no official evaluation of the impact of NGO-led external investment since the 1986 Open Door 
policy came into effect.  Although officially the government welcomes and indicates 
appreciation of NGO assistance (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2015, Committee for Foreign 
Non-Government Organizations Affairs (COMINGO), 2013), the 2011-2020 Socio-Economic 
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Development Strategy approved by the Communist Party of Vietnam (issued on February 16, 
2011) does not specifically address civil society as a significant resource or contributor to the 
country’s development.   
 
Foreign NGOs operate under the direct guidance of the People’s Aid Coordination Committee 
(PACCOM) of the Committee for Foreign NGO Affairs (COMINGO), which in turn is part of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Figure 7 outlines the relationships between these organizations 
and several other government agencies (COMINGO, 2013).  Although the Prime Minister directs 
COMINGO through PACCOM, representatives of several different sectors are consulted 
regarding NGO operations, such as the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government Office, Government 
Commission for Religious Affairs, Commission for External Relations of the Party Central 
Committee.  In addition, based on specific professional standards and requirements, other 
ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Training) may impose their 
own policies on NGO projects.  Moreover, province-, district- and commune-level governments 
may promulgate their location-specified regulations.  NGO operations are thus closely controlled 
by the central government, local governments, and state-owned agencies. Several departments 
may impose requirements on NGO operations, some requirements may differ from another.    
 
Foreign NGO operations are circumscribed by several legal documents.  Decree 12/2012/ND-CP 
issued in 2012 (regarding registration and management of foreign NGOs in Vietnam) and Decree 
93/2009/ND-CP issued in 2009 (regarding management and utilization of foreign NGOs funds) 
define foreign NGOs in Vietnam as funding agencies, and the funds must be transferred to state 
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departments or local governments for disbursement.  The fund recipients and NGOs then co-
produce project documents, which set out the terms and conditions for using the funds, for local 
authority approval before actual project implementation.  Although fund recipients are 
responsible for implementing projects, many other agencies may monitor project progress and 
outcomes.  Significantly, no formal decrees address NGO engagement in project coordination 
once funds have been released; thus, NGOs may learn the results of project implementation only 
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In addition, Decree 75/2014/ND-CP stipulates that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of 
Labours and their affiliates possess the authority to recruit and manage the staff of international 
organizations, including NGOs.  The lack of clear rules or guidelines regarding recruitent of 
NGO personnel, coupled with complicated recruitment processes, may prevent NGOs from 
properly staffing their operations.    
 
Figure 8 shows that foreign NGOs in Vietnam have relations with several other entities in the 
country.  As organizations registered under the nation’s law, they have to follow the current 
regulations in terms of operations, priorities, and reporting.  Each government department may 
have specific requirements on NGO operations, e.g., the Ministry of Home Affairs may require 
NGOs to strictly follow national security requirements; local governments may prefer NGOs to 
seriously obtain permits prior to project implementation.  The relations between NGOs and 
donors are mostly one-way, in which donors provide NGOs with grants with specific terms and 
conditions, and NGOs should satisfy the donors by fully responding to the agreed terms and 
conditions. NGOs receive grants from various donors, such as United Nations agencies (e.g., 
WHO), multinational donors (e.g., European Union), government donors (e.g., USAID, Irish 
Aid), foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation), business corporates (e.g., Prudential Financial 
Inc.).  Some foreign NGOs (e.g., VNHelp) without field offices in Vietnam may also grant 
funding to in-country foreign NGOs for projects.  Foreign NGOs generally keep close relations 
with their regional offices (normally based in a different country in the region, such as Thailand) 
or headquarter offices for operational guidelines, technical supports, and fundraising directions.  
The regional or headquarter offices may also provide their field offices with seed funds or non-
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restrictive funds annually.  Foreign NGOs also have relations with peer foreign NGOs in the 
country mainly to create networks that facilitate raising funds (e.g., two NGOs co-submit a 
proposal for grant funding), sharing field-based experience, updating progress (through NGO 
Resource Centre), and co-voicing opinions to the government.  Foreign NGOs may sub-grant 
local NGOs to implement some specific activities of a larger project that the formers receive 
from donors, in this case the local NGOs work as consultancy service providers.  However, more 
donors now tend to work with local NGOs.  Foreign NGOs’ staff cannot work directly with local 
communities.  Rather, they work with local governments to arrange for grassroot populations’ 
participation.  In this case, the local government may impose local requirements (project permits, 
official announcement, a police officer’s presence).     
 
Recently, local NGOs are able to register their operations in Vietnam. However, they cannot 
register as separate organizations, instead they have to identify themselves as being a branch of 
an umbrella technical association (e.g., Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations 
– VUSTA).  The VUSTA’s operational regulations were recently approved by the Prime 
Minister at Decision No. 1795/QD-TTg dated October 21, 2015.  The Decision states that the 
VUSTA is a member of the National Fatherland Front, and is among the 28 “special” 
associations recognized by government, alongside other associations such as Blind Association, 
Red Cross, Friendship Association.  The government established, directed, and funded the 
staffing and the activities of these associations.  Local NGOs can apply directly to foreign NGOs 
and donors for grant funds to implement community development projects, or to conduct 
technical consultancy projects (e.g., a baseline survey, a training module).  In this situation, they 
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have to follow the terms and conditions of grants.  Also, their operations largely rely on the 
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Figure 8: Foreign NGO relationships in Vietnam 
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Foreign NGOs may be needed for Vietnam’s development.  Although they do not bring great 
financial resources to the country’s development, they introduce values such as participation and 
empowerment, which the country has lacked for several decades.  They sometimes offer 
criticisms of government policies.  The Decree number 55/NQ-UBTVQH10 issued by the 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on August 30, 1998 guides the implementation of democratic 
operations in organizations in Vietnam.  Several NGO projects may be considered a response to, 
as well as a model for, the application of this Decree in actual conditions.  However, whether 
NGO operations provide the best means of development in Vietnam remains unsure.    
 
In short, despite NGOs’ increased prominence in, and contributions to, the country’s 
development, the assistance is minimal compared with other foreign assistance to the nation.  
The operations of NGOs are rigidly controlled by several regulatory policies that give 
government the ability to intervene in program operations, implementations processes, and 
evaluation.  Moreover, several different government departments, each with their own concerns 
and objectives, control NGO operations, leading to considerable confusion and uncertainty. 
Finally, though welcoming NGOs, the Communist Party avoids addressing or promoting civil 








CHAPTER 4 - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
To restate, this thesis identifies the many uncertainties that NGOs face in Vietnam and explores 
how these shape their operations within the wider socio-political context.  The ultimate goal of 
this work is to identify ways to improve collaboration and coordination between NGOs and 
government, both in Vietnam, as well as potentially in other middle-income countries where 
NGOs face similar uncertainties.  Specifically, the research addresses the following questions: 
▪ What are the uncertainties that foreign NGOs face? 
▪ What roles or modes of operation do foreign NGOs undertake as a consequence of 
these uncertainties?  
▪ How do the objectives of foreign NGOs align with Vietnam’s national development 
agenda? 
▪ What modes of coordination do research respondents recommend for foreign NGOs 
and the government departments in Vietnam, and what lessons are there for other 
emerging economies? 
 
4.1. Qualitative research approach 
Lewis (1999) argues that qualitative research methods are best at exploring bureaucracy, 
development, and policy issues relating to NGO operations.  Devault (2006) notes that 
qualitative data best describe connections among individuals, and organizational structures, 
processes and practices.  The literature presents several specific examples of how scholars have 
successfully applied qualitative methods to examine NGO operations at local and global levels 
(Porter, 2013, Basilico, Kerry, Messac, et al., 2013, Adato, Roopnaraine, & Becker, 2011, Bell, 
Reinert, Cent, et al., 2011, Markowitz, 2001, Brown, Kenny, Turner, et al., 2000).  The examples 
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illustrate how qualitative methods can be successfully used to explore several aspects internal 
and external to NGOs.  The researchers were able to reveal in-depth processes, and complex 
connections between structures and operational processes.  Importantly, many of these 
researchers had previous experience working in NGOs, or working on NGO-related topics, and 
in their research they spent additional time to gain explore NGOs at greater depth.  In so doing, 
they were able to combine the meanings that participants held about research topics with their 
own experience working in the NGO sector. This added significantly to the depth of their 
analysis. 
 
In this research, semi-structured interviews and document reviews were employed.  Combining 
these sources of data afforded opportunities to triangulate evidence and to therefore enhance the 
quality of my interpretation. For example, for each point that I learned from interviewees, I 
searched in the literature to see whether and how the point had been addressed, and I reported 
both interviewees’ points and the scholastic finding in my dissertation.   
 
As with many of the researchers cited in this thesis, I too come to this topic from many years of 
work in the NGO sector. I started my career with NGOs in 2002 as a Project Manager with Care 
International.  To date, I have had approximate 15 years of experience working for several NGOs 
(Save the Children International, East Meets West Foundation, and Plan International) in roles of 
implementation coordination as well as strategic building and fund raising.  This experience has 





4.2. Semi-structured interviews 
4.2.1. The sample 
Generating and justifying the sample size for qualitative interview studies can be a challenge.  
Franklin and Roberts (2006) recommend that researchers limit interviews to around twenty so 
that they can still, “keep a sense of the flow of the conversation, the speaker, and the setting in 
mind, as well as its literal content (pp. 90).”  Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) suggest that data 
saturation occurs within the first twelve interviews, and exceeding the limits prevents researchers 
from fully using collected data.  Ideas about the ideal number of interviews aside, the approach 
that most researchers take is to interview until they reach a saturation point where no new 
information is learned and there are adequate data for analysis and interpretation.  
 
To be included in my research, NGOs had to meet the following selection criteria: 
- Are registered officially with the Government of Vietnam; 
- Have established an official country representative or field office with a staff structure, a 
version of an operational and procedural field book, and strategic operation or 
implementation plans; and 
- Have operated in Vietnam for at least five years consecutively so that they had 
experienced and could comment on their organization’s alignment with the national five-
year planning cycles that first began in 1986 and have continued to the present. 
 
Foreign NGOs that met these selection criteria were identified through the International NGO 
Directory in Vietnam.  The Directory includes quite a bit of useful information; for example, a 
listing of primary projects and interventions, geographical location(s), key staff members, 
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contact addresses, and official websites.  From this Directory I identified 63 NGOs that met my 
selection criteria.   
 
I sent recruitment emails to all 63 organizations, briefly introducing the research project, myself 
and my supervisor, and requesting their participation in the project. An information letter was 
enclosed with the recruitment email outlining the research purposes, measures undertaken to 
ensure confidentiality of involved organizations, and my contact address for any needed 
clarifications.  Organizations were asked to let me know whether they would be willing to 
participate in the research. 
 
Thirteen foreign NGOs agreed to participate.  All of the NGOs who participated in the research 
had been working in Vietnam for twenty years or more, had field operation protocols, and had 
multiple-year operational strategic plans (Table 1).  Although they all worked across different 
sectors and had had multiple mandates (relief actions, policy advocacy, monitoring), each 
possessed its own particular focus: four specialised in child-rights, four focused on community 
development, four concentrated on health-specific issues, including treatment for diseases, and 
one focused on conservation and environmental issues (Table 1). The organizations applied 
multiple interventions, ranging from capacity building to health promotion, to social marketing.  
 
Table 1: Basic information about participating NGOs 
Organizations Target projects 
 Children Health Environment Community development 
N1 ✓    
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N2  ✓   
N3 ✓    
N4  ✓   
N5   ✓  
N6    ✓ 
N7    ✓ 
N8 ✓    
N9  ✓   
N10    ✓ 
N11 ✓    
N12  ✓   
N13    ✓ 
 
After NGOs agreed to participate in the research project, they invited their staff to contact me for 
in-depth interviews.  Although foreign NGOs participating in this research project had been 
through at least one five-year national planning cycle, representatives who were invited for 
interviews had not necessarily served the organizations for an entire national planning cycle.  
Preferably, they served in senior managerial positions so that they could comment on policy 
processes and policy impacts. I assumed that knowledge of organizational processes was 
transmitted, and least in part, through generations of leadership, so that current management 




If a staff member was willing to participate, he/she would forward me an acceptance email.  
Email transactions between the staff and me were used to identify and agree upon the venue and 
timing for face-to-face interviews.  In summary, I received thirteen acceptance emails from 
individual representatives from each of the selected NGOs.  These participants were all in 
directorship positions within their respective organizations. 
 
As discussed, NGOs must work with and get approval from government departments in order to 
implement their projects. These government departments determine what is expected of NGOs 
and are presumed to have an understanding of the role and operation of foreign NGOs in 
Vietnam.  In order to understand how government staff viewed, and worked with, foreign NGOs, 
I interviewed seven staff of several government departments. 
 
Two levels within government were considered for participation.  First, staff from central-level 
“coordinating” departments that enforce policies governing NGO activities were contacted.  The 
People’s Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM) (under the Committee for Foreign NGO 
Affairs (COMINGO), which is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)), promulgated 
policies regarding international NGO operations, and also promoted the implementation of 
humanitarian and development assistance.  In particular, the PACCOM played focal roles 
connecting foreign NGOs and other government departments, and coordinated aid activity 
country-wide.  In fact, the PACCOM recommended where and on what projects NGOs should 
deliver across the country.  The PACCOM supported understanding how NGOs dealt with major 
administrative procedures (registration, field office permits, major-event approval).  Overall, 
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discussion with central-level department staff revealed the policy-making processes and the 
dynamic relations between the public and NGO sectors. 
 
Second, as described in Chapter 3, all NGOs are required to work through public sector 
agencies/agents in order to implement their projects. I describe these agencies as departmental 
“beneficiaries.” There are two levels of beneficiaries: first, Ministry-level “beneficiary” 
departments normally promulgate policies relating to their specific areas of concern: e.g., health, 
education, agriculture.  These regulations focused on programmatic details, such as program 
priorities and enforcement of professional standards.  While the central-level PACCOM 
described above generally coordinates the administration of the NGO sector, the Ministry-level 
“beneficiary” departments specify particular cooperative priorities and methods for 
implementing projects.   
 
The second level of beneficiary includes provincial departments who actually implement NGO-
directed and funded projects in communities.  Implementation is constrained by central-level 
policies (by the PACCOM and Ministry-level departments).  Occupying a position that straddles 
policy directives at the central level and NGO priorities at the local level poses significant 
challenges. At issue is the problem of how NGO-funded programs are coordinated at the local 
level.  
 
I identified several “beneficiary” government departments at either the central level, and who 
were responsible for implementing policy, and at the local level, who partnered with NGOs to 
implement field-based projects. I engaged two Ministry-level beneficiary departments: the 
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Department of Finance (under the Ministry of Health), and the Global Health Department (under 
the Vietnam Union for Science and Technology Association), and  four province-level 
beneficiary departments: the Departments of Agriculture, of Health, of Planning and Investment, 
and of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs in Quang Ngai Province.  Staff from these 
departments provided descriptions of the implementation of projects and their perspectives on 
the impact of projects on communities.  Moreover, they offered a valuable perspective on actual 
government-NGO relationships.   
 
The inclusion criteria for those from government departments were slightly different than those 
applied to NGOs.  As for ministry-level coordinating departments, I recruited staff who were 
directly engaged in determining or directing policy-making processes, ensuring that I 
interviewed only those with direct policy experience, not just with general administrative affairs.  
As for local beneficiary government departments, I recruited those who had experience 
partnering with NGOs.   
 
I recruited participants from government departments largely through networking, relying on my 
personal contacts to recruit participants from government departments.  Participants included one 
high-ranking government officer from the PACCOM,  two staff from ministry-level beneficiary 
departments, and four staff from province-level beneficiary departments.  All are high-ranking 
officers who have directly engaged with several NGO-funded projects in Vietnam.  
 
4.2.2. The conduct of interviews 
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Qualitative researchers normally interview participants face-to-face or by telephone using 
unstructured or semi-structured open-ended questions.  Sometimes researchers conduct group 
interviews (Creswell, 2014).  Interviewing is best suited for discovering views and opinions, and 
event history, coupled with personal anecdotes and stories.  In addition, during interviews, both 
interviewers and interviewees may employ open-ended spaces for conversations that afford 
interviewees opportunities to express other thoughts or offer their own interpretation of events.  
In this research, I used face-to-face semi-structured interviews to collect personal opinions and 
stories that contributed to understanding NGO operations.  Through these stories I was able to 
capture how NGOs adjusted their strategies as they negotiated their relationships with 
government departments and other stakeholders.   
 
Interviews were conducted according to interview guides that consisted of open-ended questions, 
each accompanied by several verbal probes.  Probes were intended to prompt respondents to 
elaborate on answers and add more details.  The open-ended questions provided room for 
probing interviewees’ thoughts and created flexibility to adjust questions during interviews.  
Some interview questions repeated part of another question, and few questions received the same 
answers. Some questions might not require probes, while others might need additional probes to 
leverage participant insights.   Timely adjustments allowed for gathering quality data.   
 
In total, twenty interviews were completed as planned (Table 2).  Of these, four interviews were 
conducted via Skype for logistical reasons.  Whether undertaken face-to-face or through Skype, 




Table 2: Interviews by organization, mode of interviewing, and mode of recording data  
(n = 20) 
Organization 
 Foreign NGO        13 
Government 
Central-level coordinating departments   1 
Ministry-level beneficiary departments    2 
Province-level beneficiary departments   4 
Mode of interviewing       
 In person        16 
Via Skype        4 
Mode of recording data 
Both note-taking and digital recording    20 
 Only digital recording       18 
 Only note-taking       2 
 
Of the twenty interviews, eighteen were recorded by digital audio-recording instrument, and two 
were not recorded in accordance with the interviewees’ stated preference.  I took notes during 
interviews to avoid missing information due to technical errors or noise distractions.  The notes 
supported timely probing and following up of matters that emerged over the course of the 
interviews.  In addition, for the two interviewees who did not approve the use of electronic voice 




Interviews were conducted in either English or Vietnamese, depending on interviewees’ 
preferred language.  Normally, both languages were used in an interview, and hence in the 
transcriptions.  I also took notes using both languages.  The bilingual transcriptions and notes 
were used in data analysis to minimize information loss or mistakes through translation.  
Bilingual interviews also benefited the research project as both interviewer and interviewee 
could shift to the language that best captured or represented jargon.  For instance, “NGO role” 
could mean “NGO mandate” when translated into the Vietnamese language.  Therefore, 
interviewees and I determined to use English to clearly address each concept.  Conversely, the 
word “sensitiveness”, if used in Vietnamese translation, would reflect the ambiguous political 
position of civil society in the country.  Therefore, we used the Vietnamese translation of this 
word.    
 
4.3. Ethics approvals 
Because the research methods largely dealt with human participants through in-depth interviews, 
I was obliged to maintain interviewee confidentiality.  The confidentiality was promoted through 
obtaining ethical clearances: one from the University of Waterloo in Canada and another from 
the Hanoi School of Public Health in Vietnam.  I submitted separate applications for ethics 
clearance to the two ethics committees for review and approval.  The University of Waterloo 
Office of Research Ethics clarified research ethics through delegated review on December 22, 
2017 (ORE File # 22730).  The Hanoi School of Public Health Ethical Review Board for 
Biomedical Research granted ethics approval on January 12, 2018 (004/2018/YTCC-HD3) 
through expedited review.  The approvals allowed me to undertake further implementation steps 
(field arrangements, data collection and analyses, reporting) until completion, and ensured that 
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this research did not have any anticipated health implications on participants, and that 
participation3 was voluntary.   
 
4.4. Document reviews 
Public (official reports, meeting minutes) and private documents (personal writings and 
transactions) offer important information or “facts” that help understand organizational history 
and official practices (Creswell, 2014).  Information about organizational development that may 
be noted in official documents may be of particular value.  However, some information may be 
inaccurate, or even unavailable for public access (Creswell, 2014).  Overall, if carefully used, 
documents offer good sources of data that may complement or illuminate information gained 
from interviews.  For example, interviews may not be able to provide concrete numbers on the 
implementation of outcomes of development projects (e.g., number of beneficiaries, project 
budgets).  In addition, interviewees’ information may be considered unofficial and skewed by 
personal position, experience, or perspectives.  Combining interviews and documents offers a 
fuller set of data for research purposes. 
 
I collected several types of public documents, including official decisions, proposals, and reports 
published by participating NGOs and government departments.  NGOs provided me with their 
updated strategy documents and annual progress reports, including their financial statements. I 
 
3 Those participants involved might decline to answer any interview questions if they wished, or might decide to 
withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences, just by advising the researcher. In 
accordance with their permissions, interviews would or would not be audio-recorded.  During the course of a 
debriefing workshop, participants might add or clarify any points as they wished. 
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was also offered numerous communication materials (brochures, leaflets) about organizational 
facts and development history, meeting minutes, and a cross-NGO Policy Positioning Paper that 
presented official NGO perspective on Decree 93/2009/ND-CP (management and utilization of 
foreign non-governmental aid).  These documents captured NGO strategies and practices, 
including their dynamic relations with government departments and with beneficiary 
communities.  In addition, government departments shared officially-issued Decisions, 
Regulations, Decrees, Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plans, including for finances 
(SEDP), and periodical bulletins on government-NGO cooperation.  These documents provided 
official government viewpoints on and expectations of NGOs (Table 3).   
 
Table 3:  Documents retrieved by source and type 
NGOs     
Strategy documents 
Annual progress reports (including finance) 
Communication materials (brochures, leaflets)  
NGO meeting minutes 
NGO Policy Positioning Paper 
Government departments  
Legal documents (Decisions, Regulations, Decrees) 
Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plans 
Periodical bulletins on government-NGO cooperation  
 
4.5. Data analysis and interpretation 
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The data analysis process began when I arrived in the study setting and began interviews. For the 
purposes of this thesis I started my initial data analysis when the first interview was recorded, 
and the first notes taken.  I reviewed all interviews, notes and documents on the same day, which 
helped me to discover major trends or patterns and to adjust my data-collection procedures as 
necessary to take up new areas of inquiry.   
 
The outcome of this initial process included development of major themes and sub-themes 
(Table 4).  For example, under the major theme of “external factors to NGO operations,” I 
identified several sub-themes, such as Vietnam’s economic development, changes to donors’ 
demands, Vietnam’s restrictive regulations, NGO interactions with newly-emergent institutions, 
field-based challenges, and the country’s wider political environment.  Additionally, under each 
sub-theme, several sub-subthemes were identified.  For instance, under the sub-theme of donors’ 
higher demands, I identified the sub-subthemes of shifted programs, increased demands, imposed 
timeframes, and imposed financing styles and flows.       
 
Table 4: Themes and sub-themes 
Theme    Sub-theme 
Uncertainty caused by external influences Vietnam becomes a middle-income country 
 Greater donor demands  
 Restrictive regulations 
 Policy implementation gaps 
 Labour market  
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Local partners, populations, and field-based 
challenges 
 Wider political environment 
Uncertainty caused by internal influences Uncertain NGO awareness and relationships 
 Uncertain funding and financing 
 Uncertain implementation and effectiveness 
 Headquarters top-down policies 
Uncertain staff management 
Implications for NGO operations Adjusted roles 
 Adjusted accountability 
         Adjusted delivery strategies 
NGO alignment with government      N/A 
NGO responses for improvements     Educate stakeholders 
         Increase effectiveness 
         Collaborate among themselves 
         Learn government knowledge 
         Headquarter supports  
NGO responses for improvements     N/A 
Donor responses for improvements     N/A 
 
Informed by the results of the above initial analysis process, I then coded the data from both 
gathered documents and recorded interviews. The data were recorded in an Excel computer 
spreadsheet document, with each sheet representing responses from one organization or 
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department.  Data (including from interviews and documents) were grouped in concrete pieces of 
data that addresses a specific content point, with each piece showing the participant (coded 
NGOs or government departments), narrative contents (summarised main ideas spoken or 
written), and direct quotes (if spoken and written ideas were significant).  If spoken direct quotes 
were used, the specific timeframe was indicated.  If written direct quotes were used, specific 
documents and pages were introduced.   
 
By the end of this phase, data from all sources were grouped into numerous concrete pieces.  For 
instance, with the organization labeled N3, and for content piece A1, I had an Excel cell for 
spoken main ideas, and another Excel cell for a direct quote (see Figure 9).  However, not all 
data pieces had both narrative content and direct quotes; several had either narrative content or a 
direct quote.        
 
Figure 9: Data organized in concrete pieces 
 
Next, all data pieces were allocated to relevant themes and sub-themes (or even sub-subthemes).  
Although this phase involved simple procedures, it can create confusion when a piece of data 
could fit two themes (or sub-themes), especially when both themes (and sub-themes) had content 
that might be associated with the other.  For instance, a piece of data on government policy 
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might be allocated under the sub-theme of restrictive regulations, or under the sub-theme of 
policy gaps.  I determined that this confusion was created by unclearly-defined themes (or sub-
themes).  Therefore, I decided to firmly define themes and sub-themes.  In detail, restrictive 
regulations were used to examine the development of key regulations that seriously impacted 
NGO operations.  In contrast, policy gaps described the question of how regulations were 
implemented at a local level.  Clear definitions supported correct allocation of pieces of data into 
themes and sub-themes.  Eventually, each theme or sub-theme was fully evidenced by data 
pieces.    
 
Writing the full content of themes and sub-themes (and sub-subthemes) completed the data 
analyses and interpretations.  I also struggled to finish this phase.  First, I had to navigate 
between themes and sub-themes to ensure consistency among sessions.  The previously-defined 
themes and sub-themes became very helpful because I could easily review session content.  
Secondly, following Creswell’s (2014) recommendation, I returned to literature review for 
strengthening points.  Thanks to this technique, I was able to identify specific contributions that 
this research project made to the scholarship.  Thirdly, I also revisited my professional 
experience in the NGO sector as another point in triangulation and to make the analyses and 
interpretations more practical.   
 
4.6. Accuracy and reliability 
Information tends to be filtered through interviewees before reaching interviewers, hence 
creating biases.  Therefore, Creswell (2014) recommends using a “member-checking” approach 
to enhancing the accuracy of qualitative data collection.  According to this approach, researchers 
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present theme descriptions or major findings to informants and offer them an opportunity to 
reflect or comment on findings.  Following this recommendation, I organized one debriefing 
workshop for all representatives (of NGOs and government departments), where I presented the 
major results of the research.   
 
In Vietnam, the workshop required making legal agreements, logistics arrangements, and 
facilitation.  The legal agreement requires that those holding the workshop are part of an 
officially-established organization that has an organizational structure, according to the Civil 
Law 2015.  I thus contracted a field-based organization which I selected through my network.  
The organization possessed the requisite legal status to legally carry out research activities.  The 
contracted partner also had the capability to ensure the organizational and logistical 
arrangements for the debriefing workshops (venue, reception, audio-visual equipment, catering).   
 
The workshop was facilitated to trigger discussions around themes and subthemes of data 
analyses.  For those representatives who had missed the workshop, I prompted the discussions by 
forwarding the PowerPoint slides, coupled with specific explanations.  They would thus also 
have an opportunity to provide commentary regarding the presentation through emails.  
Participants concentrated their ideas around the key issues that affect NGO operations in 
Vietnam.  This initiative offered another chance to validate research findings.   
 
The constant comparison of emerging themes, their consistency, their anomalies, and their 
relationships within the data sets adds to the validity of data analyses (Creswell, 2014).  I 
triangulated data sources (gathered documents, recorded interviews, literature, and informant 
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perspectives), which led to further development of themes.  This time-consuming but useful 
process added to my confidence in the validity of my analyses. 
 
Creswell (2014) recommends developing a codebook to enhance consistency during data-
analyzing processes.  For this project, I clearly defined themes and sub-themes, and constantly 
compared data pieces with the themes and sub-themes.  For example, the theme of NGO 
implementation would center around specific NGO deliveries, and their impacts on communities.  
In contrast, the theme of delivery strategy focused on how NGOs delivered their interventions.  
Therefore, consistency and coherence throughout the data analyses was ensured, thereby 




      CHAPTER 5 -- RESULTS -- EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON NGO OPERATIONS 
NGO operations and survival are influenced by several factors internal and external to 
organizations.  How NGOs develop and how these factors relate to NGO evolution remain 
unanswered.  This study incorporates the reporting from NGO directors and high-ranking 
government officers, the review of several documents published by NGOs and government, and 
the professional experience in NGO sector of the research author.  The core finding of this study 
is the matter of uncertainties in dealing with factors that constrain or otherwise influence NGO 
operations, and strategies NGOs employ to deal with them. Conceptualizing uncertainties in 
terms of internal and external factors helps make sense of how NGOs develop and carry out 
programs. While changes in external factors may be identified, they are not under the control of 
NGOs. On the other hand, most internal factors are subject to organizational decisions and 
actions. 
 
The following two chapters illustrate several influences internal and external to NGO operations.  
Internal factors are comprised of factors within the organizations that impact the success and 
approach of operations. I consider them “internal” in the sense that the organizations have some 
control over these factors as they develop strategic plans and implement programs.  Internal 
factors include uncertainties related to program implementation and effectiveness, top-down 
directives from headquarters, uncertainties related to staffing, and implications for NGO 
operations; e.g., changing mandates, changes to avenues of accountability, changes to delivery 
methods, and NGO alignment with government.  In contrast, external influences are those over 
which organizations have little control, but can have a significant impact on organizations’ 
abilities to achieve goals and objectives.  External factors include how NGOs are defined and 
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perceived by government; Vietnam’s development as a middle-income country which, 
determines funding eligibility and priorities; issues of funding more generally; regulatory 
constraints, policy gaps or ambiguities, labour market factors; issues arising in relations with 
local partners; the needs and responses of local communities; field-based challenges to project 
implementation; and political sensitivities regarding  the operation of faith-based organizations.  
In the following pages, I describe the experience of the NGOs included in my study as reported 
by NGO representatives  interviewed, Government Officers at an implementation level 
(provincial level), and Government Officers at a central level. 
 
5.1. Case example 
In order to appreciate how these many uncertainties affect NGO operations, it is useful to 
consider a case example.  “Equity International” (not the real name; known hereafter as “EI”) 
established its first projects in Vietnam more than 60 years ago to support families affected by 
the war in the south.  Withdrawing their activities from the country around 1975 when the 
Vietnam War ended, EI came back to the country in 1993 to work with the most marginalised 
and poorest ethnic groups in Vietnam’s northern and central regions.  EI works with vulnerable 
ethnic groups, especially girls and children, to provide them with opportunities to develop and 
succeed.  
 
EI developed rapidly during their first years of returning to Vietnam after the war.  It initiated 
three major programs (each lasting for five years), and funding increased with each successive 
period.  More staff were recruited every year, with a peak of approximate 300 in-country staff by 
2010.  EI established 10 program units, one in each of 10 selected provinces in Vietnam, and 
79 
 
each unit had up to 35 staff who managed a sizeable budget.  EI proposed to expand their 
programs to several other provinces in Vietnam.  
 
However, EI’s senior staff soon realized that Vietnam’s rapid economic growth would greatly 
reduce their ability to attract international funders.  EI’s country office in Vietnam began to find 
it harder to raise funds due to donors’ shifting focus to low-income countries. At the same time, 
it faced increasing pressure to demonstrate program effectiveness. These two constraints began 
to change how EI operated in Vietnam. 
 
First, senior management decided to reorganize their staff complement.  They reduced the 
number of administrative and program implementation staff.  From 2014 to 2017, the number of 
staff decreased by almost half (from 300 to 160 employees).  Each staff member is now required 
to assume multiple responsibilities in order to continue EI’s programs. Management admits that 
this personnel cut has been painful, it increased workloads considerably, but it had to be done.         
 
Realizing that changes to international funding priorities threatened the sustainability of their 
existing programs, EI also developed and proposed several new programmatic initiatives, 
including programs that focus on currently “in favour” topics such as civil society development 
and advancement of human rights.  Although EI understands that these project initiatives are 
potentially controversial and risky given their political sensitivity, the organization’s leaders 
nonetheless hoped to obtain funding to launch such programs.  In addition, they also accepted 
funding for programs that lie outside of their specific area of expertise.  For example, EI has 
historically focused on child development and protection, but agreed to implement a project to 
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improve road safety.  The NGO representative argued that the organization just focused on the 
safety for children, which meant that they still remained operating in their child protection-
related program framework.  Similarly, EI is experienced in providing vocational training for the 
disabled, but has accepted new funding to work with street children.  
 
EI’s methods for implementing projects have also changed.  Previously, EI tended to implement 
programs in communities without being overly concerned with monitoring and evaluation 
focused on project effectiveness. Now, they are required to design programs that they can clearly 
demonstrate are responsive to specific community needs, and which are explicitly linked to 
values of community participation, empowerment, and transparency, which the organization has 
recently promoted and strengthened.     
 
EI’s human resources (HR) department has also revised its methods of staff performance 
appraisal.  Previously, HR staff applied a task-oriented scale to evaluate staff performance based 
on what tasks they conduct during the appraisal period.  HR has recently introduced a new set of 
global values and behaviour assessment frameworks that are focused less on task 
accomplishment and more on results produced.  The organization’s human resource department 
is working on specific indicators to appraise each individual staff’s performance based on these 
values and frameworks.    
 
EI’s management has also considered hiring Vietnamese nationals for key leadership positions 
and revising organizational costing policies to decrease operational costs (due to decreased salary 
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and staff benefits expenditures, decreased administrative procedures).  This, however, requires 
careful legal consultation as no such precedents exist in Vietnam.  
 
One of the great concerns that EI now faces is how to balance accountability “upward” to donors 
while at the same time ensuring accountability “downward” to local communities. Although still 
struggling to maintain this balance, EI realizes it is now significant to their survival. Donors are 
paying for results, and communities likewise expect them. 
 
The above case example is characteristic of how foreign NGOs in Vietnam have had to change in 
the face of external conditions.  EI tried in several ways to survive funding challenges and 
changing priorities, including downsizing and restructuring staffing, changing and expanding its 
programming, struggling to balance donor demands with government policy and community 
needs.  It is not yet clear whether all these changes will be successful.  But the pressures, in the 
context of the organization’s accountability to its donors and to its beneficiaries, place a 
considerable burden on EI’s management.  
 
In the following pages, the experiences of the NGOs included in my research project are 
explored further, illustrating in greater depth and detail the factors that emerged in my case 
example. In this exposition, several factors external to NGO operations are presented, including 
the issues of defining NGOs in the Vietnamese context, Vietnam’s accession to middle-income 
country status, issues of funding, regulatory constraints, policy gaps and ambiguities, labour 
market factors, working with local partners, local communities, field-based challenges, and 




5.2. The issues of defining NGOs  
Among those interviewed, nearly half of foreign NGOs’ representatives and two (out of three) 
central-level government officers reported their concerns over several aspects (e.g., language 
issues, modes of operations, the “sensitive” issues) of how NGO are defined in the Vietnamese 
context. These include issues of language (translation), modes of operation with regard to 
government, and engagement of NGOs with politically sensitive issues. The language used to 
describe NGOs may have specific, negative connotations for government or local communities. 
A NGO senior policy advisor tried to explain the term NGO in the Vietnamese language, as 
follows:    
If possible, we might change the name in Vietnamese to international social organizations 
or some other sorts of name, but we should not say we are non-governmental 
organizations.  Because when you say you are non-governmental, Vietnamese people 
may understand that you are not well-structured by the language.  Non means Not.  You 
are non-governmental means you are anarchist, you are without government, and you 
operate for miscellaneous things and not in a particular direction. 
 
Not surprisingly, local populations often misunderstood the community-facilitating, grassroots 
activities that NGOs strive to implement.  The local populations might be inadequately educated 
to understand what NGOs would implement, or they might not have the previous experience 
working with NGOs.  Moreover, the term “non-government organizations” sometimes sounded 
like organizations that fights against the government, like rebels.  Attempts to introduce the NGO 
concept in the Vietnamese language and political context could easily create a negative first 
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impressions in local communities.  I myself experienced being denied access to a community by 
a commune leader who indicated that the community would not cooperate with any “anti-
government organizations”.  To gain access, we (the NGO) had to convince the leader by 
providing an official operation permit, evidence of activities we conducted in another 
community, and an official introductory letter from a higher level of authority.   
 
NGO staff offered several counter-arguments on a variety of social concerns.  One NGO director 
explained that differing viewpoints existed between the Government and NGOs, and when 
NGOs provided their opinions, even with evidence and good will, they became “social critics”.  
Tandon (1989) and Fisher (2003) discuss the one-way, regulatory nature of government-NGO 
relations in Asia but they do not specifically address issues around the “counter-arguments” that 
NGOs offer to governments.  In communist Vietnam, social criticisms are evaluated for their 
potential to destabilize society.  The Vietnamese communists favour top-down social order and 
social stabilization, any feedbacks from a lower level to a higher level of the social order may be 
considered playing against the communists’ favour and will.  Therefore, NGO operations were 
labelled “sensitive” because they offered problematic input, and NGOs are inherently potentially 
destabilizing.   
 
In reality, I have learned that NGOs, through their community development projects, are often 
trying to support the government to fulfil its responsibility to citizens.  For example, they support 
building schools and health centres, and educating villagers about safe motherhood and hygienic 
issues.  However, providing counter-arguments is a different story.  When NGOs provide 
counter-arguments for the government, they believe that they are aiming to improve the current 
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situations, and in this sense, they are acting as a stabilizing force on behalf of the state.  The 
problem is that the counter-arguments that NGOs provide may not be in the government’s 
interests or priorities, or may exceed the current managerial and financial capacity of 
government.  In this sense, NGOs create controversy, and the communist government may 
consider this controversy a destabilizing factor. 
 
Civil society groups that deal with matters around ethnic minorities are also viewed by the 
government as potentially destabilizing, and thus “sensitive”.  One NGO director commented 
that: 
These are issues that are quite sensitive in the eyes of Government… We know that the 
voice of ethnic minority populations is very much limited.  The Parliament also cares 
about raising voices of the minorities, but the care is sometimes more in formality than in 
essence.  Therefore, when CSOs operate in this area, they want to have practical, 
effective solutions and recommendations.  And this is normally considered sensitive. 
Clearly, working with ethnic communities was seen as a sensitive issue in Vietnam.  Foreign 
NGOs who have rights and equity central to their missions, were normally concerned about the 
treatment and the living standards of disadvantaged ethnic populations in Vietnam and many 
developed programs to improve access to public services and to empower communities.  The 
“sensitive” label led the government to closely monitor and control NGO operations where they 




NGO operations were also “sensitive” because their implementation involved local 
communities.  In the view of a government official, neither communities nor NGOs were 
“sensitive”, but how NGOs implemented projects could be seen in such a light: 
They [NGOs] intervene too deeply in community life, and awareness about religion 
among populations is still limited.  Therefore, they [government] are very careful, despite 
their wish for aid to the populations.  They always feel they need to carefully 
consider…   that they [NGOs] do not have much money, but they deliver projects that the 
government has not implemented, and this is very good...  The populations in remote 
geographical locations are disadvantaged...  and foreign NGOs want to enter those 
locations to solve the problems.  However, their approach to problems has not met the 
government’s expectations, therefore they meet with difficulties. 
 
Islam, Siti Hajar, and Haris (2013), and Akukwe (1998) report that NGOs are strong at 
promoting and applying horizontal, bottom-up approaches to community development and the 
use of local knowledge.  In my research, many of the NGOs I studied also promoted and applied 
horizontal, bottom-up approaches to community development.  NGO staff tended to directly ask 
community members about the information related to their projects (for example, needs 
assessment, modes of implementation, mid-term review, evaluation).  Some NGOs preferred to 
apply participatory rural appraisal tools in program development, implementation, and 
evaluation.  Participatory rural appraisal is an approach that allows community people to share 
their knowledge and opinions in the planning, monitoring and evaluation of development 
projects and programs (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014). Several community groups (men, 
women, children, farmers, teachers) are normally invited to participate for the purpose of 
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projects.  Some other NGOs prefer to establish “interest groups” (e.g., interest group for saving 
and credit, interest group for pig raising, interest group for making toys for children).  All these 
activities require the significant participation of community members.  Yet these gatherings of 
people may worry the government.  The above interviewee illustrated that the NGO approach to 
community development always concerned the government, because empowerment and 
participation were often mottos when NGOs organized community lives.  As the above 
government official reported, the Government expected a different approach to communities than 
the empowering and participatory one.  The official did not mention clearly about the approach 
that the government expected.  From my experience, the government may prefer a top-down 
approach and communities are not consulted or empowered to raise their voices.  Government-
NGO disagreements over delivery tactics have the potential to adversely affect NGO operations.  
 
The “sensitive” label was also applied to NGOs engagements with state policy processes and 
advocacy of human rights.  In these activities, NGOs might be considered political organizations.  
However, as noted by one NGO director, while admitting the political nature of their 
organization’s work, argued that they were “non-political”.  S/he explained that they did not join 
any specific political party, and therefore really did not represent any political position.  This 
explanation was intended to allow room for flexibility so that NGOs could engage in policy 
dialogue without being charged with political intent or advocacy of a particular political position.  
 
The term “advocacy” is difficult to express in the Vietnamese language.  Policy advocacy might 
be labelled “sensitive” because it addresses political systems.  One NGO director confirmed that 
their organization tried to avoid the “sensitiveness” associated with advocacy.  S/he explained 
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that they used proper Vietnamese language to address the “should-be” issues, not the should-be 
NGO actions.  For example, instead of stating that the organization would advocate policy, s/he 
preferred to state that the issue should go in this or that direction, for the sake of community 
well-being. The nature of the action remained the same, but the language used to convey the 
message was softened.    
 
However, in a single-party communist country, a top-down approach to policy making prevents 
public participation in the policy sphere.  According to one NGO representative, when NGOs 
operate in Vietnam: 
A large part of NGO operations is advocacy.  We know that advocacy means fight for 
something that is true, which the government has not recognized yet.  Therefore, we need 
advocacy. This means at the time the advocacy is happening, there are gaps between 
CSOs’ viewpoints and the government’s viewpoints.  The missions of NGOs are to 
bridge the gaps.  
NGO advocacy practices may lead to changes in policies that govern numerous arenas.  Cook, 
Wright, & Andersson (2017) note that NGOs increasingly target numerous global issues and they 
aim for sustained changes.  According to Dany (2013) and Banks & Hulme (2012), NGOs have 
the power to persuade and this power explains the success of NGOs’ advocacy. In Vietnam, 
when foreign NGOs engage in policy advocacy, they encounter a political monopoly, and their 
advocacy could be interpreted as threat to public security.  NGOs offered counter-arguments that 
might deviate from the government’s views on certain policies and intrude on the policy sphere, 
and this is considered threatening to the current government.  Clearly, NGOs are placed in a 
dilemmas when they have to decide whether to proceed with the advocacy.  They may select to 
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use a proper language (as mentioned above), or adjust their methods of conducting the advocacy 
(such as sharing their messages at conference, collaborating with a government department).  
These methods may not result in strong impacts, but may help NGOs send messages without 
injuring their relations with the government.   
 
The various topics or areas of work deemed sensitive by government officials constrain NGO 
operations.  NGO’s engagement with sensitive issues (ethnic minorities, religion, community 
organization, and policy advocacy) might restrict local state-owned agencies from receiving 
NGO funds (note that all NGOs operating in Vietnam have to have a local, state-approved 
implementing partner).  This means that NGO projects cannot happen.   
 
Although most ministries clearly recognized the contribution of NGOs to the country’s 
development, the Ministry of Public Security stood out as being most concerned with their 
engagement with sensitive issues or work in ethnic minority regions.  Similarly, Dupuy, Ron and 
Prakash (2016) argue that although LMIC governments may regard international assistance as an 
important resource for development, governments may at the same time consider NGOs to be a 
threat to the state’s political control and may impose restrictive regulations on NGO operations.   
 
The literature addresses the position of NGOs in society (Buse & Walt, 1997).  Bernard and 
Grewal (2014) suggest that NGOs need to make NGO operations clear to the public so as to gain 
a better standing in a particular social and political context.  In this research project, it was clear 
that the position of NGOs within Vietnam was ill-defined and that they did not fit neatly within 
any formal state structure.  They did not occupy a position like that of other state-sponsored 
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social organizations, for example, the Women’s Union, Farmers’ Associations, or the Youth 
Union.  Trade Unions are governed by Law number 12/2012/QH13, which says that trade unions 
are a component part of the political system of Vietnam and operate under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam.  Also, foreign NGOs were not considered to be one of the 28 
“special” associations recognized by government (e.g., Blind Association, Red Cross, Friendship 
Association).  Government established, directed, and funded the staffing and the activities of 
these associations.  
 
There are no formal definitions of NGOs in state policy documents.  One respondent commented 
that many government officials (apart from those staff working in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) and many at the community level could not define or describe what a NGO is or what it 
does, reporting that, “the definition of NGOs is unclearly understood in Vietnam”.  As a 
consequence, although NGOs were approved to operate in the country, they occupied an 
ambiguous position within the social-political structure of the state.  Their non-governmental 
status was a novel and poorly understand concept in a nation where government owns and 
controls all social organizations and permits minimal activity in what might be called “civil 
society”.   
 
This lack of understanding had an important effect on government-NGO relationships.  One 
government official was concerned that, “their [NGOs] operations will face certain barriers.  For 
example, like you and me and we see clearly each other’s role, we just need to meet each other 
and start working together.  If we do not understand each other, we must take time to understand 
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first”.  As a result of their ambiguous social status, NGOs often had trouble establishing effective 
relationships with government.    
 
In many cases, NGO directors contrasted their organization’s operations with that of the private 
sector. One NGO director commented on NGOs’ entrepreneurial capabilities:   
My viewpoint is that NGOs should operate like a business--their structures, their 
organizations, everything is the same.  The only difference is their missions; on one side, 
it means to develop the economy, and on the other side, it develops society and support”. 
The literature provides a similar perspective. In Romania, for example, NGOs diversify their 
financial portfolio through developing business-oriented models (Topor & Boroiu, 2011).  In 
Vietnam, NGO directors admired the business-oriented aspects (e.g., commercialized 
advertisements, evidence-based results).  The interviewees considered that these aspects might 
consolidate NGO effectiveness and facilitate their financial survival.  However, the informants 
might have ignored Kamat’s (2003) cautions that the shift to an entrepreneurial approach may 
disconnect NGOs from the political possibilities of changing society.  For example, one NGO 
director commented: 
Development organizations always lack a business orientation and people generally 
misunderstand that NGOs are not a business.  NGOs are actually special businesses.  You 
see clearly that it is a business.  If we cannot earn money, how can we have money to 
spend?  The way that we sell through producing project proposals and development, and 
we sell through results and changes, we do with the purpose that we earn money to keep 
operating.  This is also a form of fund raising and so we are business, aren’t we?  But to 
91 
 
whom do we bring the benefits, and why do we call NGOs special businesses?  NGOs 
lack a business-orientated mindset, as I have been saying for a long time”. 
 
5.3.  Accountability of NGOs 
Interviewees also discussed NGO accountability in the Vietnam context.  One respondent noted 
that although NGOs conducted projects intended to benefit Vietnamese communities, they took 
the stance that this was mainly the government’s responsibility.  This denial offered NGOs 
flexibility in delivering their field activities.  If NGO activities are evaluated (for instance, by 
donors, by governments, by consultants) as good for communities, NGOs may claim their effort 
to benefit the communities.  If the activities are evaluated as not good for communities, the 
NGOs may claim that the ultimate responsibilities for the communities lie with the governments.  
Ironically, despite NGOs’ grassroots-oriented missions and visions, NGOs reported that they did 
not take responsibility for the long-term well being of the populations that they served. 
 
In contrast, another NGO director related accountability to their delivery effectiveness, as 
follows: 
Accountability should be improved significantly for both donors and beneficiaries. 
Previously, accountability was not stressed, and we assumed that when we did this 
project, we would have accountability. This was an assumption…  And now, 
accountability must be counted in specific ways. If you want to say you are accountable, 
you must achieve this or that.  It is not that you can produce 1, 2, 3, 4 things today, and 
the next day you say you get sick and you cannot produce anything.  This is your job.  
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Accountability means the result on which you are accountable for the funds that donors 
trusted and transferred to us. 
More importantly, NGOs had to clarify to whom they were accountable.  The current literature 
shows that despite NGOs’ clearly-defined accountability to donors, NGOs’ downward 
accountability to communities is comparatively weak (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, Clark, 2001, 
Fox, 2000).  The findings of this research suggest that NGOs seemed to weigh donor’s trust over 
that of beneficiaries.  The above interviewee clearly stated that “accountability means the result 
on which you are accountable for the funds that donors trusted and transferred to us”, clearly 
articulating the prioritization of accountability to donors over other stakeholders.      
 
Although different NGOs targeted different beneficiary groups, they tried to balance upward-
downward accountability when differences existed between donors’ priorities and community 
needs.  For example, a NGO director reported that although their organization supported 
decreasing traffic accidents in Vietnam through supporting the development of alcohol 
consumption policies, donors focused on drivers’ behaviours.  Although donors always oriented 
NGOs towards their priorities and NGOs had to follow the rules of the game, NGOs needed, at 
least, to convey true community needs to donors.  The director confirmed that donors would 
flexibly adjust their objectives to fit with NGO-proposed concepts, if NGOs insisted 
convincingly and used solid evidence to articulate community needs.   
 
NGO’s efforts to balance upward-downward accountability involved “bridging” or brokering 
relations between beneficiaries’ and donors’ wishes.  A NGO director commented on the NGO 
bridging role, as follows:  
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This is our key role and responsibility.  If we cannot do that, why are we here?  In all 
cases, donors and beneficiaries can work together, so why us?  NGOs are intermediaries, 
we are middle-men.  We do not work for free.  We are middle-men.  We are brokers.  We 
get salaried by donors; we use the money donors pay us to cover operation costs so that 
we take the responsibilities.  We are bridges between those who want to do, and those 
who deserve to enjoy the benefits...  We stand in-between and we must balance it.  We 
are salaried to do it…  However, sometimes we do not perceive it; therefore, we 
misunderstand, or we have the illusion that we bring this or that benefit to communities.  
No, no, we are just doing our bridging role.  
The NGO director considered that a bridging role was the right role that NGOs took in delivering 
their projects because it facilitated balancing upward and downward accountability.  NGOs 
accounted downward to communities when investigating their needs, and upward to donors 
when completing funds’ requirements.  My data does not allow for concluding whether this is a 
common view of the role of NGOs.   However, this bridging role may not be enough for NGOs 
to fully develop and transform communities.       
 
5.4. Vietnam as a “middle income” country 
Vietnam became a low middle-income country in 2011 (World Bank, 2013).  Vietnam’s 
economic development is a significant matter relating to NGO operations in the country. All 
interviewees expressed this immediately when asked about factors influencing NGO operations 
in Vietnam.  Vietnam’s increasing prosperity in recent decades is a serious challenge to the NGO 
sector because its re-labeled economic status puts in question its fit with donors’ criteria for 
fundability.  Decreased levels of funding have, of course, a serious impact on NGO operations, 
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and in some cases the survival of foreign NGOs was an expressed concern.  For example, one 
NGO respondent made the following comment: “We do not have enough money for operations.  
Many NGOs have withdrawn from Vietnam… The utmost reason is Vietnam’s announcement of 
being an middle income country”.  Supporting this assertion, a high-ranking government official 
noted that although the number of NGOs registered in Vietnam increased, the number of 
functioning NGOs decreased sharply from about 1,000 registered in 1991 to 487 in May 2018.   
 
Uncertainties in future donor funding have forced NGOs to develop alternate rationales for 
continuing operations.  One NGO director stated that: 
When Vietnam becomes a middle-income country, why do NGOs stay here?  It is 
precarious.  We see that the middle-income status is just a trap; just a certain proportion 
of the population is middle-income, and a large vulnerable population still exists.  For 
example, the middle-income populations only inhabit urban areas, and some rural 
populations may reach a certain point of income, but they are surely far from being 
middle-income.  This means that NGO programs are still necessary in these areas, but if 
we view the entire country’s situation, we are not allowed to attract all those things.  That 
is an uncertainty…  There are so many things foreign NGOs can contribute and do for 
poor populations, but those things are not attractive to funding bodies. 
 
This perspective is stated clearly in the organization’s strategy document:  
Although Vietnam has made significant achievements in implementing the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), … ethnic minority communities severely lag behind 
national trends… The remaining poor still predominately reside in rural areas and their 
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livelihoods depend on agriculture and related activities. Despite being in the minority, 
poverty rates among people from ethnic minorities account for almost half of the 
country’s poor households. They have difficulty accessing basic services, such as 
healthcare, clean water and education. The child mortality rate among minority groups is 
double that of the majority Kinh people, and the malnutrition rate of ethnic minority 
babies (33%) is more than double the national average (15%). 
This passage represents the real picture of contemporary middle-income Vietnam, where some 
groups and those in rural areas have unequal and often inadequate access to basic health and 
social services.  The country’s significant economic achievements have not been evenly 
distributed, and this fact continues to provide justification for the continued work of those NGOs 
which are concerned with addressing poverty and the consequences of poverty. Yet, Vietnam’s 
official accession to middle income status works against this important priority.  
 
5.5. Shifts in funding priorities  
Nearly all respondents (10 NGOs, 1 central-level government officer, and 2 implementation-
level government officers) expressed concern about the impacts that the shifts in funding 
priorities and allocations may have on NGO operations in Vietnam.  The respondents showed 
strong interest in how NGO projects are funded and financed, and how NGOs are able to survive 
financial matters in Vietnamese context.   
 
Despite the expressed concerns with poverty remediation and worries about long-term funding, 
respondents did note that Vietnam had in fact made significant progress on a number of health 
issues.  For example, as one respondent noted, it has achieved good results in nutritional 
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education and high levels of vitamin A coverage compared with other countries at the same 
income level.  World Bank’s (2019) statistics also supports this comparison, indicating that 
Vietnam’s coverage of vitamin A among children of 6-59 months is much higher in 2015 (97%) 
compared with several other countries at the same income level (for example, the Philippines 
72%, India 53%, Papua New Guinea 15%, Laos PDR 88%, and Egypt 68%).  Moreover, the 
national health insurance scheme also covers eye diseases such as cataracts, and the country 
intends to eradicate trachoma. As one respondent noted, because of these achievements, nutrition 
and eye health have not remained public health priorities among NGOs in Vietnam. 
 
Parallel with decisions to eliminate or downgrade Vietnam as a priority country, donors have 
also shifted their program priorities.  Many will no longer fund traditional public health 
programs (nutrition, maternal and child health, HIV prevention, trachoma), nor infrastructure 
projects such as school and road construction. One NGO respondent commented that, 
Donors will not fund ‘regular’ issues anymore because they suppose that those issues 
have been solved.  They just attend to funding newly-emerged issues such as 
environmental problems and non-communicable diseases.  They still fund infectious 
diseases, but they focus on diseases causing dangerous problems and possibly 
international pandemics, or with the risk of trans-national communication, for example 
flu A-H5N. 
 
Another NGO director added that even newly-emerging problems would not be funded if they 
differed from donors’ new priorities: 
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We consider that alcohol drinking is a big issue in Vietnam, and the health and social 
consequences of alcohol abuse are big.  Importantly, the consumption is rapidly 
increasing due to lack of effective policies to control the consumption, especially in 
youth…  If young individuals consume alcohol at an early stage in their life without 
control measures, consequences may happen just a few minutes after the use.  My 
organization considers this an issue of concern, but our budget is limited because of 
current international funding sources. 
 
This comment is consistent with research reporting that funding uncertainties may impact 
program breadth, intensity, and sustainability (Biermann, Eckhardt, Carlfjord, Falk, & Forsberg 
(2016), Jennings (2015), Mussa, Pfeiffer, Gloyd, & Sherr, 2013).  In Vietnam, current NGO 
projects are driven by this new environment of donor funding, shifting them away from many of 
their more traditional activities to a focus on new kinds of projects. For example, one NGO has 
shifted its traditional focus (charity activities, emergency responses) to access by the public of 
information (for instance, master plan for local development), community ownership of forest 
land, and environmental protection.  
 
However, there are NGOs that seek to maintain their traditional commitments report facing a 
more-competitive funding environment. One foreign NGO with a long history of work in 
Vietnam decided to continue its ongoing projects in nutrition and blindness prevention despite 
limitations on external funding for these issues and realizing that this might jeopardize future 
funding. The representative of this NGO explained that they were proud of their more than 100-
year history of work on these issues internationally and were afraid that any change to their 
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traditional scope of work would have negative reputational consequences internationally. 
Management was also skeptical about embracing new programs. No data available exist to prove 
any mismatch between emerging donor priorities and the country’s health issues. I think that the 
country’s health sector, donors and NGOs have their own measuring systems to determine their 
priorities.   
 
Donors have become more demanding, preferring to fund projects that promise long-term 
impacts over short-term outputs.  Moreover, they look increasingly for project sustainability in 
funded programs.  As is reported in the literature, NGOs may use different methods to achieve 
sustainability (Biermann, Eckhardt, Carlfjord, Falk, & Forsberg, 2016, Berry, 2014, Mosley, 
Maronick, & Katz, 2012, Sarriot et. al., 2004, Gellert, 1996).  For instance, in several cases 
reported in the literature, NGO fixed-term interventions necessitated exit strategies to ensure 
smooth transition to local governments (Abramowitz, 2015, Ejaz, Shaikh, & Rizvi, 2011).  
However, the expectations for greater accountability in terms of documenting program impact 
and sustainability were sometimes not clearly specified by donors.  My respondents indicate that 
there was often a great deal of confusion over what, exactly, donors wanted. In order to cope 
with this confusion, NGOs simply developed their own accountability measures.  One NGO 
director argued that sustainable development meant, to their organization, an unfinished agenda 
that embraced transparency and accountability, good governance and civil society, and public-
private partnerships.  The uncertainty surrounding understandings of these terms allowed for 
some flexibility in local interpretations of different dimensions of program impact -- e.g., what 
constitutes poverty reduction, which NGOs then used to their advantage in negotiating with 




Donors were also said to sometimes pull back from fully financing projects by cutting 
operational costs and requiring NGOs to provide matching funds. For example, a donor may 
cover only direct costs related to core project staff and project activities, but would not pay 
indirect costs for support staff (e.g., administration, finance, management) or operations.  There 
were even donors who requested fund matching in activity lines, meaning that the donors would 
allocate funds for only part of interventions proposed by NGOs, which meant that NGOs had to 
seek additional sources of funds to sponsor project activities.  In this new funding environment, 
NGOs also reported facing increased competition for funding, and were often forced to reduce 
spending in some areas.  
 
At times, and in a departure from past practices, although donors were wanting to invest in the 
long-term sustainability of projects, they imposed short timeframes for implementation.  For 
example, NGOs were asked to complete projects within one year, whether they were installing 
water filtering systems for kindergartens or building a primary school.  A NGO director reported 
that, “[Name of organization] gives us ten water filtering systems… We must complete within 
one year.  When we ask whether the funds are available for next year, they say they do not know, 
they are not sure.”  In this case, the donors themselves were unsure about their own financial 
prospects. NGOs, in turn, had to rush to fulfil contracts regardless of any challenges or any 
higher priority needs that might arise in the field.      
 
As well as imposing controls on the use of funds, some donors also dictated fund flows without 
involving the Government of Vietnam.  This bypassing of local government and their priorities 
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(if identified) generated concerns over accountability and transparency.  A high-ranking 
government official complained that donors might bypass government to finance development 
projects (survey research, technical support, community development, and emergency measures) 
through foreign NGOs.  Unfortunately, funding details were miscommunicated to government, 
which therefore could not determine the total picture of international investments, coordinate and 
monitor fund disbursements, and evaluate the effectiveness of such investments.   The 
government official cited above went on to cite an example of this problem: 
Donors are committed to spending an amount of money for Vietnam, but they select to 
partner with NGOs in the implementation.  The government does not care about that, but 
the ways donors spend the money they never let the government know…  For example, 
this is a poverty alleviation project, in which there is an amount of about several million 
dollars to be allocated for a research activity to support the project objectives.  The donor 
selects an organization to conduct the research.  When this organization receives the 
funds, they are not informed of the framed agreement the donor signed with the 
government.  The organization is also not provided with relevant documents and permits.  
...  Supposing the Ministry of Health is a project recipient …  then the Ministry of Health 
does not know the role of the organization because the former does not receive the 
announcement from the donor.  When the NGO completes the research activity, they 
send the results to the Ministry of Health as per the grant’s terms…  The Ministry of 
Health cannot approve the research results because it was not officially involved. 
So, according to this respondent, proper donor-government-NGO communication would have 
ensured official acknowledgement and recognition of program effectiveness.  When 
miscommunication happened, NGOs suffered the most because they were blamed for not 
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working effectively.  Their attempts to fulfil grant contracts were not recognized by the 
government and donors.  They faced a reputational risk with both donors and government.  Some 
observers note that donor bypassing of government is a problem and NGOs are unfortunately 
responsible for any inconveniences this bypassing may cause (Jennings 2015). 
 
In Vietnam, both NGOs and government voiced concerns over NGOs’ financial status.  NGOs 
have never had substantial financial power compared with governments’ funds, nor those of 
several other multi- and bi-lateral financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank or Asian 
Development Bank).  A senior staff member in one NGO admitted that NGOs provided the 
country with the fewest financial contributions compared with other financial institutions.  
Clearly, while governments have expected that NGOs would provide communities with funds, 
their financial status made NGOs less powerful than other potential donors in the country.  This 
matters because the government is under less pressure to provide favourable conditions for NGO 
operations, and the government may therefore be less interested in NGO efforts at policy 
advocacy.  
 
The shortage of funds was further complicated by several other financial constraints uncovered 
during this research.  A provincial-level senior government official stated that NGOs only 
financed small-scale, short-term projects, and did so unpredictably. Moreover, this official also 
noted that NGOs normally made use of different financial reporting styles, depending on their 
donors which made it difficult for government to track funding flows. Another government 
official noted that NGOs did not submit full reports with detailed budgets to local governments, 




Budget constraints compromised long-term planning and sustainable partnerships with 
government.  The current literature highlights several aspects around government-NGO 
partnership frameworks, such as commitment and willingness (Solana, 2014, Haque, 2002).  In 
this research one NGO respondent said that NGOs were unlikely to propose long-term plans due 
to short, fixed-term grants and anxiety over the shortage of funds. One NGO director commented 
that: 
A NGO needs to have its country operation plan, then its people plan, if it wants to 
develop sustainably in the longer term.  If funding is unstable, how can we do that?  ... 
Now we make one-year budget plans, and programs and staff plans are built just for the 
one-year period. 
The uncertainty created when NGOs are not able to build long-term operation plans challenged 
their effectiveness as development partners.  More seriously, as one government respondent 
claimed, this uncertainty in long-term funding led to poor planning of government-NGO 
partnerships.   
 
As is reported in the literature, under such circumstances, NGOs apply several tactics to achieve 
financial self-reliance (e.g., Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012), ranging from building staff 
capacity to actively seeking funding alternatives.  In Vietnam, in the past, NGOs focused more 
on program development and proposal writing, and less on active salesmanship.  Donors might 
send an invitation to NGOs to declare funds availability.  Now, fundraising has been elevated as 
a priority, for example employing and training staff in communications and organizational 
development.  Another NGO conceptualized diversifying its funding sources by,  
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.. diversifying [the organization’s] funding base and continually improving its donor 
reporting and information sharing system to make it compact, fast and interactive. We 
will test different, diverse and innovative fundraising products to construct lasting 
partnerships with new donors.   
 
The literature suggests that NGOs often leverage funds from the private sector to navigate 
periods of financial vulnerability (Arhin, Kumi, & Adam, 2018, Besel, Williams, & Klak, 2011, 
Aldaba et al., 2000).  In Vietnam, one NGO noted in their 2015 Annual Report, that they aimed 
to raise funds in all three sectors: the public, corporate, and individual.  Such tactics indicated 
that NGOs were doing their best to overcome funding uncertainties and shifts to donor priorities.  
Clearly, staff capacity building and fund diversification needed to be converted from principles 
laid out in official documents (strategy documents, progress reports) into concrete actions.  The 
words were noted down in official documents echoed NGOs’ strong commitment to their 
finances so that they could survive and address poverty in Vietnam.  
 
One question may arise around the existence of NGOs in Vietnam.  I did not ask NGO 
respondents why they chose to remain in Vietnam given the difficult circumstances and burden 
of uncertainties in which they operate, but based on my experience I believe that the NGOs have 
their own missions and visions to accomplish.  Because NGOs are generally committed to 
working with underserved communities, they find Vietnam still fitting in their scope of work. 
Despite the country’s rapid economic growth, several populations lag behind, and new social 
issues emerge.  These situations offer NGOs reasons to stay in Vietnam despite unfavourable 
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social and political circumstances.  However, NGOs’ leaders have to ensure that their programs 
effectively target disadvantaged communities.     
 
In Vietnam, NGOs are not likely to attract domestic corporate donors. One NGO director 
complained that “Domestic individuals and corporations do not fully understand charity, and 
generally when contributing to charity, they would prefer direct giving, without going through 
any individuals or organizations, and they would never think of the fact that there should be 10% 
or 15% for operating costs.”  In addition, “bricks and mortar” material project outcomes (e.g., 
school construction) always dominated over “softer” outcomes – health promotion, knowledge 
translation/exchange. 
 
While domestic corporations were reluctant to cooperate with NGOs on development projects, 
internationally-based companies were seen to be less so.  Although NGO directors admitted that 
they had rarely received funds from internationally-based companies, they believed that strong 
networking might change this.  One NGO director said that his organization did enjoy excellent 
corporate funding because they had a wide-ranging and active network with the corporate sector.  
The Annual Report 2016 of one NGO highlighted their successful partnerships with enterprises 
such as Coca Cola, HSBC, and the International Investment Bank.  The report confirmed that 
partnering with the private sector “advanced the country’s sustainable finance scheme,” and that 
the organization made private corporations the target of fundraising initiatives to support the 
achievement of country-wide program objectives.  Several NGOs reported exploring the 
potential to engage corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs for funding purposes.  NGOs 
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can be funded by international companies (that is a company headquartered outside Vietnam that 
has a representative office in Vietnam).       
 
5.6. Regulatory constraints 
More than half of interviewed NGO respondents, and all interviewed central-level government 
officers, reported problems stemming from current regulations of NGO operations in Vietnam.  
While the central-level government officers explained current policies and asserted that foreign 
NGOs had to follow the policies, NGO representatives provided several critical comments on the 
development and enforcement of these regulations.    
 
Governments continually impose regulations intended to govern NGO operations even if NGOs 
offer great support to state development (Murtaza & Austin, 2011).  In Vietnam, the three main 
policy documents are Decree 12/2012/ND-CP, Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg., and Decree 
93/2009/ND-CP.  In particular, Decree 12/2012/ND-CP guides the registration and management 
of foreign NGOs’ humanitarian activities.  The decree regulates all administrative procedures 
within NGOs, including reporting and monitoring of NGO deliverables, and income tax on 
foreign workers.  Organizations must be issued representative office permits, field office permits, 
and single project permits. This requirement sometimes represented barriers to the effective 
implementation of projects in the field.    
 
Several government departments are tasked with managing NGO operations, e.g., the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Committee for Foreign Non-Governmental Organization Affairs, agencies with 
representatives who are members of the Committee for Foreign Non-Governmental Organization 
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Affairs, ministries, ministerial-level agencies, government-attached agencies and central 
agencies, provincial-level People's Committees, and Vietnamese partners.  Many authorities are 
thus able, and likely, to scrutinize NGO activities.   
 
Consequently, many NGO organization described suffering from “paperwork pressure”. Two 
organizations expressed their concerns over the applications for extension of representative 
office permits that involved project locations.  Although the applications would eventually be 
approved, requirements imposed on NGOs to develop applications, and the time to process 
applications, often led to delays in project implementation. 
 
NGO operations are also affected when international staff needed approval prior to entering the 
field.  The approval process normally required paperwork submissions one to two weeks in 
advance.  However, despite NGOs’ efforts at compliance, some visits were cancelled due to 
short notice and for several other reasons described as “sensitive” by government.  One NGO 
director noted ironically that whereas foreign tourists could go anywhere in the country with 
their visitor visas, foreign NGO workers could not access field sites without prior permission.   
 
The literature shows that NGO staff qualifications can be affected by resource constraints 
(Gilson, Sen, Mohammed, et. al., 1994), and by the poor-settings of NGO activities and 
associated physical and infrastructural challenges (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012).  This 
research found that the country’s regulations even targeted local staff who were working with 
foreign NGOs.  One director reported that national policies closely tightened labour recruitment 
and management in foreign sectors (e.g., foreign NGOs).  The involvement of a state department 
107 
 
in the recruiting processes, coupled with the requirement that all must undergo a “police check”, 
was likely to erode local people’s willingness to work in this sector.  In addition, several NGO 
directors were concerned about unstable staffing due to changes in policies regarding retirement, 
salary and income tax. Clearly, the interventions of government departments in recruiting and 
managing labour in foreign sectors, alongside uncertain policy directions, greatly affected NGO 
operations. 
 
In summary, Decree 12/2012/ND-CP stipulated several procedures pertaining to the 
administration of foreign NGOs.  Multi-department engagement, time-consuming paperwork, 
and bureaucratic interventions in human resources introduced considerable uncertainty in NGO 
operations. Additionally, NGOs expressed insecurity about how and in what directions 
regulations might change.     
 
Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg regulates the organization of events engaging “foreign factors”.  The 
regulation aims to review content, agendas, and procedures before, during and after sponsored 
events take place.  Fisher (2003) stresses that NGO policies may sometimes be “schizophrenic” 
and may actually “conceal co-optation” (pp. 22).  NGOs must obtain a permit before such events, 
meaning that apart from obtaining an operation permit, NGOs had to obtain several small 
permits for certain categories of activities, such as events that gathered many people (e.g., 
conferences, workshops, communication activities).  Even minor adjustments in presenters’ 
profiles, participants, or content topics had to be approved beforehand.  The need for both 
“umbrella permits” and “small permits” illustrates the degree to which government attempted to 




Although introducing several terms describing regulated “events” (workshops, conferences, 
foreign factors), the Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg does not clearly define what activities these 
include, and this has been confusing to applicants.  For example, foreign “factors” might mean 
foreign partners, foreign participants, foreign sources of funds, or foreign organizers.  NGO 
directors were concerned that conferences and workshops might also comprise roundtable 
discussions, meetings, and many other events that gathered participants, such as communication 
activities, all of which might separate need permits.  The blurred definitions meant that 
organizations have had to make tremendous efforts to obtain permits and to report the numerous 
“workshops” likely to occur nearly every day in a NGO’s projects. 
   
Applications of this policy were often a significant nuisance for NGO directors.  For instance, 
one director complained that a police officer always accompanied communication activities, so 
that the activities could not happen naturally.  Event agendas were also not allowed to touch on 
any “sensitive” matters (e.g., politics, religion).  According to one NGO director, 
There was an event of some nature, the [name of organization] was a co-organizer with a 
series of other agencies (British Ambassador from EU, foreign NGOs, along with the 
People Participation Working Group (PPWG)).  The event was about access to 
information associated with anti-corruption activities.  In the last minute when 
participants were all seated in the meeting hall, the event was cancelled, and they 
[government officials] referred to Decision 76.  You know, the British Ambassador came, 
EU Ambassador came.  And the content of the event was already sponsored by the 




In the above example, issues around access to information and corruption might be considered 
“sensitive” subjects; therefore, the event was labelled “sensitive” and was cancelled at the last 
minute.  Even though the Law on Access to Information had been passed, Decision 76/2010/QD-
TTg remained as a legal tool used by officials to control NGO activities.    
 
Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg presented a more political than professional approach to controlling 
NGO operations.  The Decision seemed to deploy numerous barriers, ranging from time-
consuming administrative procedures to content censoring the operations of foreign NGOs.  A 
NGO director said this about the Decision:  
Such provisions are very ominous.  The situation speaks to the fact that government 
officials in charge of constructing the policies really stay away from real life.  And the 
policies should not be passed, and I think the policies should gain much improvement 
before being passed.  In fact, the policies really become great barriers against the 
operations of CSOs and NGO.  
Clearly the focus on administrative approvals, even of minor events, could draw NGOs’ efforts 
and resources away from the delivery of interventions or other initiatives that benefit 
communities.   
 
The legal document that was most discussed and criticized by NGOs was Decree 93/2009/ND-
CP, which regulates the management and utilization of foreign NGO aid in Vietnam.  Foreign 
NGOs are considered funding agencies or donors.  No individuals or community groups were to 
become fund recipients, and the funds had to be transferred to official public sector organizations 
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regulated by the government.  The funds were not to negatively affect political security, social 
order and safety, or the interests of the nation, and the rights and legitimate interests of 
Vietnamese organizations and individuals.  After NGOs transfer the funds to Vietnamese 
agencies, the fund recipients became de facto fund owners and they could then direct the 
implementation according to their interests or priorities.  NGOs in Vietnam cannot therefore 
engage in direct implementation. The language and the content expressed in the Decree are clear.    
 
This Decree strongly framed NGO operations, stating that foreign NGOs had to keep their 
“international status” in Vietnam and undergo the stricter “control path” for foreign 
organizations.  If foreign NGOs were localized (meaning they registered as Vietnamese NGOs), 
they could possibly coordinate directly with communities without partnering with government-
owned agencies.  A high-ranking government official noted that: 
On the State’s administration side, and legally, we do not acknowledge or have not 
acknowledged the Vietnamization [of NGOs].  This has many reasons, but concurrently, 
international communities want to transfer their models of operations to Vietnam. 
As is revealed by this comment, government has not been ready to allow for the Vietnamizing of 
foreign NGOs.  They want to control the international status of foreign NGOs, and they impose 
administrative measures that are designed to tighten this control.  By the issuance of the Decree, 
the Government has confirmed their intention to tightly control foreign NGOs.   
 
Recently, the Decree was reviewed to simplify regulations and to serve the purpose of promoting 
and encouraging more effective aid for Vietnam’s development.  A NGO Task Force was invited 
by the government to engage in the review processes.  The Task Force included representatives 
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from foreign NGOs and from the Embassy of Canada, the Embassy of Australia, an EU 
Delegation, and USAID.  One NGO director expressed that their organization had served on a 
Task Force for ten years to promote an open-ended Decree to facilitate NGO operations.  
Respondents were concerned about the review because although the processes were undertaken 
seriously, no one can predict the end-result.  The Task Force produced four or five updated 
versions of the Decree, each devised with great effort to convey messages to government 
agencies and authorities.  Ultimately, however, the latest version that officially came out of the 
mission was considered by NGO participants to be disappointing.  No Task Force suggestions 
were acknowledged or adopted by the authorities.  One NGO director complained that:   
Decree 93, which will finally be approved, may be better or worse than the current draft, 
and this remains unknown.  The current draft has in itself several limitations, but the 
coming draft may have even more limitations.  This is a challenge for international 
NGOs…  And this clearly represents that the reality is more controlling than enabling. 
 
Thus, through several rounds of revision, the regulations became even more restrictive, rather 
than enabling, of NGO operations.  Representatives of development partners and foreign NGOs 
released a position document dated October 29, 2016, in which they noted that: 
Overall the Draft Decree has not yet addressed the existing shortcomings of Decree 93 
(both in written content and actual implementation). The spirit of the Draft Decree still 
fundamentally demonstrates a lengthy, complex, and multi-window process of project 
approval. It does not create favourable conditions for mobilizing, receiving, managing 
and using foreign non-governmental assistance. 
The representatives concluded that: 
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Development partners and foreign NGOs present in Vietnam urge the Vietnamese 
Government to streamline the current complexities in the regulatory framework for 
foreign non-governmental aid by clarifying the intention of the Draft Decree and bringing 
it into alignment with existing laws and decrees that shape the enabling environment for 
foreign non-governmental assistance, including the Civil Code, Decree 16, Decree 12, 
and the framework of business regulations. 
Although participatory stakeholder consultations took place, the voices were apparently not 
heard.  The state’s efforts at political control were argued by NGOs to be extreme. This 
experience is a good example of how the uncertainty of policy and political engagements in 
Vietnam affects NGOs.    
 
These events also represent the top-down approach to social programs in Vietnam, which require 
adherence to policy stipulations with little room for adjustment or feedback.  Outside Vietnam, 
scholars note that government-NGO relationships are characterized by unequal power, in which 
NGOs must obey state priorities and frameworks (Anku-Tsede, 2014, Mercer, Thompson, & 
Araujo, 2014, McLoughlin, 2011, Fisher, 2003, Gary, 1996, Lubin, 1987).  In Vietnam, and as 
reported by one government respondent, it is clear that NGOs are expected by regulation to 
recognize and align with the government’s procedural processes, including the bureaucratic tasks 
of filing proper paperwork, permit issuances, partnering, geographic locations, and reporting. 
Conversely, NGOs are not expected to resist or complain.  No official mechanisms exist by 




Within this controlling policy environment, NGOs’ self-censorship is visible.  They make efforts 
to skillfully maneuver within this policy environment (e.g. interpreting the laws in a way 
beneficial to their operations or narrowing down their interventions and initiatives).  One NGO 
director commented that:  
Tightening regulations is inevitable and is a big concern to organizations like [name of 
organization].  More importantly, we will implement the decree, which means it will 
make individuals and organizations censor themselves.  The self-censorship deserves 
greater worries…  In Vietnam, even though laws existed, there was always room for 
manoeuvring...  Operations, in real life, mean trying ways to maneuver.  Now with the 
tightened policies, each individual organization will be more careful, and they may self-
censor before pushing a matter.  This is a big concern. 
 
The complicated processes of transferring funds to state-owned agencies, expressed though 
bureaucratic, time-consuming procedures and paper submissions, seriously affected Vietnam’s 
funding landscape.  A NGO representative admitted that, “The organization must follow 
administrative procedures and sometimes misses funding opportunities from overseas...  
Sometimes funds come due and we must return the funds”.  One government official admitted 
that when foreign NGOs missed funding opportunities, they also failed to commit funds to 
Vietnamese fund receivers (state-owned agencies, local NGOs).  The bureaucracy therefore 
affected the delivery of services to needy communities.    
 
In a nutshell, Decree 93/2009/ND-CP addressed the management and utilization of foreign NGO 
aid.  It provided necessary steps and procedures for transferring funds from foreign NGOs (as 
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international donors) to government-controlled agencies (as fund receivers).  The transactions 
were marked by reams of bureaucratic, time-consuming paperwork.  A recent review of the 
Decree illustrated that the voices of foreign NGOs and several other donors had not been heard 
by the government.  As a result, the latest version of the Decree became even more controlling 
than previous ones, potentially damaging the state-wide funding landscape and pushing NGOs to 
“maneuver”.  The top-down approach to social processes, coupled with extreme policy and 
political engagement, represented the uncertainty of regulations development and 
implementation.      
 
NGOs were also concerned about the uncertain progress of a long-gestating Law on 
Associations.  During its 20 years of development, the law evolved with some progressive drafts 
with several ideas supporting the operations of NGOs.  The Law is supported by NGOs because 
it offers favourable conditions for NGO operations.  However, the final version that was 
presented before parliament seemed to appear, in one NGO respondent terms, as "from the sky." 
Progressive language introduced during the Law’s development was withdrawn by government.  
A government official provided an example that indicated that NGOs were not included in the 
latest version of the Law: 
People mention that the scope of regulation just involves associations and not subjects 
such as international and local NGOs and community organizations.  This is what I think 
it is time they should have the understandings of foreign NGOs, and once we call it the 
Law on Associations, this means the right of the people to form their associations.  This 




The long history of development of the Law suggested the existence of significant barriers to its 
passage.  A NGO director said that, 
There seems to exist something that makes it difficult for the Government to pass the 
Law on Association, and I understand if the law is passed, civil society organizations may 
enjoy more advantages.  The Law has been worked on through so many periods, for 
dozens of years… but we cannot have it because of very different barriers and opinions, 
in which I understand that here is a very big concern.  If civil society grows strongly, it 
can lead to insecurity for political institutions. 
The “sensitive” area of associations was linked with unstable society and politics.  Without the 
passing of the Law, an operational framework for NGOs would be impossible, leaving NGOs 
open to restrictions posed by the Decrees cited above. This is clearly a source of great 
uncertainty.   
 
Given this uncertainty, NGO respondents worried that legal measures might be implemented to 
sanction NGOs’ and other international institutions’ failures to obey regulations. NGO directors 
warned that they expected a soon-to-be-issued legal document that would place further burdens 
on NGOs and, again, hinder NGOs’ abilities to implement new or innovative projects.   
 
Several NGO directors discussed differences between what government said and what it did.  For 
instance, although the government needed NGO support, they created several “excuses” to 
control NGOs’ project deliveries, and they, “call those excuses support.”  As reported by one 
NGO respondent, there are clearly differences between language and action:   
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This is a big absurdity.  In language, it is support.  But in real life, all policies clearly aim 
to control.  You tie our hands and legs.  Clearly, it has been very hard for us to raise 
funds, but how can we attract additional funds with such controlling policies?   
 
Whether the government actually supports NGO operations in Vietnam is, in fact, unclear. On 
one side, a senior government official confirmed that the Government of Vietnam appreciated 
and respected NGO interventions over time, and they wanted to increase this collaboration. This 
official also stressed that Vietnam promulgated consistent policies to facilitate NGO operations.  
However, NGO directors presented a different perspective: that the government undoubtedly 
aimed to tightly control NGO operations.  The different viewpoints between the state cadre and 
NGO representatives echoed uncertainties over policy directions.   
 
Last but not least, differences existed between the government’s verbal confirmation that 
Vietnam always endeavours to create an enabling environment for NGO operations, and political 
directives that demonstrate a different perspective.  One NGO director shared that, 
The politics in Vietnam may be a black box; you cannot know what is happening in the 
top-notch Ministry of Politics with different schools of thoughts… and different interest 
groups….  There are some “open periods” and some “closed periods” in policy drafts…  
It is the command of the Party…  I am not sure if it is a Regulation… but Regulation 
102…  limits some activities, or the Party members will be penalized for publicly 
supporting civil society organization”.   
Within a political monopoly, the ruling party’s directive represents absolute power over all 
dimensions of the country’s development.  Regulation 102-QD/TW stated that political party 
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members would be expelled from the party if addressing or discussing support for civil society 
(Chapter II, Article 7, Point 3b).  With this regulation, government could not issue any legal 
documents that would facilitate NGO operations.  The party’s directive seriously compromised 
any official effort to facilitate NGOs’ operations, and certainly constrains the development of 
policies that might facilitate or be conducive to NGOs’ operations.   
 
5.7. Policy gaps 
The implementation of policies certainly challenged the NGO directorship.  While no 
government officers at both central level and implementation level addressed this issue, more 
than half of interviewed NGO representatives were greatly concerned about the implementation 
of government policies, which they considered to have the potential to negatively affect their 
organizations’ operations.  Yet, interestingly, no one could predict whether or not the policies 
would be implemented, or how they would be implemented.  One NGO director commented that,  
Decree 76 has actually existed for ten years or longer. …  It is ridiculous to implement it, 
and generally it cannot be implemented.  It means everyone has just left it there.…  
However, 76 has been used more frequently in the last two years, meaning that when I [a 
government official] need it I will use it, and when I do not need it, I will not use it” 
Policy implementation was arbitrary.  As the director cited above noted, the government applied 
these rulings when they needed or wanted to.  The implementation of  policies likely occurs 
either when a NGO’s practices are seen as so problematic that intervention is needed, or when a 
government representative decides they want to do something.  For example, newly registered 
NGOs, or NGOs that operate with “sensitive” areas may be targeted by government 
representatives.  The use was uncertain, and no one knew when the government would apply or 
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implement the Decree.  NGOs were thus placed in rather precarious situations, characterized by 
considerable uncertainty, with staff having to decide whether or not to follow regulations, and 
not knowing of the outcome of these decisions. 
 
The flexibility of policy implementation depended on specific NGOs.  One NGO senior policy 
advisor disclosed that paperwork requirements seemed to rest more heavily on newly-landed 
organizations in Vietnam, and on organizations with US-based headquarters.  Different treatment 
of different audiences again revealed uncertainty in policy implementation.   
 
Sometimes, NGOs were allowed to escape regulations.  One NGO director admitted that,  
There was a time we had an opportunity to work in Nam Dinh province.  The Nam Dinh 
people knew this, and PACCOM also allowed the local people to work with [name of 
organization].  This means they turned on the green light despite no approved permit 
extension. 
Organizations are supposed to obtain permits before they could access the field, though in this 
case this requirement was inexplicably waived. 
 
Also, current policies require that NGOs must transfer funds to relevant state-owned partners for 
implementation at the local level.  However, a few NGOs might be exempted from this 
requirement.  For instance, [name of organization] did not follow the regulation, reasoning that 
the regulations were not consistent with the organization’s financial management and requesting 
that it be able to manage the money flows.  The NGO director disclosed that, 
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Provinces accept the [name of organization]’s current financial management, meaning 
that [name of organization] remains a fund owner.  No big problems so far, but I am not 
sure what happens in two or three years; they may be more controlling, and things may 
be different.  This is an uncertainty. 
In this case, while other NGOs followed the rules regarding the transfer of funds to local 
partners, this NGO did not.  However, as admitted by the director, the long-term viability of 
exemption is uncertain.   
 
Policy implementation might depend on the relationship between NGOs and state-owned 
agencies (partners), or personal relationships between individual officers in charge of the 
implementation.  One NGO director admitted that personal relations determined how quickly 
project documents were approved at the ministry level: 
They [ministry staff] are fine if not working on NGOs’ documents…  However, they are 
affected by personal relationships; for instance, when they meet with NGOs’ staff who 
are not easy-going, they do not like them, then they do not work.  Sometimes it is 
personal relationships, not rules. 
In reality, despite tight government regulations, NGOs have often found room for flexibility and 
“manoeuvring” when personal relations might supersede the observance of rules.  The 
personalization of regulations means that NGOs remained challenged by the unpredictability of 
implementation.  
 
NGO directors asserted that the government did not have the capacity to fully implement its 
controls, and they just targeted policies "where needed" and focused on a few organizations of 
120 
 
concern. Unfortunately, no one could predict whether and when their organizations would be 
targeted.   
 
In summary, NGO operations are vulnerable to the uncertainty of whether and to what degree 
governing policies are enforced.  In this research project, policy implementation was arbitrary, 
with different treatments given different organizations, and by unexplained exemptions.  This 
uncertainty in policy implementation was linked both to personal relationships between NGO 
staff and government partners, as well as the government’s managerial capacity.   
 
Even where policies are implemented, the implementation was neither consistent nor proper. 
Government-stipulated processing time standards might be ignored by authorities, with no 
explanation.  NGOs sometimes waited hopelessly for signed papers:   
We depend on time; we never know when we will get things back.…  We just submit 
[papers] to them; they process them but they also need information from other agencies…  
We are very passive.  Sometimes there is an issue after they have signed it, but we have 
waited so long to receive it…  We do not know what the difficulties are.  When we ask, 
they say they are submitting for signature. 
This NGO director noted here that their organization became “passive”, meaning that they did 
not undertake any efforts to speed the process, and even when they did, they were stymied.   
 
Occasionally, incomplete instructions and inconsistent feedback were provided.  For instance, 
the websites of relevant authorities were not updated to include updated requirements.  Also, 
when government officers explained the full procedures, delivery of their instructions may be 
121 
 
divided amongst several communications, which created time delays, and as this respondent 
notes, a great deal of annoyance: 
They should list what we miss from the submission, such as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; then we 
can go home to prepare all those 7 documents for a second submission.  However, here 
when they find that we miss a document, they tell us to fix it.  When we have fixed, they 
tell us about another missed document.  They are not professional therefore they generate 
waste of time and efforts from both sides...  We never know because they always say 
their website has everything, but we do not receive good instructions.  
This example illustrates the difficult experience of working with government agencies.  NGO 
staff might not be able to predict the information gaps that they should have prepared for.  The 
“matrix of administrative procedures” in one respondent’s terms, became a real burden on NGO 
operations.   
 
As above, respondents reported that bureaucracy in policy implementation had a negative impact 
on NGO operations due to the time-consuming issuance of several permits for each single 
project. One NGO found itself six to seven months behind schedule in a nutritional intervention. 
The organization’s director also noted the risk of losing funds due to their inability to disburse 
funds granted for the project.   
 
Poor coordination among levels of authority concerned NGO directors.  For instance, they had to 
submit several reports to several different authorities.  One NGO director reported that their 
organization directly submitted annual reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PACCOM, 
but also to the Department of Diplomatic Corporations, local governments, and even the 
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Department of Public Security, each of which had their own requirements and formats.  
Although NGO staff had to allocate adequate time for reporting, they were still sometimes 
confused by the several levels of authorities and their various requirements. This confusion was 
exacerbated when NGO projects were implemented in several locales.  Each locale would be 
represented by one fund recipient, and NGOs would transfer funds to each of the recipients for 
implementation and disbursement.  Whether the recipients could receive the funds and 
implement their components depended on prior approvals by competent authorities.  NGO staff 
had to ensure proper approvals in each location.  One NGO director noted, “It takes much time 
for procedures.”  Poor cross-agency coordination generated confusion and hints at the 
consequent heavy workloads to meet bureaucratic requirements that foreign NGOs suffered in 
Vietnam. Poor coordination was also marked by the issuance of several different policies on the 
same matter.  For instance, different legal documents regulate the taxes levied on expatriate staff 
working in Vietnam. A few NGOs had closed their offices due in part to a tax levied back in 
2012.   
 
Poor coordination at times caused delays in responding to government requests.  For instance, 
One NGO’s late submission of tax information might be caused by delayed office operation 
permits.  Unfortunately, it was the NGOs who were penalized for this problem.  Other NGOs 
were also penalized for delayed extension permits.  In the words of one NGO director, 
When we receive a permit with changes in information or expiry date, we provide an 
update to a competent authority…  however, we are penalized for providing late 
information.  Other organizations may also meet with this situation. …  We show them 
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that we have just received the permit extension, but even with a receipt, they say they do 
not know.            
As a result, NGOs are held accountable for delays that they did not cause.   
 
To summarize, poor coordination across government agencies severely hampered NGO 
operations. NGOs were often confused by the requirements of various authorities, each with their 
own reporting requirements and formats, and regulations.  NGOs were also held accountable for 
repeating several procedures for each project location. NGOs could also be penalized for delays 
caused by the government offices’ poor coordination.   
 
Policy development and implementation created considerable uncertainty.  The arbitrary 
enforcement of regulations, improper policy implementation, and poor cross-agency 
coordination were among the policy-associated factors that create uncertainty for NGOs.  This 
situation contributed to the unpredictable success of NGO-led programs, and challenged their 
financial survival. NGO directors were often uncertain as to how to proceed due to the 
inconsistency and confusion related to legislation governing their organizational operations.   
 
5.8. Labour market factors 
The literature reports that the qualifications of staff are affected by resource constraints (Gilson, 
Sen, Mohammed, et. al., 1994), and by the poor-settings of NGO activities and associated 
physical and infrastructural challenges (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012).  In Vietnam, as 
reported by several respondents (including 5 NGO representatives and 1 central-level 
government officer) characteristics of the labour market affected NGOs’ ability to recruit 
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sufficient numbers of qualified staff. These characteristics are as follows: First, wealthy for-
profit enterprises often offer attractive benefit packages (commissions, extra-salary income) 
bundled with a dynamic work environment, and opportunities for promotion and career 
advancement.  Second, NGOs might also compete with one another for staff through offering 
more competitive benefit packages, leading staff to move to NGOs with the better options.  
Third, government donors might re-prioritize their funding to favour a newly-emerging local 
NGO that can then attract qualified labour from the non-profit sector. Fourth, working with 
NGOs is not perceived in Vietnam to be “fashionable" as compared to several other employment 
opportunities. Fifth, the trans-millennium generation (born in the 1990s) tend to actively explore 
opportunities to meet individual goals, and they might not possess strong commitment and 
loyalty to specific organizations as compared to earlier generations.  For all these reasons, 
NGOs’ directors are seriously concerned about local staffing issues in the current Vietnam 
context.  NGOs are sometimes driven to take risks through inadequately staffing their operations 
or employing un- or marginally-qualified staff.      
 
5.9. Local partners, local populations, and field-based challenges 
From my knowledge of managing NGO projects in Vietnam, the implementation of NGO 
projects in local geographic areas requires a combination of local government, NGOs, and 
community participation.  In these contexts, local governments receive financial resources 
transferred by NGOs to carry out project activities; they are the local partners.  This means that 
local partners are not part of broader civil society in Vietnam.  They are government’s agencies.  
Local NGOs may also be involved in field-based implementation.  They receive money from 
foreign NGOs to carry out some or all of the funded field activities.  Then, they also need to 
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cooperate with local government to arrange permits for all field-based activities.  Grassroots 
populations are involved as project beneficiaries.  Sometimes, communities are consulted for 
assistance in developing or designing methods for implementing projects or for monitoring and 
evaluation purposes.  In these situations, NGOs do not work directly with the local groups, they 
instead request the local governments’ arrangements for local involvement.   
 
Issues with field-based project implementation were reported by nearly half of the interviewed 
NGO representatives, all interviewed implementation-level government officers, and two (out of 
three) interviewed central-level government officers.  One particular concern was with overhead 
costs. Even when neither NGOs nor local partners had sufficient resources, local partners often 
expected that the NGOs would cover their overhead costs such as administrative expenses and 
staff costs (on the local partners side).  Yet donors assumed that the costs should be covered by 
the local partners.  This confusion over responsibility had the potential to negatively affect local 
agency-NGO partnerships.  According to one NGO director, the organization’s partners once 
warned that they might not cooperate without receiving overhead payments.     
 
NGO-funded projects normally require matching funds.  For example, [name of organization] 
required up to a 50% match for constructing home-based biogas plants.  This organization also 
required a “symbolic” contribution to compensate for charges associated with project quality 
assurance.  For instance, the delivery of eyeglasses might include the eyeglass cost plus 
professional consultation on eyeglass quality.  The NGO director stated, “Our approach is that 
[name of organization] can only contribute in part… and recipients must contribute something, 
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possibly in cash, or by labour, or in kind, but nothing is ever free.”  In addition, local partners 
might be asked to earmark a budget line for specific matching funds expenditures.  
 
However, matching funds are rarely awarded by government.  Even when awarded, local 
partners might earmark matching funds for different purposes than overhead.  A local 
government official explained this as follows: 
Of course, government commits funds to match NGO projects; it is clear how much is 
covered by the government, how much is covered by foreign organizations.  Yes, there 
should be matching funds, but it is difficult for central government or provincial 
government to allocate or to disburse the funds due to their own shortage of funds.  Most 
of the funds go to investment in infrastructure…  and seldom to a community project. 
Consequently, local communities and implementation partners generally did not expect to cover 
matching funds.  If a matching fund was compulsory in NGO-funded projects, it had to be 
prioritized for certain activities (such as infrastructure construction) upon prior agreement or 
negotiation.  This dilemma might require further communications among parties, and the process 
tended to consume time and certainly influenced project progress.   
 
Whether foreign NGOs responded to local priorities or expectations was political insofar as 
differences existed between the priorities of communities and those local governments. This 
disjuncture has been described elsewhere. Pfeiffer (2003) and Galway, Corbett, and Zeng (2012) 
provide criticisms of effectiveness and efficiency of NGO delivery, and found that the NGO 
projects may not respond to community needs. In Vietnam, while local populations expected 
“soft” projects from which they could receive higher amounts of money (e.g., per-diems) when 
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attending meetings or training workshops, local governments might prefer infrastructure 
construction projects.  More practically, differences also existed between NGOs and government 
agencies over project priorities and locations. As reported by one government official, this 
disjuncture had the potential to result in failure to implement projects, and as one NGO director 
commented, communities might be disappointed when NGOs failed to respond to local needs.  
This might lead to an erosion of trust between NGOs and their beneficiary communities.     
 
Respondents noted that NGOs were vulnerable to problems created by changes to local 
leadership.  Newly nominated local leaders might claim no knowledge of signed partnership 
agreements, and hence request a whole new round of negotiations.  This consumed time and was 
apt to erode patience on both sides.  According to one NGO director, 
The handover between old and new leadership is not properly conducted…  We signed a 
five-year Memorandum of Understandings (MOU), and halfway through, they changed 
the chairman of the project management board.  So, the in-coming chairman had to learn 
everything from the beginning, and he asked questions all the way through. 
Because NGOs were held accountable for the funded projects, they needed to ensure that the new 
partner leadership attained adequate knowledge to deliver the project effectively.  However, local 
partner leadership was nominated and decided by the government, and NGOs could by no means 
interfere with this nomination.     
 
Whether local partners were willing to collaborate with foreign NGOs and be honest in doing so 
(Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012) was another matter of concern. A province-level 
government official admitted that local governments did not seriously collaborate with NGOs:  
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Let’s take the work of planning as an example. We should have sent a staff member who 
had full knowledge.  But in real life, we sent whatever guy was available.  That guy 
participated just for fun, and the partners’ participation and partnership agreement were 
just a name, but the truth was it was not effective…  Collaboration among the parties is 
not really taken seriously. 
Several respondents noted that local partners were often not in favour of seconding staff to 
NGO-funded projects.   
 
A number of reasons were offered by respondents to explain this reluctance, including that NGO 
aid was normally non-refundable and small so that local partners might not be held accountable 
for it. On the partners’ side, government staffs were tightly scheduled, with numerous political 
priorities.  In addition, a NGO director reported that local governments seemed more willing to 
collaborate with NGOs with a longer history of local partnerships.  Newly-arriving organizations 
were rarely able to establish effective partner relationships right away.  Commitment and 
willingness from parties involved in partnerships is significant. This is consistent with the 
literature; for example, Paudel (2013) stresses the strong willingness of political leaders and 
senior administrators in those partnerships.  NGOs needed to consider all these reasons when 
selecting their partners in the field.   
 
NGOs also have to concern themselves with fraud involving their partners.  A NGO director 
noted that “There were some schools we provided with eyeglasses, and the principals asked us 
where the commissions were. … From north to south, this happens all the time although this 
number is not great.”  This director also reported that a local agricultural promotion center used 
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to provide products that were beyond their shelf-life.  The director also cautioned that any 
engagement with local partners had to be closely monitored. Some NGOs reported a lack of trust 
with their local partners. 
 
As has been reported in the literature, NGOs often find it problematic to disseminate their 
research findings (Delisle, Roberts, Munro, Jones, & Gyorkos, 2005) or to develop effective 
relationships with researchers (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016).  In Vietnam, NGO staff reported 
receiving warnings from local governments if they reported worse-than-expected development 
outcomes.  Government might even question or ignore any NGO research activity.  NGO 
directors worried that local governments "made up" indicators, and reported unreal indicators 
that might not reflect actual conditions.  This dishonesty had the potential to compromise future 
funding opportunities because donors would be confused about the actual communities needs.  
Consequently, reporting field implementations and results became an area of uncertainty.  
Faithfully reporting local conditions might facilitate NGOs credibility to donors, but also has the 
potential to damage their relationships with local governments.   
 
It was reported that NGOs were often accused by government of confusing or unclear 
communication.  Government officials commented that NGO staff used hard-to-understand 
jargon when communicating with local cadres and populations. Several terms common to the 
development sector were not translated smoothly into the Vietnamese language. For example, 
non-government organizations and advocacy are among those hard-to-translate terms.  Other 
examples include empowerment and promotion.  These terms are either new to Vietnamese 
populations, or their Vietnamese translations may mean something “sensitive” to the 
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government.  A province-level senior director commented that despite several years of 
experience working with NGO-funded projects, they still found it difficult to understand their 
jargon. They were also concerned about how to transfer knowledge to lay populations in the 
field.   
 
Other challenges sometimes arose in the field.  Commuting between villages might be difficult 
because of the quality of roads and transportation.  In addition, awareness and literary levels in 
mountainous areas and among ethnic minorities were limited. NGO projects generally conveyed 
positive messages about development to beneficiary communities, but the meaning of the 
messages were often too complicated for community members to understand, or the community 
members were simply more interested in tangible support (such as money, food). An 
implementation-level government senior official stated that,  
Vietnamese people are poor, and they are not aware about the benefits NGOs bring about.  
They [NGOs] care about awareness, they [NGOs] bring about benefits.  They [local 
people] just think about coming to the place to listen, and receive money, and go home, 
and they are not fully aware what they listen to is for practice, for self-help. 
 
5.10.  Wider political environment 
One interviewed central-level government officer, and one NGO representative reported 
concerns with how the global political economy influences several aspects of NGO operations in 
Vietnam.  At a macro level, funding to Vietnam is greatly influenced by globalization.  A high-
ranking government official was concerned that globalization made messages quickly shared and 
disseminated, meaning that funding to Vietnam might be easily or unpredictably re-scheduled 
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and promptly shifted to another region experiencing a natural disaster.  This government official 
warned that although no evidence existed, Vietnam could not survive situations when, for 
instance, the USAID- or State Department-sponsored international development program 
decided to shift funds to different purposes.  The official also worried that even policy changes in 
China and South Korea impacted funding to Vietnam.  Again, the global politics of funding 
represented an uncertainty in NGO operations, at least from the perspective of government.   
 
Secondly, fluctuations in the bilateral diplomatic relations between Vietnam and another donor 
country might affect funding to NGOs.   For example, recently in German-Vietnam diplomatic 
relations the two governments disagreed with each other about a high-ranking official based in 
Germany.  Vietnam stated that the official had voluntarily returned to Vietnam, but Germany 
announced that the official had been illegally kidnapped within German territory.  A NGO 
director confirmed that the diplomatic conflict suspended German funding to their organization 
in Vietnam.  This story illustrates the politics of NGO funding, the possibility of unpredictable 
situations, and an area of uncertainty in NGO programming.   
 
5.11. Sensitivity about faith-based organizations 
One interviewed central-level government officer and one NGO representative reported their 
concerns over religious issues, although in Vietnam, religious issues are considered "sensitive", 
and the government was greatly concerned with the potential proselytizing of faith-based 
organizations. This sensitivity is likely linked to a history where political upheavals led by 
religious leaders sought to challenge government authority.  Religion-associated activities likely 
worried government due to its orientation to the tenets of Marxism and Leninism, which 
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comprises the blue-print theory for the country’s development.  This sensitivity has been 
described amongst NGOs in China. There, faith-based NGOs employed several strategies to 
maintain their presences in China: cooperation with government, collaboration, and resource 
sharing (Tam & Hasmath, 2015).  In Vietnam, events or services organized by religious 
organizations (e.g., churches) engage several community members, which may result in 
collective actions that the government cannot control. Despite this, the fact is that many currently 
operating NGOs in Vietnam are faith-based organizations. Because religion-based 
implementation is considered a threat to public security, it therefore attracted close government 
scrutiny. 
 
Engaging communities in project implementation was rarely possible with faith-based 
organizations (FBO).  Although religious groups were argued by one NGO respondent to have 
the potential to contribute to international development projects, NGOs’ abilities to do so in 
Vietnam were severely constrained:  
Faith-based organizations in other countries…  can connect with Catholic churches, 
Catholic youth, Young Man Christian Association groups, Catholic Scouts to implement 
activities.  But it is very, very hard in a Vietnamese context.  There seem to be no 
connections between [name of organization] and churches or Christian associations in 
this context to use youth, young individuals, churches, and religious believers. 
 
Cooley and Ron (2002) note that faith-based organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, 
Lutheran World Services, World Vision, and the Middle East Council of Churches access 
alternative funds from Catholic dioceses in the developed nation, and this access has allowed 
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them to reject western governments’ funds if their projects were found to be in poor alignment 
with government preferences.  In contrast, faith-based organizations in Vietnam may find 
themselves in dilemmas about whether, how, and up to what level they should enhance their 
funding.  One NGO director offered as an example funding for faith-based organizations in 
Cambodia.  In that country, child-focused sponsorship was the core funding source of an 
organization, accounting for sixty to seventy percent of the organization’s funding in the country.  
In this case, Cambodia was very sensitive to activities in China, and China firmly controlled the 
operations of faith-based organizations.  Child sponsorship was likely to be considered a 
potentially uncontrollable channel for transmitting religious messages.  As a result, the 
Government of Cambodia decided to cut in half the organization’s sponsorship funding from $8 
million to $4 million because of the fear that religious messages were being integrated into child 
sponsorship activities.  Because Vietnam also relied on China economically and politically, the 
above NGO director was concerned that the Cambodian story would certainly be repeated in 
Vietnam as well, and similarly affect foreign NGO operations:  
So, you will see that the uncertainty is when the government is concerned about 
everything, they are ready to collapse it, and [name of organization]’s budget is just few 




In this chapter, I have presented numerous factors external to NGOs’ abilities to achieve strategic 
goals and objectives in Vietnam.  I have reported several matters considered “sensitive” by 
current government regulations and thus are subject to control of operations: information 
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transparency, advocacy, association, and religion.  NGOs were labelled “sensitive” (meaning 
problematic or worrying) and “a threat” to national security.  Restrictive regulations and political 
will shaped the understandings of NGOs.  Current regulations did not offer NGOs an official 
definition, so NGOs lacked an official position in the local social structure.   
 
My work experience agrees with the above finding.  NGO projects seem to always worry 
government departments.  For example, NGO staff always meet with local villagers to discuss 
aspects of project implementation.  In particular, in order to implement a project of building a 
school in the local area, NGO staffs involve local villagers in designing, hiring construction 
company, monitoring progress and quality of the construction, and reporting any abuses to NGO 
staffs.  However, the involvement of local villagers in the project implementation may be seen as 
threatening.  Government may worry that it cannot control the gathering of several villagers in 
one place at one time.  Also, the government may worry because its staff can not control the 
content of communication between NGO staffs and the local villagers.  The government 
considers an association between villagers’ participation in project implementation and “social 
insecurity”.  Because NGOs facilitate the villagers’ participation, they are “sensitive”.    
 
Language use comprised a special problem in field implementation when NGOs introduced new 
terms without proper translation into Vietnamese.  Moreover, the Vietnamese translation of 
“non-government organization” and “policy advocacy” was sometimes confusing and 
misunderstood.  Through the translation, “non-government organizations” became outlawed 
“social evils”, and advocacy became “sensitive” social criticisms.  This miscommunication led 
government departments and local groups to fear working with NGOs.  In my experience, a 
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government department denied cooperation agreements with NGOs in a mid-course phase 
because, as the department’s representative confirmed, they did not want to cooperate with 
outlawed “social evils”.  
 
Of particular note, NGOs refused to assume responsibility for local communities, making their 
accountability and grass-roots mandates vulnerable to being blurring in society.  To further 
complicate matters, some NGOs even considered shifting to an entrepreneurial role or becoming 
professional associations so as to enhance their effectiveness and increase their likelihood of 
survival.  
 
The nation’s wealthier status in international economic terms has affected NGOs’ ability to 
secure long-term funding to address poverty-related issues amongst marginal and/or vulnerable 
populations.  An economy-oriented development strategy transformed Vietnam from one of the 
poorest countries in the world to a lower middle-income country with the GDP per capita of 
US$1,260 in 2011 (World Bank, 2011).  However, segments of the population who were lagging 
behind this new standard, and newly-emerging social issues, offered NGOs reasons to stay in 
Vietnam.  However, the country was de-listed (no longer a central priority) in donors’ lists, 
which unpredictably influenced its financing of development projects.  The survival of foreign 
NGOs was challenged.  Coupled with economic progress, Vietnam’s major public health 
improvements (for example, national vitamin A supplementation coverage rate), donors’ shifted 
priorities, and donors’ heightened grant requirements all influenced NGO operations.  NGOs had 
to familiarize themselves with new priorities and demands (a shortened timeframe, an insistence 
on tangible results, shrunken funds, and dictated fund-flows) that were not their traditions and 
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strengths.  NGOs’ coping strategies to donors’ control showed their flexibility as well as 
vulnerability to survival.    
 
Based on my experience, the country’s wealthier status greatly influenced NGOs’ funding status 
and survival.  In an organization I was working with, its annual budget was decreased from 
approximate $21 million to about $5 million, and most donors committed funds on an annual 
basis instead of their previous multiple year basis.  In addition, the number of staffs was 
decreased from more than 100 to 30.  The organization’s leaders decided to access several 
sources of fund which sponsored programs (HIV treatment, health services delivery) that were 
not consistent with their past program objectives.   
 
I have also highlighted the country’s controlling regulations and policy gaps that challenge NGO 
values and delivery effectiveness, and that have eroded NGOs’ commitment to long-term 
objectives and community development initiatives.  Many other Asian governments have always 
regulated NGO operations (Fisher, 2003, Tandon & Rajesh, 1989).  The Government of Vietnam 
issued the Decree 12/2012/ND-CP, Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg., and Decree 93/2009/ND-CP, 
which all imposed restrictions on NGO administration, personnel, finance, and projects.  Any 
activities, as small as a two-hour workshop, or as large as a multiple-year project, needed the 
authorities’ approval before being implemented.  To further complicate the policy landscape, the 
Law on Associations had still not been promulgated after a twenty-year development.  Most 
seriously, Regulation 102-QD/TW allowed the expulsion of any Communist Party member who 
“addressed” civil society (Chapter II, Article 7, Point 3b).  With this regulation, the mono-
partisan government would not promulgate any legal documents that might facilitate NGO 
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operations.  The political imposition meant that how and in what directions the regulation might 
change remained uncertain.   
 
I experienced a programmatic uncertainty as a result of the policy that requested that any NGO-
sponsored activities, as small as a two-hour workshop, or as large as a construction project, 
needed the authorities’ approval before being implemented.  The organization that I worked with 
applied a capacity building approach to programming, which normally resulted in a workplan 
with several training events.  If the organization adhered to this capacity building approach, the 
annual workplan might not be completed because the staff did not have enough time to spend on 
obtaining permits.  In case the organization’s leaders approved any activities that supported 
spending (for example, a construction project may support spending of several times as great as a 
training activities, and need only one permit), the organization strayed afar from their traditional 
programming approach.      
 
Policy development processes were vague and their implementation was typically arbitrary.  
Different NGOs might be treated differently depending on the relationships between a NGO and 
state-owned agencies (partners).  In addition, policy implementation was completed only 
intermittently, often confusing instructions were provided, and formal standards were not 
observed by officers-in-charge.  Coordination amongst departments was poor, with each 
department imposing their own reporting requirements and formats, and even their own policies.  
Uncertain policy development and implementation contributed to the uneven progress of 
programs, and even endangered NGOs’ financial survival.  NGO directors were often uncertain 




Based on my experience, at times there were even no authorities able or willing to approve a 
NGO-sponsored project.  For example, I managed a construction project that aimed to build few 
classrooms for children in a remote village.  The regulation indicated that the project had to be 
approved by the provincial Department of Foreign Affairs before implementation.  However, the 
department’s representative refused to accept our application for approval and forwarded the 
application to the provincial Department of Construction.  This Department of Construction, in 
turn, refused to receive the application because they did not have the authority to deal with 
NGO-sponsored projects.  The lack of inter-department coordination resulted in wasting the time 
and effort of NGOs’ staffs.      
 
Several factors in the labour market affected NGO personnel.  Newly emerged business 
enterprises offered competitive compensation packages and dynamic work environments.  
International funds sometimes favoured local organizations.  NGOs also had to compete against 
each other for personnel.  As a result, staffing issues were a serious concern to NGO directors.  
My professional experience is consistent with the finding that the applicants to NGO staff 
positions would compare the benefit packages offered by different NGOs, and by business-
oriented enterprises.  In most cases, they chose to work with the business sector or with a NGO 
with more competitive benefit packages.    
  
Local partners represented several challenges to NGO operations.  They might fail to complete 
their responsibilities in the partnerships (e.g., providing matching funds, sharing agendas), and 
they sometimes changed leadership without a proper hand-over.  Even fraud poisoned some 
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relationships. Partnering became uncertain because of the limitations in the choice of partners in 
the field.   In addition, NGOs might be unwelcome if they disseminated research findings that 
were different from those in local government reports.   Although NGOs managed to respond to 
local needs, differences might exist between local populations and local governments. Local 
priorities or expectations became politically charged, and NGOs risked losing the trust of local 
communities, and donors. 
 
Based on my experience, I would add that any partnership with a government agency may be a 
negative experience.  Because NGOs must cooperate with a government department or a local 
government to implement projects, they do not have options from which to select.  For example, 
if a NGO wants to implement a health project, it can select to partner with a local health 
department, or a local government. Either option can be difficult because when the NGO 
cooperates with one partner (for example, with the local health department), the other partner’s 
leaders may feel insulted, not because they fail the opportunity to implement the project, but 
because they fail the opportunity to show their power to control the project.  This partner may 
refuse any further cooperation with the NGO.    
 
The wider political environment has also affected NGO operations.  Vietnam’s emerging 
economy has made it vulnerable to policy changes in other donor countries like the United 
States, the Europe Union, China and South Korea.  Fluctuations in bilateral diplomatic relations 
between Vietnam and other donor countries can impact funding to NGOs.   Moreover, because 
Vietnam also relies on China economically and politically, it might choose to copy China’s 
140 
 
restrictive regulations on faith-based organizations.  In what dimensions these challenges will 
evolve remains unforeseen when politics are involved. 
 
Because religion-based implementation is considered a threat to public security, it therefore 
attracted close government scrutiny.  Faith-based organizations in Vietnam may find themselves 
in dilemmas about whether, how, and up to what level they should enhance their funding or 









CHAPTER 6 - FACTORS INTERNAL TO NGO OPERATIONS 
In the previous chapter, I reported the several influences external to NGO operations.  In this 
chapter, I present factors internal to NGO operations.  These are things that NGOs have some 
control over. In the context of this thesis, these may be thought of as the adaptive strategies that 
NGOs employ to respond to, and survive, the uncertainties that characterize the Vietnam context.  
 
6.1 Case example 
Bido International (not a real name, known hereafter as Bido) has operated in Vietnam for nearly 
30 years. Their main country office was in Hanoi and it also had several program offices 
established throughout the country.  Bido coordinated a number of community development 
programs in Vietnam.  Its Health and Social section provided health, social and economic 
supports for people with disabilities, supplies medical equipment for hospitals, and supports 
development of clean water and sanitation facilities for poor communities.  The Health and 
Social section also maintained a health clinic that provided clinic care free of charge for children 
of poor families in different provinces.  Bido’s education section offered scholarship 
opportunities for poor students at primary, secondary and tertiary education levels.  Its 
Infrastructure section led several construction projects, both small (e.g., one classroom primary 
schools in rural areas) and large (e.g., general hospitals in urban areas).  At one time the 
organization had an annual budget of more than twenty million US dollars and a staff of more 
than 100 members. 
 
Its multiple project foci and wide geographic coverage required the organization to continually 
update or renew its operation and project permits.  An organization’s representative reported that 
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they have faced considerable uncertainties over when operation permits would be issued.  When 
they asked government for progress processing permits, government staff often answered that it 
is coordinating feedbacks from related authorities.  Sometimes, they have been told that it “takes 
time” for the director to review and sign the permit. Once signed, it may take another 1-2 months 
for the final, signed and stamped permit, to reach the organization’s head office.   
 
Once the organization’s in-charge staff receives the operation permits, they had to file a copy of 
the permit with the tax authority.  The tax authority has complained about late submission of the 
renewed permit, even though the delay was caused by government, and has been penalized for 
the late submission of the permits to the tax authority. On occasion, funding to the organization 
has been cancelled as a result of these delays. For example, in one province, the funding for 
constructing water towers was cancelled. 
 
As a condition of donor funding, the organization is sometimes required to hire advisors or 
consultants from outside of Vietnam to evaluate program quality. The administrative procedures 
for applying for a foreign worker work permit are both ambiguous as well as constantly 
changing. The government’s staff in charge of reviewing the work permit application did not 
provide full, responsive instructions, and has instead made several recommendations for 
improving an application, but only one at a time, thereby prolonging the permitting process.  
Once, a foreign advisor had to work from abroad (outside of Vietnam) as a result of these 
cumbersome and lengthy permitting procedures.  Of course, evaluation work done from abroad 




Because of the permitting delays, Bido risks losing control over their projects’ progress and 
staffing, which might in turn result in a reputational risk with donors.  The organization’s 
management decided to enter into a contracting relationship with private contractors with 
specific projects’ milestones and deadlines.  The organization’s director believed that private 
contractors were able to assume the risks regarding project progress, financial disbursement to 
local workers, maintenance, and quality assurance -- in implementing the contracted projects.  
Payment was made to contractors based on project outcomes (e.g., the number of villagers who 
are connected to the built water tower). This method of project management allowed for a 
significant decrease in the number of staff required to direct projects, though some staff are still 
required to ensure that contracted outcomes are met. For example, the water and sanitation 
program used to have up to forty staff in charge of project coordination, engineering, and 
financial matters.  Now, and with reduced funding, the program had just one project officer 
managing contractors and financial disbursements and accounting.   
 
This example shows how a foreign NGO’s implementation was influenced by the current 
regulations that created uncertainties and delays.  With current bureaucratic regulations requiring 
a permit for each NGO, and within the NGO, a permit for each newly-funded project, and with 
substantial time needed for each element of the permitting process, the delays, with 
consequences in terms of project funding and implementation, could be considerable. These 
delays were exacerbated by ineffective coordination between government departments. NGO 




This example also illustrated how the organization worked to overcome these obstacles.  Their 
shift to a contracting approach to program implementation transferred many of the management 
risks to private contractors. However, this arms-length approach, while shifting bureaucratic 
risks to a third party, might raise a question of whether, and how, the NGO ensured adherence to 
its key values of community empowerment and participation.  In addition, this approach 
involved a shift in responsibility for the NGO – it simply occupied a position where it “bridged” 
the donors and local contractors, with a minimal role in project or program implementation. This 
brought up questions of who in fact was accountable, either “upwards” to the donor, or 
“downwards” to the community. 
 
Building on this example, in the following paragraphs I report on several influences internal to 
NGO operations.  These factors include those affecting NGO program implementation and 
effectiveness, top-down directives from headquarters, and uncertainties related to staffing.  I then 
examine the implications that these factors have for NGO operations, such as changing 
mandates, changes to avenues of accountability, changes in delivery strategies, and NGO 
alignment with government.  At the end of the chapter I present several of the recommendations 
for improving NGO-government-donor relations made to me by respondents.    
 
6.2. Factors affecting program implementation and effectiveness 
NGO interviewees were interested in reporting their experience implementing programs and the 
programs’ effectiveness in the context of the many external challenges I presented in the 
preceding chapter. All of NGOs’ representatives, two of four implementation-level government 
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officers, and two of three central government officers responded to the issues with NGO program 
implementation and effectiveness. 
   
At the implementation level, NGOs might want to introduce "new concepts" to local populations 
(such as community empowerment).  These new concepts ranged from direct supports (e.g., 
community members were involved in monitoring the progress and quality of school 
construction projects) to capacity building (e.g., communities were invited to raise their ideas 
about local development projects), and from general “new values” (such as communities were 
project owners) to specific “low-resource appropriateness” (such as climate change and 
adaptation projects that fit local settings and conditions).  The introduction of these concepts are 
coupled with multi-component programming designed to contain several components (direct 
support, capacity building, communication and advocacy, and partnership).  The introduction of 
the new concepts may be preferred by donors.  One NGO director commented that, “If we cannot 
devise anything new, we cannot attract donors”.     
 
Although NGOs devised initiatives based on their already existing strengths, they might deviate 
gradually from their older priorities of focusing narrowly on a particular area of expertise 
(building water systems) to incorporate newer foci.  However, given an uncertain political 
atmosphere, local communities’ literacy levels, and funding, the successful implementation of 
any new programs might be uncertain.   
 
The NGO representatives I interviewed reported that they often included several aspects of 
community development in their programs.  One director reported that although their 
146 
 
organization focused mainly on child-benefitting programs, they also engaged with gender equity 
initiatives and, more generally, the promotion of grassroots democracy.  Even the director could 
not explain how grassroots democracy directly related to the organization’s child-centered 
approach.    
 
Some NGOs implement projects focused on securing rights (empowerment, democracy), rather 
than on what would be considered more “traditional” service projects such as charity or 
provision of health services.  One director commented that NGOs should not keep offering 
charity projects, but instead work to strengthen the government’s accountability to its citizens, 
especially in the context of Vietnam’s economic development.  The literature provides some 
insights about the consequences of such a shift. Ghere (2013) defines rights-oriented NGOs as 
focusing on promoting human rights and empowerment among states, corporate entities and 
community with the goal of changing their administrative behaviours and actions accordingly. 
Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006) suggest that such a shift in NGOs’ operational conceptual 
framework, such as to a rights-based approach, could improve what has become a somewhat 
“tarnished” image. So, as one NGO director observed in the context of Vietnam, instead of 
implementing rural poverty alleviation projects, a NGO might work on the rights for and access 
to social protection among the poorest populations in urban areas.  This director explained that 
urban-based mobile populations were deserving given their limited access to basic health, social, 
and administrative services.  However, although NGO directors might be motivated to promote 
such rights-based programs, the implementation of such programs will certainly be considered 
“sensitive” by government.   
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Because issues around human rights are sensitive in the Vietnam context, the government can 
create difficulties for these NGO projects.  Yet, although NGOs experienced difficulties in 
rights-based approaches, they accepted the difficulties to engage in issues such as human rights, 
civil society, and ethnic populations.  For example, one director observed that “many people, 
especially ethnic minority people, women, youth, people with disabilities and disadvantaged 
children do not have the opportunity to benefit from many services, notably health, education 
and public administration services”.  Legally, the chapter II of the 2013 Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam mentioned human rights and citizens’ fundamental rights and 
duties.  One NGO strategy document commented that, “this constitution opens a completely new 
space for social organizations to discuss topics of human rights more freely, and to implement 
programmes and projects based on the principle of human rights in sustainable development.”  
NGOs deployed their legitimacy approaching rights-related matters, pending funding and 
resource (tools, expertise) availability.  Because the government considers the right-based 
approach to programming to be “sensitive”, and in violation of policy, NGOs in this context, can 
be seen as challenging government.   
 
Despite concerns about a negative government response, some respondents reported that their 
organizations shifted their interventions from humanitarian projects to policy engagement despite 
the “sensitive” nature of policy advocacy. The literature has much to add to this discussion. 
Advocacy is one NGO interaction with governments that may sustain the impacts of 
development projects through structural changes and promotion of rights (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). 
NGOs increasingly target numerous global issues and they aim for sustained changes. Cook, 
Wright, and Andersson (2017) argue that NGO advocacy practices may lead to structural 
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changes in numerous arenas. In Vietnam, a senior advisor in one NGO explained that NGOs 
changed their mandates to adapt to social and political changes, so they could advocate for 
policies at appropriate levels (community, district, province, or central levels).  Their policy 
engagement was perceived to fit with the mandates. Perhaps ironically, although NGOs engaged 
in policy advocacy, they also tried to make that advocacy apolitical by not being, in their words, 
“partisan.” One director explained,  
Doing policy means involvement in politics.  However, by doing politics, NGOs remain 
non-political because they are non-partisan.  I do not participate in any political party.  
This cannot prevent me from engaging in policies and politics.  Many other 
organizations… also have the same understanding. 
Similarly, Hannah (2007) notes that NGOs struggle to create a formal space for their advocacy 
roles in developing contexts to ensure an equal engagement in the policy sphere with 
governments, given their non-political nature.  When NGOs in Vietnam engaged in policy 
projects, they did not belong to or reflect the perspectives of any specific political parties.  
   
In written documents, several organizations articulated their position on advocacy.  For example, 
one organization made “policy influence” a separate objective in their 2016-2020 strategy.  
NGOs specified several components (construct knowledge, establish evidence databases, build 
supporter networks) involved in their moves to advocacy.  One organization highlighted their 
advocacy across all their priority programs in their annual report 2016.  Another promoted a 
stronger voice among ethnic minority women and socially-marginalized people, and integrated 
an examination of gender-based violence into their national agenda.  Still other organizations 
considered advocacy to be one of their key tactics in their Vietnam operations, together with 
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securing child-centered approach, improved partnerships, and increased government 
accountability: 
We will advocate for greater public investment in improving the lives of children from 
minority ethnic groups – particularly their nutrition and education. And we will call for 
inclusive economic development and the reduction of economic inequality affecting 
ethnic minority children. 
 
NGOs used several tools to deploy their “apolitical” policy advocacy.  First, being aware about 
their own funding limitations, political sensitivities, and their limited access to formal policy-
making processes, they attempted to maximize the impact of community-based evidence. 
Hudson (2001) notes that one role for NGOs is to link grassroots communities with upper levels 
of governance, ensuring that their voices are heard. In Vietnam, for example, one organization 
consolidated and disseminated field-based evidence (children’s clubs, children’s voices, 
children-led injury prevention communications) to the 2015-2020 national agenda on child 
participation when NGOs were invited by government to contribute ideas on the development of 
the agenda.  Another researched social inequality among some populations and aimed to 
mainstream inequality in Parliament’s Social Development Committee agenda.  Other 
organizations advocated grassroots-level child-friendly models to bring positive impacts to 
children’s lives.  This use of evidence shows how NGOs used their strengths.  However, despite 
such efforts, NGOs did not seem to have much influence over the policy process in Vietnam.  
Although they organized several events for advocacy purposes, they had no means available to 




Second, organizations collaborated with government departments to deliver or scale policies for 
nation-wide impact. In Vietnam, an organization in this research collaborated with the Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) to organize policy dialogues on industrial 
development, and with the Central Institute for Economic Management, a leading social research 
institute in Vietnam, on Vietnam’s long-term development goals.  Also, few NGOs allocated part 
of their grant funds for collaborating with central government departments on clean water-related 
policies.  NGOs understood that they could not engage directly with parliament, so instead they 
used discussions with related departments to disseminate key messages and evidence from their 
projects. These practices appear muted, though roughly consistent in comparison with NGO 
activities in other development contexts. NGOs increasingly use their capabilities to vote, lobby, 
advocate, and hold political representatives accountable for their actions (Chakanika & Chuma, 
1999).  In one example, through lobbying government delegates, cooperating with developing 
country delegations, and mobilizing public pressure, NGOs were able to generate significant 
impact during the pre-negotiation phase of the UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity to 
issue the Biosafety Protocol (Arts & Mack, 2003).  
 
Third, NGOs created networks and forums to amplify their voice.  Such networks might include 
several NGOs with the same interests.  For example, one NGO took the initiative of networking 
with other organizations with the same programmatic interest to advocate for wider coverage of 
health insurance for children up to 12 and even 16 years of age (current policies in Vietnam 
cover only children under six years old). Another NGO used the National Youth Forum to 
amplify youths’ voice on Youth Law. The National Youth Forum served as a platform for 800 
youth representatives from across Vietnam, and was jointly convened by Action Aid Vietnam, 
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the National Committee on Youth of Vietnam, Plan International Vietnam, and ChildFund 
International. In 2015, the Forum focused on the review and enforcement of youth-related laws 
and policies.  NGOs have clearly learned to take advantage of collective efforts on issues of 
interest.   
 
Fourth, some other organizations coordinated with several stakeholders -- financial institutions, 
international bodies, the private sector -- in their advocacy projects, resulting in several national 
guidelines and policies related to conservation.  One respondent reported that because the links 
among these institutions were weak, NGOs would want to play the coordinating role linking 
those institutions and creating a collective result.   
 
Fifth, under some circumstances NGOs were able to coordinate their advocacy work through 
government departments.  For example, one NGO undertook consultation with Ministry of 
Health throughout the development, endorsement and adoption of eyecare policies and 
guidelines, which eventually received adequate government response. 
 
Although my data did not reveal when NGOs began their advocacy efforts, the move into the 
policy sphere suggests that this is a recent change to NGO operations.  Early NGO projects 
implemented at the time of the 1986 economic reform did not engage in policy advocacy, but by 
the time of my study, NGOs had begun to implement policy-level interventions.  This change in 
role and mandate appeared to rely on both their prestige as social development organizations as 
well as their capacity to convey well-framed, evidence-based messages to the appropriate levels 
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of formal decision-making.  One NGO senior advisor cautioned, however, that despite such 
efforts, NGOs should not assume that their messages are heard or acted upon.  
 
An example of success in policy advocacy was reported in one organization’s annual report. The 
organization implemented a two-year project to inform a new law enhancing citizen’s 
participation in policy processes. This involved cooperating with the Vietnam Lawyers 
Association to draft the Law on Referendum through policy research and advocacy workshops, 
including collecting citizens’ views and opinions from all 63 provinces in Vietnam on the 
proposed law.  The Law on Referendum was approved by the National Assembly in November 
25, 2015.   For the first time in legislative history the right to referendum was stipulated in the 
Constitution of Vietnam to ensure that the voices of citizens, especially those living in poverty 
and in marginalized communities, are heard in the process of developing laws directly affecting 
their lives.  This example shows that although NGOs had no actual standing to discuss policy-
related matters with authorities, their networking activities, if carefully conducted, can bear fruit.     
  
Several NGOs prioritized research activities in their strategy documents.  Outside Vietnam, and 
as discussed in chapter 2, researchers have expressed concerns about the quality of NGO 
research projects (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 2005), and suggest 
that NGOs should connect with universities or research institutions in order for research results 
to meet standards for academic rigour (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016).  However, one director of 
a NGO in Vietnam argued that NGOs were in fact well-placed to conduct research because of 
their international connections and if they maintained good collaborations with research 
institutions. For example, when I was working with a NGO, we cooperated with a university in 
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central Vietnam to conduct an evaluation of a 10-year community development project.  Another 
organization partnered with a university in northern Vietnam to conduct a baseline survey on 
disability issues.  Both examples represented short-term agreements between NGOs and research 
institutions in Vietnam.  As discussed above, research has certainly helped NGOs build 
knowledge and create evidence to use in advising the government on several development issues. 
A particular strength of NGO research is their focus on disseminating evidence collected at the 
level of the community. When done well, such research would seem to enhance an 
organization’s credibility with external stakeholders. 
 
Despite some successes in the research domain, NGO directors were often concerned about their 
ability to assess the effectiveness of their projects. This concern has been raised in other country 
contexts as well.  Scholars have noted that NGOs lack rigorous techniques for measuring their 
effectiveness (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016, Ghere, 2013, Pillai, Wei, & Maleku, 2013, Watkins, 
Swidler, & Hannan, 2012, ISSEE, 2010).  One NGO director in Vietnam admitted that “we 
believe [in an impact] rather than we have evidence [of such an impact].” NGOs sometimes 
failed to evaluate programs because of unrealistic or inappropriate outcome indicators.  One 
senior manager reported that: 
Once [we] implemented a project about empowering women through economic 
development and rights promotion.  Local partners were very excited about the micro-
credit component because of economic opportunities for poor women…  However, one 
of the indicators was that three years after the project ended, the proportion of women 
nominated in district-level leaderships was changed like this and that.  This indicator was 
unreal, because the NGO, by and large, could not interfere, by any means, in the 
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arrangement for human resources of the government…  They control all the political 
systems, and we cannot do anything about it. 
As this comment indicates, NGOs cannot influence government staffing processes given the 
government’s own “Core Cadre Master Plan.”  This plan aims to regulate staffing of the 
leadership positions of state-owned departments and organizations.  The NGO project described 
above introduced no measures that could influence the political processes of appointing 
leadership. 
 
Indicators were often used to measure task-level, not impact-level results, and were best 
illustrated by examining NGOs’ annual planning and strategy documents.  For example, one 
NGO’s annual planning document aimed to show the effectiveness of a fund-raising objective.  
This objective would be achieved through two tasks: staff capacity building, and preparation of 
concept notes for funders.  Indicators proposed for achievement included the number of staff 
receiving training, and the number of submitted proposals. This organization also employed the 
same approach to designing indicators for other objectives. For instance, the objectives of 
strengthening local-groups’ capacity (project management, communication and facilitation) was 
measured by the number of meetings conducted, the number of field visits and reports with 
recommendations, the number of field visits and reports co-conducted with local participants, the 
number of recommendations followed up, and the number of project reports shared. Task-level 
success indicators were also used by another NGO. Monitoring and evaluation indicators can be 
formative, process-focused, or outcome-focused. In this situation, NGO-devised indictors did not 
speak to longer-term project outcomes or impacts. I think that NGOs need to provide evidence, 




At times, effectiveness means that achievements are sustained or replicated after projects were 
completed.  Although NGO projects may have been implemented with the best intentions and 
designs, their duration is always restricted to a project cycle. One government official noted that 
when projects are completed and efforts withdrawn, their effects also stopped. Project effects 
could not be replicated because of fund limitations, local government leadership changes, and 
follow-up and maintenance deficits.  So, NGO projects might produce short-term results, but 
their long-term impacts would remain uncertain.  This concern is not unique to Vietnam: the 
effectiveness of NGOs’ projects on local social and health systems has been a focus of criticism 
for many scholars (Pfeiffer, 2003, Pfeiffer, Johnson, Fort, et al., 2008).      
 
Several reasons were claimed for implementation ineffectiveness.  First, as in other development 
contexts, NGOs may have made assumptions about community needs that were not reflected in 
reality.  NGOs also made assumptions about the effectiveness of modes of project delivery.  In 
addition, they assumed that projects were designed to maximize or ensure effective responses to 
communities’ needs.  The NGO directors I spoke with expressed disappointment when their best 
efforts did not yield real change.   
 
Second, implementation schedules affected projects’ effectiveness.  For example, a senior 
official in government reported that a foreign NGO had sponsored a project aimed to improve 
the well-being of coastal fishery villagers.  The project activities included communications with 
the villagers on coast-related matters (natural disasters, border issues).  However, when 
communication sessions were organized fishermen were out at sea and could not attend.  Instead, 
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project staff decided to convey messages to their family members but could not ensure that the 
messages were passed on to fishermen, and whether the messages were conveyed accurately.  
When asked why project activities could not happen during holidays when fishermen stayed at 
home, the government official who was responsible for implementing the NGO project said that 
their staff could not work on holidays. This is an example of how reliance on local 
implementation partners, who in Vietnam are part of or approved by government, can jeopardize 
the implementation of what might otherwise be important and worthwhile projects. 
 
Project implementation was typically characterized by a participatory approach which means that 
several stakeholders engaged in implementation processes (community groups, local 
governments, professionals, beneficiaries).  As has been documented in a number of 
development contexts, community participation represents a valuable implementation tactic 
(Hoque, Clarke, & Huang, 2016, Kuhl, 2009, Akukwe, 1998, Ghimire, 1998, Cincotta, 1994).  
Uncertainties arose with the actual application of this approach.  First, while multi-component, 
multi-objective projects might include involvement of several state-owned departments, these 
departments tended to focus on single, “vertical” objectives (e.g., the health department just 
focused on health outcomes of projects).  In the words of one director,  
We work on food security, which covers numerous areas, agriculture, health, and 
women’s issues.  Generally, it’s a mixed thing.  One government department cannot 
manage this project.  Health people cannot direct agriculture people.  Then, we as a NGO 




As this comment suggests, in Vietnam, government departments often do not work well with 
each other.  The departments operate “vertically”, which means that each department fulfils 
specific tasks assigned by the central government, and the department is responsible to the 
government for the tasks.  For example, the department of health must fulfill health-related tasks.  
Cross-departmental links are limited.  Therefore, any project that engages two or more 
departments may be poorly implemented because of the lack of a principal responsible 
department.  For example, a school-setting health project may be difficult to implement because 
it matters whether the department of health or department of education will be the main 
responsible department for the project.  Therefore, when NGOs partnered with several different 
departments, they were required to take on a coordinating role, which was not considered 
officially legitimate by government. Inevitably, this placed a great deal of stress on NGO-
government relationships. NGOs were required to tread carefully when engaging in multi-
objective, multi-sectoral programming.   
 
Secondly, local implementing partners and NGOs may have different organizational practices 
that can lead to conflict.  Although NGOs tended to prioritize delivery of quality programs in a 
transparent way, local partners complained that NGO’s internal control measures were too tight 
to deploy in the field.  One NGO director stated, “When tenders are invited, local people are used 
to dishonest behaviours; therefore, they feel very uncomfortable working with [us].”  The 
conflict happened between a NGO, which aimed for financial transparency in bidding, and the 
local departments, which did not want the transparency.  I think that this mention is just a quote 
from a director of an international NGO, and this mention does not mean to depict the whole 
country as corrupt.  In real life, if this dishonest behaviour happened with this organization, it 
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may or may not happen elsewhere, and it may be hard to quantify the level of corruption in this 
research project.      
 
Thirdly, at times community groups were paid to participate in project implementation.  In their 
project, Islam (2013) criticizes that community participation may sometimes be distorted by such 
practices. For instance, in Vietnam volunteers and project promoters are often paid monthly 
incentives to join project activities.  Problems appeared because of differences in how specific 
NGOs allocated per diem costs.  And, of course, when NGOs withdraw, and with them their 
money, local participation flags.   
           
Government officials were concerned that NGOs lacked knowledge of state-owned agency 
operations and administrative procedures, and this deficiency affected field implementation.  For 
instance, as noted above, NGOs did not realize and align with government expectations 
regarding permits, partnership agreements, implementation guidelines, geographic locations 
permissions, and reporting requirements.  A high-ranking government official argued that 
foreign NGOs often submitted incomplete or even incorrect documentation, resulting in delayed 
approvals and project implementation.  Foreign NGOs were expected to become fully aware 
about and observe government regulations, without which project implementation would be 
affected.  
 
Both NGO directors and government officials proposed solutions for this knowledge deficiency.  
For instance, a NGO director considered building staff’s soft skills to search for necessary 
information and to build relations with government officials.  Few government officials indicated 
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that there were no mechanisms in place to facilitate communication between government and 
NGOs.  They pointed out that:    
International organizations may want to sponsor local organizations, but they do not have 
the correct information.  For instance, we recently worked with a French development 
organization. Although they have had a representative office in Vietnam for many years, 
their understanding of the policy environment and Government regulations is limited.  
Government, foreign NGOs and local NGOs, to a limited extent, should exchange 
information about themselves. 
Poor exchange of information between government and NGOs led to a number of problems.  
Although this official did not identify clear mechanisms for knowledge exchange, he/she referred 
to the NGO Resource Center, which was established in 1993 through a partnership between 
foreign NGOs and the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO).  It aims to facilitate 
sharing information, resources and experiences between foreign NGOs, their partners and local 
organisations. It also aims to strengthen relationships and enhance dialogue between foreign 
NGOs and other development actors in Vietnam, including government agencies and donor 
organisations. The Centre, which should have access to and facilitate the proper flow of 
information, does not appear to operate to its full potential.  It is clear that a lack of knowledge or 
understanding on both sides affects creates considerable uncertainty in the implementation of 
projects. 
 
6.3. Top-down directives from headquarters  
Four NGO respondents and one central government officer contributed their opinions on how 
foreign NGO’s international headquarters influenced their field offices in Vietnam.  Foreign 
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NGOs in Vietnam normally reported to and complied with directives issued by their overseas-
based regional or headquarters offices. For example, NGOs might have to shift their intervention 
focus to advocacy because of a global office’s directive.  Head offices also imposed regulations 
on, and required compliance from, their local organizations.  For instance, a head office might 
require a local office to sharply reduce its operating budget, asking it to raise funds from other 
sources. Consequently, the local office was expected to cover nearly all expenses on its own, 
including operating and program costs. In one case, the local Vietnam office actually had to 
transfer part of its overhead budget to its US-based headquarters.   
 
Beyond financial dealings and changes to rules and compliance processes, headquarters-issued 
policies might also simply be irrelevant or inappropriate for a local program.  One NGO director 
said that newly-recruited staff at headquarters lacked field experience, therefore leading them to 
issue changes to programs were inappropriate to the local context.  Foreign NGOs in Vietnam 
might not always obtain support from their own international office, making their operations 
more vulnerable to changes in funding, programming, and local political interference. 
 
Headquarters-imposed policies might also run counter to Vietnamese law.  A government 
official commented, “foreign NGOs may have their own regulations at headquarters level.  
Those regulations, when reaching Vietnam, must correspond with Vietnam’s regulations.  If 
those policies cannot harmonize with each other, administrative processes will be prolonged.”  
Foreign NGOs in Vietnam are often placed in the impossible position of trying to obey both their 
organizations’ and local regulations, creating another time-consuming aspect to working in 




Moreover, the NGOs studied suffered from the uncertainties caused by too many layers of 
supervision.  The greatest challenges occurred when they had to concurrently convince 
government, headquarters, and donors of the need for a course of action before actual 
implementation, sometimes an impossible balancing act, and certainly a tiring one. 
 
6.4. Uncertainties related to staffing  
All NGO interviewees were concerned about staffing their organizations’ operations. Recruiting 
and retaining qualified staff challenged NGO directors because benefit packages were less 
rewarding than those offered by the private sector and even by government.  NGO directors 
might be unable to adjust salary scales to be competitive due to funding limitations.  How to 
allocate adequate funds for effectively staffing operations has been an on-going challenge for 
directors.  
 
Despite challenges in recruiting staff, NGO directors required that staff possess proper 
qualifications.  Many operations require multi-talented staff who are also willing to work 
overtime, and for modest benefit packages, and possibly be based in remote field sites where 
living amenities are not as desirable or attractive as in urban areas. One director complained that 
their organization struggled to find a suitable candidate for one key position: 
I travelled to [name of remote place] two months ago to recruit staff for the position of 
project assistant based in the field.  Interviewing nearly 10 people, I could not select 
anyone. Several village-heads applied but they could not take charge of the few 
communes that we needed.  We also needed basic agricultural skills, nutritional 
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education, team skills…  We also received an application from an electrician. Generally, 
mixed applications.       
In their analysis of global health NGOs, Gilson and colleagues (1994) argue that under 
conditions of funding vulnerability, NGOs may compromise on staff qualifications, e.g., by 
recruiting untrained or inadequately-trained staff. This was certainly seen in Vietnam, where 
NGOs complained that requirements for particular skills led to problems with staff recruitment. 
Talented individuals with required qualifications normally expected more competitive job offers.  
Personnel recruitment has for many organizations become a very challenging problem.   
 
If recruiting staff is difficult, retaining staff is even more so.  First, the NGO work environment 
was generally considered to be less dynamic because of less demanding and altruistic 
management compared with the vibrant for-profit business sector (no rewards for early 
completion of project objectives, no penalty for late deliveries of project outcomes).  In general, 
as one respondent noted, NGO directors tend to be strong at technical expertise, but weak at 
people management. Specifically, they lacked the tools and measures needed to recognize and 
evaluate staff efforts. 
 
Second, workplace policies, including personnel responsibilities, were unclear, and generally 
overly tolerant.  For example, in one organization, Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for each 
individual staff member were too general to be used to assess staff performance.  Therefore, 
failure to deliver projects, or great initiative taken in deploying projects, might be attributed to 
working environment factors, resulting in no punishment or no recognition, respectively.  Such 




Third, short-term project-based recruitment raised concerns about career progression for staff.  
Even for the few permanent staff who thought their career paths were set, those career paths 
were unclear or not accessible due to lack of implementation or supervisory attention.  As a 
result, staff might seek longer-term careers outside of the NGO sector, and commitment by staff 
to their organizations was considered weak. 
 
Even under funding constraints, in order to improve staff morale and/or effectiveness, some 
NGOs sought to improve staff skills for building relationships with high-ranking government 
officials, and for conducting advocacy efforts.  Still other organizations determined that their 
staff needed to acquire leadership skills or the capacity to build local partners’ capacity. In 
general, these approaches aimed to improve staff competencies and productivity to contribute to 
organizational development.  No evaluations exist to prove whether these activities enhance staff 
commitment, or benefit NGOs’ development.  
 
A few NGOs undertook systemic changes to ensure better staff performance.  For instance, one 
NGO restructured its staffing from a specialist grant-based vertical model (a staff member would 
be assigned to and held responsible for their granted projects) to a generalist geographically-
based horizontal model (a staff would be responsible for all projects/grants allocated in one 
geographic area).  The representative of this NGO explained that the restructuring reduced the 
number of staff functioning in each geographic area, and because the staff was the only 
organization’s representative in the geographic area, he/she became the point of contact that 
promoted more effective coordination between communities and implementing partners.  In 
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addition, one NGO representative mentioned that their organization would build measurable sets 
of indicators to appraise performance for each staff category and for the entire organization, 
however they did not have tools and knowledge to do so.  Staff recruitment methods were also 
adjusted, such as by offering field-simulation sessions in new-staff orientation programs to 
familiarize them with real conditions in project communities.  In general, these kinds of systems-
level improvements aimed to build effective working environments and better, more capable 
teams.  However, although the literature suggests that NGOs, through their initiatives, are known 
to strengthen the capacity of their partners, local governments, and individual beneficiaries 
(Freed, Dujon, Granek, & Mouhhidine, 2016, Suleiman, 2013), in this study no respondents 
reported successful outcomes of these tactics for systemic change.   
 
6.5. Implications for NGO operations 
6.5.1. Changing mandates  
Five NGO representatives and one implementation-level government officer provided their 
comments on whether NGOs changed their mandates to adjust to the particular context of 
Vietnam. Despite numerous programming, financing, and political uncertainties, I found it 
surprising that foreign NGOs did not markedly change their overall roles or mandates in 
Vietnam.  However, in practice, NGOs simply adjusted their priorities and directions so as to 
meet local conditions without running afoul of government.  One NGO director confirmed that, 
“I do not think the roles of NGOs in Vietnam change. Their projects are always about technical 
support and innovative solutions to emerging issues… The roles remain, but specific operational 
priorities may change.”  Further to this comment, many NGO directors clarified their loyalty to 
Vietnam.  They remained in Vietnam to support disadvantaged populations, to complete their 
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missions, and to support the government.  Moreover, NGOs showed their commitment to the 
country’s development efforts through adjusting their poverty-relief deliveries to coincide with 
government priorities.  Government officials were positive in confirming that NGOs had 
delivered several projects to alleviate poverty in local areas. In practice, NGOs managed to 
recognize government’s sovereignty and to align their projects within its legal framework.  For 
instance, a NGO director stated, “The NGO’s mindsets are to benefit communities, and this is 
important.  When government regulations change, people must accept.” Although NGOs 
adjusted their operational tactics, they expressed a strong, value-drive commitment to their work 
in Vietnam, and were likewise committed to delivering humanitarian interventions and poverty 
reduction programs. 
 
Ironically, although NGO directors confirmed that their roles in Vietnam remained unchanged, 
some exhibited confusion about their roles.  In the words of one,  
Sometimes our roles become confusing.  We think we are not political…  But when we 
do advocacy, it relates to politics.  We want to change institutions, and we advocate the 
changes...  Or there are many problems that we shut our mouths on, but we really want to 
interfere with.  We manage to influence the government and change their minds.  We do 
not say what we think, and it is why the government must watch us. 
 
6.5.2. Changes to avenues of accountability 
During the interviews, only three NGO informants and one central government officer 
commented on the issue of NGO accountability.  I consider accountability “internal” in the sense 
that the organizations have some control over this factor as they develop strategic plans and 
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implement programs.  NGOs prioritized accountability to grant donors, and as has been reported 
in the literature, their downward accountability to populations was considered comparatively 
weak (Clark, 2001, Fox, 2000).  A NGO director commented on his organization’s “upward” 
accountability as follows: 
In practice, to this point in time, upward accountability to donors is more prioritized, at 
least through complying with compulsory conditions.  Donors’ requirements are very 
rigid, they require reports: they require mechanisms; they require obeying codes of 
conduct.  One obvious reason we comply is that they are our donors and if we do not 
have the money, we cannot implement projects. This is a NGO’s top priority.  
 
Another NGO director said that, 
Even when NGOs, like [our organization], receive donor funding, we still use our own 
internal compliance systems to manage the funds.  Secondly, we have audits to ensure we 
are following donors’ guidelines.  Additionally, organizations are evaluated by the 
Vietnam Tax Authority to ensure smooth transactions. 
 
At the same time, NGOs were also aware of the need for “downward” accountability to 
grassroots communities:  
It is not that [our organization] does not realize how its downward accountability to 
populations is presented.  More and more mechanisms exist in place to improve this, such 
as transparent information, access to various information channels, reporting evaluation 




So, while NGOs prioritize accountability to donors in order to ensure their access to grant funds, 
they also indicate some commitment to communities, as well as to government authorities.  
However, as commented by one NGO director, NGOs need to comply with donors’ 
requirements, and this is the top priority. 
 
6.5.3. Changes in delivery strategies 
Although only few interviewees provided their comments on the issues around NGO 
accountability and mandates, two-thirds of NGO respondents, one central government officer, 
and one implementation-level government officer commented on the issue of program 
implementation. Scholars have described several tactics NGOs used to deliver projects, including 
capacity building and project modelling (Chowdhury, Jahan, & Rahman, 2017, Suleiman, 2013).  
In this research project, the representatives of NGOs discussed what they thought of as 
“innovative” approaches for delivering projects, one of which is what they referred to as the 
“output-based” approach.  Although this approach is now fairly standard everywhere, and known 
as “results-based management,” it was proudly presented as innovative by my informants.  One 
NGO applied this approach to water and sanitation:   
In the old days, we had several staff, from a bidding officer to technical professionals…  
The water program comprised so many people…  Now, we apply an output-based 
approach [contracting private contractors].  We just come over to check water meters, 
and whether the water-flow is strong, and the water quality is acceptable…  We do not 
care about the construction of water towers; it is the contractor’s job.  We just care about 
our outputs, meaning whether the water is clean, and local people are happy.  We count 
the number of water meters and pay the contractor. 
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The above director elaborated that contracting private contractors offered several advantages.  
First, this approach focused the organization’s efforts on quality management rather than 
process-based implementation issues.  Second, contracting and financing matters were simplified 
and paperwork needs reduced (a large part of the paperwork was transferred to the contractor).  
Third, management of risk was transferred to contractors.  Fourth, contractors were also asked to 
reserve and manage maintenance and contingency funds, so the organization did not have to 
organize and oversee them.  Finally, the output-based approach led to more business partnerships 
with the private sector.  One organization’s Annual Report 2016 claimed that the “innovative 
output-based approach” expanded and sustained access to basic services for the underserved.  
 
Another method that NGOs employed was to construct “models of care” (Chowdhury, Jahan, 
and Rahman, 2017; Suleiman, 2013).  Here, NGOs devised and piloted innovative, reliable 
models of care for underserved communities before transferring them to local governments.  One 
organization created a social entrepreneur model for sanitation marketing through a partnership 
with the Central Women’s Union.  The partnership opened a business that produced and 
marketed spare parts and equipment for latrines, with the goal of allocating the commissions 
gained from country-wide distributions to Women’s Union operations.  This NGO was also well-
known for its model of linking resources to help people with disabilities Vietnam-wide.  These 
NGO-authored models were highly appreciated by government.   
 
In Vietnam, like many other NGOs the world over, NGOs created and nurtured implementation 
networks, especially those related to policy advocacy initiatives and which were beneficial to 
benefit population health (Akco, Dagli, Inanici, et. al., 2013, Brechin & Salas, 2013, Zaidi, 
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Mayhew, & Palmer, 2011).  They use their networks to influence government policies on 
poverty reduction, and to persuade and drive the government in their social and political 
arrangements (Ahmed & Potter, 2006).  For example, one organization established the Youth Act 
to End Poverty Network (YAEP), which engaged 640 young men and women mainly from poor 
and disadvantaged areas, to increase youth’s role in national development and poverty 
eradication.  The YAEP acted as a youth platform to share their activities, plans and ambitions, 
and to exchange knowledge and culture.  In particular, different foreign NGOs centered their 
efforts around the NGO Resource Centre to form working groups, to avoid duplicated funds, and 
to build grounds for coordination.   
 
Capacity building was an approach that NGOs employed to deliver projects to communities.  
One of the NGOs maintained that it was amongst its key prioritized methods.  Another 
organizations worked to build the capacity of stakeholders (government departments, civil 
society organizations, communities) to manage projects with the participation of communities.  
In this context, NGOs used several methods to support the capacity of local institutions, 
including experience exchange, training, and study tours.  Said one government official: 
In the old days, local NGOs did not have much experience in policy advocacy.  Then we 
were invited on overseas study tours to witness how people advocated policies.  Foreign 
professionals also came over to Vietnam to teach why policy advocacy is useful, what 
policies were, so that we believed that policy advocacy was not unfamiliar.           
In this sense, the NGOs that engaged in this work could no longer be considered direct 
implementors, but instead transferred knowledge and technologies to other individuals and 
institutions, who, in turn, delivered interventions on the NGOs’ behalf.  As such, capacity 
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building positively changed individual and institutional awareness about development.  NGOs 
have claimed that this achievement represents sustainability.  This change might last in 
communities even after foreign NGOs had withdrawn.   
 
Foreign NGOs strengthened local organizations as part of a strategy to hand projects over.  Some 
foreign NGOs’ directors confirmed that they would soon phase out of Vietnam, leaving local 
organizations with opportunities to lead in serving local populations and development goals.  
Local organizations might then raise funds domestically and internationally, and some 
international donors would name local organizations to take the lead.  In this sense, foreign 
NGOs provided resources that facilitated local projects.  An informant gave this example: 
NGOs are very good because they provide local organizations with information, for 
instance, on the worldwide use of asbestos, how many countries have banned it, why the 
ban, evidence on asbestos-related harm… We have got much useful information… Some 
other groups want to extend the use of asbestos in Vietnam, they also give a lot of 
evidence.  Although this evidence is out-of-date and unscientific, we would not have 
known.  Then foreign NGOs provided us with the good information. 
The above informant stated that when local organizations acquired appropriate resources 
(knowledge, information), they could confidently deliver interventions.  In this example, local 
organizations were prepared and ready to take over field-based implementation.   
 
NGOs might use multiple methods concurrently to deliver their initiatives.  For instance, they 
combined coordinating resources, engaging stakeholders, bridging gaps, networking alliances, 
and building movements, in addition to providing technical knowledge.  Therefore, foreign NGO 
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staff needed soft skill sets (networking, relationship building, coordinating) different to just 
technical expertise (agricultural extension, medical examination).  There were no data to assess 
how effectively the combined approach worked, and whether NGO staff possessed the soft skill 
sets.  
 
Interestingly, although using several methods to deliver their projects, NGOs could not imagine 
making their general operations more effective and responsive.  On one hand, they might localize 
their operations, becoming a local NGO.  In this dimension, NGO directors were concerned 
about the legal aspects of localization, and about the separation from international alliances that 
this might entail. On the other hand, a NGO might become an international alliance member.  In 
this sense, NGOs might focus their efforts on fund mobilization, and escape local politically-
controlled implementation.  However, NGO directors stressed that they needed more time and 
further analyses because of the lack of precedents in Vietnam to become a local or international 
organization. Limited scholarly attention has been paid to whether and how NGOs can improve 
their own institutional capacity in terms of human resource and organizational performance.  
Seims (2011) states that donors strengthen NGOs’ internal capacity (e.g., management, project 
delivery).     
 
6.5.4. NGO alignment with government 
Based on my experience, although NGOs sometimes challenge the government on matters 
associated with human rights and other priorities that may differ from those of government, they, 
in general, want to engage with and complement government priorities and directives, and 
participate in government-led development policy development and initiatives.  NGO alignment 
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with government may be considered an internal factor because NGOs may decide, to some 
extent, whether and to what degree they align with government priorities.   
 
Nearly all NGO respondents (twelve out of thirteen NGO interviewees) discussed their concerns 
regarding alignment of their organization’s projects with government’s objectives and priorities.  
These opinions were supplemented by comments provided by three of the four implementation-
level government officers interviewed, and one central government officer.   
 
NGOs have traditionally supported the development goals of the government and aligned their 
objectives accordingly.  One NGO director stated that “No one force[d] NGOs to do that 
[support government priorities],” and “if we do not realize it [supporting government], we have 
no reasons to stay here.”  Another NGO director affirmed that, “The role of NGOs, in general, 
and of development agencies is to bring resources to what the government prioritizes.  If a 
NGO’s strategies do not relate to the Government of Vietnam’s, it will be in a bad position.  It 
will get its foot kicked.” Still another NGO director concluded that:  
People are normally mistaken, that we think we are "non-governmental," meaning we do 
not have to serve any governments and we do not need to follow anyone.  In reality, we 
are operating in the territory of a country and we are committed to observing host country 
regulations…  We need to align with government.  We must understand that we do not 





In general, respondents suggested that NGOs assumed a role of helping government achieve its 
development objectives. This is generally consistent with the literature; indeed, many donors 
require as a condition of funding that NGO sponsored programs align with country priorities 
(Akukwe, 1998, Badu & Parker, 1994, Webb, Kye, & Sant’anna, 1995).  NGOs in Vietnam, 
perhaps more than in other settings given their potentially difficult position vis-à-vis 
government, clearly acknowledge state sovereignty.   
 
The NGOs studied worked carefully to ensure their alignment with state priorities, referring to 
public master plans, state development reports, and official strategic plans in framing their own 
objectives.  They endeavoured to build strong partnerships with government departments at 
various levels in order to ensure compliance with objectives and financing conditions. One NGO 
took the initiative of consulting both government departments and local communities in order to 
establish complementary priorities.  Another organization consulted the five-year Social 
Economical Development Plan (SEDP) in order to develop programs consistent with government 
priorities. Still other organizations analyzed national statistics or their own research findings to 
ensure alignment with government priorities.  The knowledge that NGOs gained through those 
sources facilitated their alignment with the country priorities.   
 
NGOs participated in establishing government development objectives through several 
mechanisms.  One such mechanism, the Health Partnership Group (HPG), was comprised of 
development partners (including foreign NGOs), the Ministry of Health, and other Ministries, 
and aimed to improve the effectiveness of external supports to the health sector (NGO Resource 
Centre, 2010).  HPG annual meetings reviewed the milestones of national health programs, 
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thereby facilitating the contribution of NGOs to national planning.  The HPG served as a primary 
forum for developing trust, building common understanding, and facilitating progress towards an 
improved health system.   
 
In addition, NGOs also offered support to the drafting of the Vietnam Voluntary National 
Review (VNR).  The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development encourages member states to 
conduct regular and inclusive reviews of progress at the national and sub-national levels. These 
national reviews are expected to serve as a basis for the regular reviews by the High-Level 
Political Forum, meeting under the auspices of the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs.  The regular reviews by the High-Level Political Forum are to be voluntary, state-
led, undertaken by both developed and developing countries, and involve multiple stakeholders. 
The VNR allowed for sharing experiences and progresses, strengthening government 
policies and institutions, and mobilizing resources for implementing Sustainable Development 
Goals.  Vietnam is one of the VNR countries and shared its progress reports biennially. The 
NGO section of the 2018 Vietnam VNR Report was led by a NGO through several consultation 
workshops with ministries.  Through supporting VNR reports, NGOs enjoyed an opportunity to 
participate in establishing state priorities.    
 
NGOs also served on several national committees, such as the National Blindness Prevention 
Committee, through which NGOs offered their technical and financial resources in establishing 
objectives.  NGO’s active participation in state priorities facilitated a healthy government-NGO 




Some NGOs followed multiple channels to support establishing development objectives.  One 
NGO, for instance, actively joined in the processes of developing a Five-Year Socio-Economic 
Development Plan (SEDP) at central and local levels.  This organization was among foreign 
NGOs offering help to furnish the NGO part of the VRN reports.  The NGO also served on the 
National Target Programs in Sustainable Poverty Reduction (NTPSPR)4.  Another foreign NGO 
offered support through the government-organized Consultative Groups of Donors.  This 
organization also co-led the National Children’s Forum and co-chaired the 2018 World 
Economic Forum in Vietnam.  NGO’s active engagements in these mechanisms meant that 
NGOs played significant roles in informing and shaping state development priorities.   
 
Despite the apparent positive relationship between NGOs, and government, the implementation 
of NGO projects continues to face obstacles.  The reasons for this are as follows: First, the 
government and NGOs approached the same objectives differently.  Although the government 
expected tangible service delivery, NGOs might deliver intangible outcomes.  For example, 
government might prefer the construction of rural-appropriate latrines, or microcredit programs 
for disadvantaged rural women’s groups, over programs advocating “sensitive” issues of human 
 
4 The National Target Program on Sustainable Poverty Reduction for 2016-2020 was approved by Vietnam Prime 
Minister through Decision No.1722/QD-TTg.  This US$2 billion program aims to reduce the number of poor 
households in the country by 1-1.5% per year, to increase the per capita income of poor households to 150% and of 
those living in disadvantaged districts by 200% by 2020, as compared with 2015.  The programme will be carried 
out across the country, with coastal, island and border areas as well as communes in extreme poverty as top 





rights.  Second, the government did not publicly disclose some of its priorities, or their priorities 
were unclearly articulated, so that NGOs could not provide support or align appropriately.  For 
instance, one NGO was unclear about state policies regarding conservation areas, and therefore 
was unable to deliver relevant projects that may have supported government conservation 
priorities. Third, even though a program might be aligned with publicly stated government 
objectives, NGOs might face state regulations that restrict effective delivery, for instance, by 
denial of access to certain geographical locations.   
 
Despite these occasional difficulties, informants generally reported that NGOs offered 
meaningful contributions to Vietnam’s social and economic development.  According to a high-
ranking government official, foreign NGOs contributed approximately 300 million dollars 
annually for several years in a row.  This assistance also corresponds with the financial figure 
provided by UN Agencies in Vietnam, Delegation of European Union to Vietnam, Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam. (2014).  According to one respondent, at the macro-level, 
NGOs contributed greatly to the achievement of Vietnam’s Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) and they offer strong support of the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).  At 
the micro-level, they contributed to nationally prioritized programs, such as for maternal and 
childcare, blindness prevention, and the 2030 national nutrition strategy.  These contributions 
have been recognized by government. 
  
These findings are consistent with the international literature. Srivastava and colleagues (2016) 
comment that through partnering with government, NGOs contribute resources to nations’ social 
welfare and development planning.  Mabawonku (2001) comments that NGOs may translate 
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scientific and technical information into evidence-based recommendations or initiatives that are 
understandable and usable to decision-makers, the media, and the public.  NGOs can share with 
governments their participatory approaches to the planning and design of community-based 
initiatives (Ahmed, Capistrano, & Hossain, 1997).  Likewise, NGOs have been shown to build 
and strengthen governments’ project implementation capacity (Maxwell & Lirenso, 1994).  In 
Vietnam, as reported by one government official, NGOs raised the need for community-based 
natural disaster mitigation plans, and then offered the government funds and internationally-
referenced materials to support the development of national disaster-mitigating guidelines.  
Another NGO provided lessons on global child abuse prevention initiatives, thanks to which the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the Ministry of Education and 
Training (MOET) issued regulations on positive discipline (to replace corporal punishment).  
NGOs also supported the first government-issued tobacco regulations in 2000, and were also 
lauded by government for providing locally appropriate technology and programs (local 
language, cultural sensitiveness in ethnic minority communities).  One NGO director shared their 
organization’s support for improving the capacity of local healthcare workers to provide high 
quality eye care: 
In 1992, only a few hundred cataract surgeries were performed annually.  Now the 
number is 240,000 per year, meaning a greatly increased number of beneficiaries. 
Moreover, in 1992 we had only two eye surgeons, now we have 1,350. In the 21 project 
provinces, [name of organization] supported providing not only basic eye care and 
cataract surgery, but also specialized care such as pediatric eye care, glaucoma treatment, 




Although most NGO directors confirmed their firm stand in supporting state development 
objectives, others doubted how real or meaningful NGO inputs were to state-owned programs.  
One NGO director disclosed that the government actually did not take the initiative of consulting 
NGOs, and NGOs "managed to be invited" to those events as simply observers. At times, NGOs 
disseminated key research findings at large events involving high-ranking professionals and 
policy makers, but informants told me they were not able to determine whether these findings 
were acted on or even heard. 
 
Reflecting on the situation in Romania, Topor and Boroiu (2011, pp. 599) note that government 
has generally not taken into account the economic and financial contributions of the non-profit, 
non-governmental associations to the labor market, including to the financial dynamics and 
stability of the financial market in Romania.”  This problem was also articulated by high-ranking 
government officials in Vietnam.  One official stated that NGOs did not appear in their 
department’s strategic plan because it was unclear whether they had a secure source of funding. 
Another official confirmed that the provincial Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(SEDP) included no budget lines for NGOs because NGOs had failed to provide progress reports 
on the projects, unclear or unusable inputs into long-term plans, and lack of evaluation metrics 
demonstrating improvements in key development indicators.  Even when NGOs submitted 
biannual reports to local governments their contributions were seen as too modest to be in 
included final reports. A government official concluded that, “The presence of NGOs in the 




NGO contributions to country development were blurred by different approaches to assessment 
and evaluation. While NGOs measured specific task-level objectives (mid-range outcomes), 
government departments tended to focus on long term outcomes and impacts, even though 
Vietnam’s statistical bureau lacked monitoring and evaluation tools to measure specific 
indicators and to synthesize them in greater national development reports.  In addition, NGOs 
rarely communicated financial issues (especially high indirect costs), project costs, and human 
resources to central- and local-level governments, and instead reported directly to grant donors 
without including government.  Therefore, government was not fully aware of the details of 
NGOs’ project implementation.   
 
6.6. Respondents’ recommendations for NGOs  
This chapter examines internal factors that influence NGO operations in Vietnam, and several 
recommendations here address issues over which NGOs may have some control.  However, for 
convenience, I also include the recommendations derived from NGO representatives’ own 
perspectives, which target external factors which NGOs would appear to have little say.   
 
6.6.1. Educating government and donors  
Several interviewees in this research project (three NGO respondents and one central 
government officer) suggested that NGOs need to educate government departments and donors 
on various issues around NGO operations in Vietnam.  The respondents mentioned that the 
government had little understanding of NGO operations, and this tended to complicate 
government-NGO relationships, and hence compromise the development of effective 
partnerships.  A high-ranking government officer suggested that NGOs should disclose their 
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projects for public review, and bridge knowledge gaps to facilitate partnerships with the 
government.  The government “worried” that foreign NGOs could create political upheavals, 
hence social instability.  This worry might negatively affect government views on NGOs.  The 
participant recommended that NGOs should have effective, transparent communications with the 
government and other stakeholders. This respondent went on to assert that full provision of 
information might decrease the government’s "worry" about NGOs and CSOs.  However, from 
my experience, how NGOs can “educate” the government and enhance their relationship remains 
a question.  Currently, no official channels exist for two-way communication, except that NGOs 
have to apply for several permits required for their operations and activity implementation, and 
they have to submit annual reports to the government.  Occasional chances for NGO feedback 
might happen when local governments offer a meeting as a means of communicating with 
NGOs.  However, even under these circumstances NGOs might not necessarily communicate 
their concerns due to their concerns over dissatisfying government.   
 
Some respondents suggested that NGOs could do a better job of communicating with donors 
regarding local conditions in Vietnam.  For instance, NGOs could discuss the in-depth physical 
and political challenges that their operations encounter so that donors would become 
knowledgeable about field-level implementation issues without always asking for a rationale.  
One director suggested that:  
We have to provide donors with clarifications.  When donors grant you funds and you 
cannot deliver, the donors may suspect that your capacity and competency is not enough.  
They do not understand the conditions in Vietnam, the challenges from government 
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departments, and challenges from local governments…  I think we need to provide 
explanations. 
 
In addition, donors also needed wider and deeper background information on local, community-
level issues that affect NGOs (poverty, health improvements, systems).  Through the provision of 
background data, NGOs can educate donors about local priorities, NGO operations in Vietnam, 
and several other development needs.  Such knowledge would help donors prepare and earmark 
funds as appropriate to local conditions. 
 
Based on my experience, donors normally required project objectives be achieved without 
regards to actual local conditions (such as transportation issues, populations’ literate level, local 
government’s staff capacity).  NGOs’ leaders may be afraid that their organizations might fail to 
win grant awards if they share these local challenges with donors.  In my opinions, the 
organizations’ leaders should confidently educate donors on those challenging conditions in 
order to achieve donors’ respect and possibly positive funding prospects.  
    
6.6.2. “Collaborating among themselves first” 
Five NGOs, one central government officer, and one implementation-level government officer 
commented on the importance of collaboration among NGOs.  Informants strongly 
recommended that NGOs should collaborate with each other to maximize their impact on state 
development, such as progress toward meeting the SDGs.  The literature also notes that NGO 
collaborations with each other increase NGOs’ access to information and resources, their 
legitimacy and power, and commitment (Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012, Yanacopulos, 2005).  
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Through such collaboration, NGOs generate impacts on population well-being, and cope with 
environmental turbulence (Ahmed & Potter, 2006, Chapman & Fisher, 2000).  For example, in 
Vietnam, I experienced working with the NGO Network for Health, which was granted funding 
for implementing a program on HIV/AIDS in a northern province of Vietnam, and a NGO 
consortium, which co-led a climate change and adaptation project in central and south Vietnam.  
Both projects were among the several examples of NGO collaborations in the country.  
According to a respondent, NGO collaborations ensure that they “strengthen the voice of 
grassroot communities, strengthen the voice of mass media”, and raise stronger voices to the 
government. This respondent stressed that a stronger voice would have a greater impact and 
would ensure that government would pay attention.  
 
Some respondents suggested that NGOs might also collaborate with each other on several 
programming issues to avoid overlap.  They might also share their ways for fund diversification 
and tactics for effective program delivery.  In addition, NGOs might coordinate on operational 
policies (e.g., paying the same salaries and per-diems) to avoid confusion and conflict at the local 
level.  The respondents argued that these measures facilitated effective coordination among 
NGOs.       
 
A few interviewees mentioned that although NGOs had their own systems of operation and 
management, and might sometimes be driven to compete against one another, they nevertheless 
recognized the need to support each other.  These interviewees stressed that the NGOs might 
have centered around the NGO Resource Center to promote and push members towards actions 




6.6.3. Increasing the effectiveness of NGOs 
Nearly half of the interviewees (seven NGO representatives, one central government officer, and 
one implementation-level government officer) recommended that NGOs work to enhance the 
effectiveness of their operations. For example, several respondents suggested that instead of 
working in several widely dispersed geographic and program areas, NGOs might narrow their 
focus to specific areas, and build close relationships with local communities to ensure that 
programs properly address local needs.  Moreover, the participants stated that NGOs should have 
expertise in their areas of focus to ensure success.  On informant suggested that effectiveness 
could be mandated in organizational strategy documents, cutting across several key 
organizational objectives.  The NGO regarded organizational effectiveness as one of the five 
goals in their 2016-2020 strategic plan.  They implemented the Development Effectiveness 
Framework in the development of robust and sustainable programs to ensure impacts for 
children.     
 
One government official stated that NGOs might update programming to ensure consistency with 
local conditions and trends, and mandate the updated strategies in organizational strategy 
documents to ensure that they had the resources to concentrate efforts on specific problems and 
in specific contexts.  Several respondents noted that the old-fashioned charity approach should be 
replaced by innovative, holistic projects with clearly identified strengths and follow-up 
capabilities.  One respondent gave an example that, instead of providing food to very poor 
communities, NGOs should identify the root cause of poverty in those communities, and 
carefully conduct a needs assessment, from which to work with communities and local 
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authorities on a suitable strategy addressing poverty reduction.  Second, both government and 
NGO respondents noted that NGOs should promote and test development initiatives through 
collaborations with multiple state-owned agencies, local authorities, local organizations, media, 
and contract-based service providers, including technical consultants.  Third, according to one 
government official, NGOs ought to propose an exit strategy early in their programs, such as 
follow-up provisions in the forms of secured funds or sustainable income-generating livelihood 
activities in local communities.  Lastly, one government officer suggested that NGOs might 
integrate their projects with public funding initiatives, arguing that this strategy would create 
mutual interdependence and facilitate the long-term sustainability of projects.  
 
6.6.4. Acquiring knowledge about government 
About one-third of interviewees (six NGO interviewees and one central government officer) 
discussed the problems that NGOs have in acquiring relevant knowledge about government.  As 
noted here and in the literature, NGOs must obey state priorities and frameworks and to maintain 
good relationships with government (Anku-Tsede, 2014, Mercer, Thompson, & Araujo, 2014, 
McLoughlin, 2011, Fisher, 2003, Gary, 1996, Lubin, 1987).  This priority was also articulated in 
some NGOs’ strategy documents.  Some NGO representatives expressed a need to acquire 
knowledge of government departments’ operations and administrative procedures.  These 
respondents explained that understanding and being able to adhere to the approval processes for 
necessary applications (registration certificates, operation permits, project approval documents, 
tax-related formalities) as well as appreciating how the work culture of government departments 
might affect such approvals, is of significant benefit to NGO operations.  The above respondents 
added that knowledge is also needed to facilitate contacts with the proper department, and with 
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the officials who have the relevant authority, to approve projects and permits.  One government 
officer noted that NGOs were better able to comply with government policies if they “spoke the 
government’s language.  In short, respondents reported that understanding of government 
organization, processes, and functions was especially important to the proper financing of 
projects, and such knowledge facilitated selecting the right department to partner with in terms of 
disbursing projects’ resources for program activities.   
 
6.6.5. Head office’s policies and directions 
A few NGO representatives addressed how managers working the organization’s international 
headquarters influenced the operations of field country offices in Vietnam.  One respondent 
stated that overseas headquarters were often remiss in not consulting and informing themselves 
about local laws and culture when imposing restrictions on or directing field operations.  In 
addition, another NGO representative noted that headquarters staff were criticized for not 
offering appropriate, concrete directions or practical supports for staff on the ground, for 
instance, ways to develop relationships with government; or to implement, monitor and evaluate 
projects.  Still another NGO representative considered that mechanisms were also needed to 
promote field offices’ capacity building and organizational development.  Importantly, 
respondents felt that headquarters’ staff should regularly update and enforce codes of conduct so 
as to protect field staff and associates from deviance from local norms of behavior.  
 
6.7. Recommendations for government 
Nearly all of the respondents provided recommendations for government (twelve NGO 
representatives, two central government officers, and three implementation-level government 
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officers).  According to the NGO respondents, the central government needs to strengthen 
awareness about NGOs’ operations among their several departments and local governments.  
NGOs’ representatives complained that while the People’s Aid Coordination Committee 
(PACCOM) had a reasonably good understanding of NGO operations, and they issued 
regulations of these operations, they did not collaborate with NGOs on specific projects.  These 
respondents went on to comment that, NGOs, conversely, collaborated with specific ministries 
(e.g., the Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs) and local-level governments (e.g., province-, 
district, and commune-level governments), that did not fully understand how NGOs operate, and 
were not even aware of current government’s regulations on NGO operations.  Therefore, based 
on my experience, even after NGOs obtained registration and operation permits, they might still 
face obstacles in communicating and transacting with ministries and local governments.  
 
The literature illustrates governments’ regulative, one-way controls over NGO operations 
(Murtaza & Austin, 2011, Tandon, 1989).  In Vietnam, respondents noted that improving the 
regulatory process, or at least making this process clearer and less of a barrier, could result in 
improved government-NGO coordination.  First, a government officer recommended the creation 
of regulations enabling rather than restricting NGO operations. NGO representatives argued that 
government must understand that CSOs and NGOs need favourable conditions to flourish and to 
contribute to the country’s development. Second, several NGO representatives were concerned 
that despite the existence of several policies regulating NGO operations, the country lacks the 
necessary legal frameworks for governing charity and civil society (e.g., Law on Charity, Law on 
Associations).  These representatives went on to confirm that the Law on Charity and the Law on 
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Associations would positively facilitate NGO operations.  However, from my knowledge, both 
laws have not existed yet.  Third, research respondents argued that different policies have 
traditionally overlapped and hindered each other, eventually compromising NGOs’ performance.  
Therefore, in my perspective, a better approach would be for the central government to work to 
identify and address gaps in NGO-related regulations in order to ensure consistency within the 
national system.  Fourth, and as discussed at several points in this thesis, NGO respondents 
argued that government needs to reduce the amount of administrative paperwork, simplify 
procedures, and provide concise, clear, and concrete guidelines.   
 
Specific mechanisms to improve the policy environment were recommended by several 
interviewees.  In their views, the government was expected to direct departments and local 
governments to implement existing laws to ensure that government-NGO collaborations were 
fully reviewed.  As noted in the literature, and described in this thesis, government-NGO 
mistrust is often caused by discrepancies between generally supportive policies and unsupportive 
practices (Batley, 2006).   Respondents in this study argued that NGOs should be more active in 
sharing participatory approaches to development,  including staff capacity building.  These 
respondents went on to recommend that the government would then be in a better position to 
develop their development priorities and resource planning so that NGOs could effectively 
contribute.  One NGO representative suggested that the government can also establish a national 
database about development needs and funding availability which NGOs can access.  Moreover, 
another NGO director noted that NGOs might engage in negotiations on international agreements 
(e.g., Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) to strengthen governance for sustainable 




Some interviewees noted that from a resource perspective, the government should lift current 
restrictions and allow foreign NGOs to raise funds domestically.  Moreover, these interviewees 
stated that the government should allow foreign NGOs to access state funds for public and social 
services.  From my perspective, if NGOs can access the state funds and implement projects 
delivering public and social services to local communities, the pressure on government to 
manage implementation would be lessened so that it can focus effort on leadership.  In addition, 
respondents argued that government should be willing to step in and offer transitional funding to 
maintain projects after NGOs withdraw. However, based on my experience, this might be a risky 
process insofar as reliance on state funds might create more dependency by NGOs on 
government and thus in an even more unequal position in what is already a sensitive relationship.   
 
6.8. Recommendations for donors 
Nearly all of the NGO interviewees (eleven out of thirteen), one implementation-level 
government officer, and one central government officer had recommendations for donors. 
Although Vietnam has recently achieved status as a middle-income country, donor support is still 
needed to support the country’s development.  Several NGO representatives noted that 
international donors might consider offering a transitional plan for Vietnam.  These respondents 
explained that financially, donors were encouraged to provide flexible, non-restrictive, packaged 
funds to fully cover initiatives that effectively solve development problems.  In addition, the 
respondents also recommended that donors were expected to coordinate amongst themselves to 
avoid overlaps and gaps.  Donors were particularly encouraged by government officers to 




Programmatically, interviewees encouraged donors to focus on a few projects (rather than 
many).  Government officers interviewed further recommended that donors could favour 
government-related priorities.  NGO directors interviewed also recommended that donors 
promote and advocate for civil society in Vietnam, because “Donors have a strong voice and the 
ability to put pressure on certain Vietnamese institutions to support NGOs.”   
 
Respondents observed that donor-NGO communications could be strengthened. Some NGOs’ 
representatives suggested that NGOs’ field offices could provide donors with knowledge of local 
topics of interest (poverty, health promotion gaps, data). Based on my experience, once donors 
acquired knowledge of the local landscape, they could earmark funds where relevant and share 
local challenges with NGOs, and promote NGO results in Vietnam.  Better two-way 
communications would likely ensure the effectiveness of fund disbursements in local areas.  
However, as Cooley and Ron (2002) argue, NGOs are not likely to complain directly to donors 
for fear of triggering their dissatisfaction.    
 
In summary, in this chapter I reviewed the internal influences that affect NGO operations.  In 
terms of program implementation, NGOs often introduced new concepts and devised 
comprehensive, multi-component programs, though these were often compromised by improper 
implementation schedules, reliance on local implementation partners, ineffective coordination 
among government departments, NGOs’ deficiency in knowledge about state-owned agency 
operations and administrative procedures, and poor government-NGOs information exchange.  
How NGOs staffed their operations represents another internal challenge.  It is hard to recruit 
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highly-qualified staff, and it is even harder to retain staff due to less-rewarding benefit packages, 
less dynamic working environment and altruistic management, and unclear staff and workplace 
policies.  NGO operations were also influenced by changes in regional or headquarter strategies 
and finance.   
 
A NGO may devise very interesting program logical frameworks, or model of local community 
development, that engage local governments, government departments, and several local 
communities.  These initiatives aim to generate a sustainable model of practice that would 
remain functioning after the NGO programs withdraws.  Unfortunately, these programs are often 
based on assumptions that local governments and government departments cooperate effectively, 
local community members enjoy high level of literacy, state agencies fully support the program 
implementation, and the NGO staffs fully understand the programs’ concepts and are capable to 
transfer knowledge to local people.  When these conditions are not met, program success may be 
compromised. 
 
My experience suggests that NGOs should carefully evaluate risks possibly associated with the 
implementation of their programmatic initiatives, and propose measures to mitigate those risks 
before, or during the implementation.  Yet NGOs normally do not have the resources (time, 
financial resources, methods) to conduct such risk analyses.     
 
My experience is consistent with complaints about the top-down policies that headquarters staff 
deploy in ignorance of in-country conditions.  Once, headquarters asked country offices to apply 
an online approving system.  Because the multiple million dollar system did not work properly, 
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the country office had to use both the manual system and the newly-created online system, and 
this overlap greatly consumed time and effort of staff members.  Moreover, the online system 
allowed access to only four staff, and other staff were requested to “borrow” the access from the 
4 “allowed” staff.  This limitation violated the confidentiality that the organization traditionally 
respected.  Headquarters staff convinced my office’s staff that this system was a “global trend,” 
and they were resistant accepting complaints about the use of the online system.   
 
In order to cope with these internal influences, and to better help the government achieve 
development objectives, NGOs adjusted their mandates, accountabilities and strategies.  Foreign 
NGOs did not markedly change their overall roles or mandates in Vietnam, but simply adjusted 
their priorities and directions so as to meet local conditions without running afoul of government.  
NGOs prioritized accountability to donors rather than to grassroots communities.  NGOs used 
several tactics to deliver projects, including capacity building, project modelling, and contracting 
private contractors.   
 
When I worked with some NGOs in Vietnam, I experienced several changes in their 
programmatic strategies.  One NGO changed their strategy from delivering projects that met 
communities’ needs (schools, seeds, latrines) to projects that promotes the rights of and the right 
holders (for example, villagers) and the responsibilities of duty bearers (for example, state-
owned agencies).  This NGO had an impaired relationships with the government, and this 
influenced implementation progress.  Another NGO adjusted their strategy from implementing 
big construction projects (for example, general hospitals) to multiple-component community 
development projects that engaged community education on sanitation and hygienic issues, 
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advocate for local standards on latrines, and supports for very small charitable activities (family-
based water tanks, school-based water filtering system).      
 
I have also reviewed the various recommendations made by respondents for how to reduce 
uncertainties and improve the environment for NGOs.  Respondents recommended that NGOs 
might better strategize their contributions to national development.  The government was 
expected to promulgate enabling rather than restrictive policies for NGOs, and government-NGO 
partnerships should start on an equal basis.  Donors were advised to promote and advocate for 
civil society in Vietnam through the offering of flexible, non-restrictive, packaged funds to fully 
cover program activities.   
 
Although the proposals are reasonable, my experience indicates that some of these 
recommendations are not practical.  For example, respondents suggested that NGOs should 
cooperate among themselves, though such coordination is not practicable because each 
organization has their own administrative, financial, and operational systems, alongside their 
unique programmatic priorities and fund-raising initiatives.  In my experience, few coordination 
meetings ever resulted in any real plans.  I also joined several projects where NGOs were 
expected to work together.  From my perspective, however, each participating NGO seemed to 
bring in their own small projects, without necessarily sharing common project objectives.        
 
Respondents also recommended that the government promulgated enabling rather than restrictive 
policies for NGOs.  However, because the government currently does not have entirely positive 
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views of NGOs, and may label the NGOs as a threat to national security, it is not ready to 





CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION 
The previous chapters highlighted the constraints (internal and external) that reflect NGOs’ non-
status in Vietnam, and the strategic response of NGOs in the face of these constraints, which I 
have characterized as “uncertainties”.  NGOs tend to apply flexibility in order to maneuver 
through these constraints.  In the discussion that follows, I argue that the core problem that faces 













themselves in comfort 
zone 





NGOs fail to produce 
lasting results 
Figure 11:  Problem tree on NGO operations 
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This problem is related to three main issues: implementation and management of organizations’ 
operations, unclear funding and donor engagements, and various key environmental influences.  
These three issues lead NGOs to “hide” themselves in a what they refer to as a “comfortable 
zone” out of government view and to thereby escape government scrutiny and control.  However, 
this does not create a healthy government-NGO relationship, and as a consequence, affects the 
quality, impact, and sustainability of projects. 
 
7.1. The core problem: Indeterminate social standing  
NGOs have no official standing in Vietnam.  Although those whose directors were interviewed 
for this study are in registered organizations, these organizations are not eligible to join the 
government-recognized list of political and social agencies.  This means that although NGOs 
operate, their presence in the country is ignored by the government, and NGOs occupy unofficial 
roles.  I find in this study that although this fact compromises their effectiveness, it might afford 
them flexibility in adjusting strategies and shifting priorities as needed, and thus facilitates NGO 
operations in conditions of uncertainty.  In the literature, where scholars have discussed NGO 
flexibility in project planning, implementation, and partnerships (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016, 
Fisher, 2003, Holdsworth & Winkley, 1990), they have not explained the origins of that 
flexibility.  This research project shows that flexibility in a Vietnamese context comes from the 
unofficial roles that NGOs occupy, which also offers NGOs room to maneuver.  
 
However, this flexibility is also a challenge to NGOs when they are uncertain as to how to 
proceed with strategic directions.  For instance, the dilemma inherent in choosing to remain a 
beneficiary international NGO, or becoming an international alliance member, or localizing 
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operations, all challenge foreign NGOs in Vietnam, with each direction or decision involving 
pros and cons.  Because NGOs are uncertain about their future directions under such conditions, 
and no precedents exist, they tend to employ an approach that is open to several scenarios.  For 
example, they may operate on the funding that is provided through an international alliance 
member.  In this case, funding is normally guaranteed, but NGOs rely strategically on their 
sponsoring headquarter.  NGOs may, at the same time, seek funds to run their own 
implementation, which means that NGOs may fail to be granted with funds, but they have more 
autonomy on strategic actions.  Normally, NGOs opt to financially survive on guaranteed funds 
or on their own.  This uncertainty has the potential to dilute directors’ effort to ensure quality 
service delivery. The directors may not focus efforts on a specific approach. 
 
Foreign NGOs sometimes want to hand over development projects to local social and technical 
associations, which are established under a state-owned umbrella technical association (Vietnam 
Union of Science and Technology Associations – VUSTA).  However, the hand-over might 
complicated if local NGOs are not issued operating permits. Foreign NGOs in this study 
explained the need to determine whether to terminate project-based, longer-term partnerships 
with local NGOs, or to remain as key implementors with activity-based, short-term consultancy 
contracts with local NGOs.  The dilemma of how to work with local NGOs reflects the 
uncertainty that exists in circumstances when, for example, foreign NGOs might not be ready to 
hand over projects, and where local NGOs are not ready or lack the capacity to take over 
projects.  Because civil society initiatives are not officially sanctioned in Vietnam, and the legal 
frameworks governing NGOs are unclear, any hand-overs to local NGOs might invite political 




Despite their ambiguous role in Vietnam’s social and political system, NGOs assert their 
legitimacy to operate in Vietnam through their public adherence to globally-accepted, 
fundamental values (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009), and their commitment to the needs of less-well-
off groups.  For instance, they endorse the rights-based approach to programming in which they 
highlight the responsibilities of rights holders (communities) and duty bearers’ (the government).   
They also argue to government that there are many groups who lag behind the rest in the 
country’s development and deserve help.  NGOs are put into an uncertain position insofar that 
government has in fact invited them to participate in Vietnam’s poverty reduction. In this way, 
NGOs insist on their legitimacy to operate in Vietnam despite their uncertain funding conditions 
and the adverse social and political circumstances under which they often operate.  
 
7.2. Immediate causes of the indeterminate social standing 
7.2.1. Issues with program implementation 
Scholars have described several tactics NGOs used to deliver projects, including capacity 
building and project modelling (Chowdhury, Jahan, & Rahman, 2017, Suleiman, 2013).  This 
research project adds several single approaches (output-based approach, intervention modelling, 
networking, and capacity building) and combined approaches that NGOs employed to deliver 
interventions.  Although these diverse approaches represent NGO innovations and flexibility, the 
effectiveness of those approaches has not been confirmed.   
 
For instance, NGOs are part of effective networks and wield information relevant to population 
health (Akco, Dagli, Inanici, et. al., 2013, Brechin & Salas, 2013, Zaidi, Mayhew, & Palmer, 
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2011).  They employ their international and domestic networks to influence government policies 
on poverty reduction, and to persuade and drive the government in their social and political 
arrangements (Ahmed & Potter, 2006).  This research project has highlighted that NGOs have 
established such networks and channels of communication, e.g., the Youth Act to End Poverty 
Network.  However, whether such newly-emerged institutions can evolve to generate lasting 
impacts is unknown.   
 
Capacity building represents another important project dimension.  The findings I discuss here 
are consistent with those described elsewhere (e.g., Suleiman, 2013; Humphries, Gomez, & 
Hartwig, 2011) that through capacity building, NGO projects approach macro-level objectives 
(democracy, gender equity, global citizenship).  NGOs have claimed that this achievement may 
also facilitate sustainability.  This study has found that NGOs transfer knowledge and 
technologies to local institutions, that, in turn, deliver interventions on their behalf.  The 
technologies and competencies thus remain with local groups when the interventions end.   
 
The NGOs interviewed for this research seek to transfer delivery models to local organizations.  
The models would thus stay with the locals, a situation that implies project sustainability.  
However, whether models are applied or not depends on the availability and capacity of local.  
This research has clearly shown that local organizations may lack the follow-up funds needed to 
maintain the initiatives that NGOs launch.   
 
Although NGOs and their initiatives are known to strengthen the capacity of their partners, local 
governments, and individual beneficiaries (Freed, Dujon, Granek, & Mouhhidine, 2016, 
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Suleiman, 2013), the literature seldom examines whether and how NGOs might improve their 
institutional capacity (human resource, organizational performance).  This research shows that 
NGOs’ directors are concerned about lacking sufficient measures and tools to effectively manage 
and evaluate their organization’s performance.  NGOs therefore require  donors’ understanding 
and support to strengthen their internal capacity (management, project delivery) (Seims, 2011).   
 
Community participation represents a valuable implementation tactic (Hoque, Clarke, & Huang, 
2016, Kuhl, 2009, Akukwe, 1998, Ghimire, 1998, Cincotta, 1994).  This project has shown that 
participatory approaches, although promoted in NGO projects, may fail due to the government 
not legitimating NGOs’ coordinating role, local partners not being familiar with participatory 
processes, and political constraints on faith-based organizations.  This project found that local 
communities were often paid for their participation, which does not necessarily entail real or 
authentic participation.   
 
Implementation success depends heavily on NGO approaches to staffing.  Interestingly, the 
literature has not revealed much about how foreign NGOs staff their operations.  Interviewees in 
this research reported that NGOs have reviewed all their strategies, including their personnel 
policies.  Unfortunately, I could not find the information on how the reviews have been carried 
out in official documents (strategy documents, progress reports).  Available documents that I 
reviewed concentrate mainly on scheduling, funding, and key program results. 
 
The literature indicates that under conditions of funding vulnerability, NGOs reduce staff 
(Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012), or compromise on staff qualifications, e.g., by recruiting 
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untrained or inadequately-trained staff (Gilson et. al., 1994).  This research has illustrated that 
numerous internal factors (compensation policies, work environments, performance appraisal) 
and labour market factors (newly-emerged business enterprises, local organizations) all influence 
the staffing of NGOs.  Given this complexity, foreign NGOs in Vietnam were found to reduce 
staff numbers, but respondents did not indicate that they have compromised on staff 
qualifications or recruitment procedures.  In addition, NGO directors suggested several 
innovative methods to refresh their staff and improve the work environment.  For instance, 
organizations use individual- (for example, key performance indicators, staff capacity building) 
and systematic-level measures (for example, staff reporting restructuring) to improve staff 
qualifications and effectiveness.  However, these positive approaches are not mandated in 
official NGO documents.   
 
Successful implementation requires careful selection of partners.  The selection of appropriate, 
capable, and willing partners was reported to be a significant requisite of effective collaboration.  
Because NGOs are allowed by government to partner only with locally-authorized agencies, the 
number of partners to select from is limited.  NGOs rely on their experience to select the 
appropriate partners, though this relationship may be characterized by uncertainty. 
 
Despite NGOs’ commitment to providing humanitarian relief, scholars are concerned with NGO 
delivery effectiveness, and offer ways to improve effectiveness, including focusing on 
establishing service standards and strengthening systems (Pfeiffer, et. al., 2008).  Adopting these 
approaches may lead NGOs to becoming professional, technical associations responding to 
contracted consultancy tasks.  This research offers additional ways to improve delivery 
201 
 
effectiveness, including focusing resources on only a few pointed development issues or 
geographic areas, and mandating focusing resources on improving the effectiveness of project 
implementation.  Above all, this research has emphasized that NGOs should maintain core 
values of participation, empowerment, and sustainability.  Although these approaches together 
ensure NGO effectiveness without compromising their core values, how to balance the several 
aspects of  participation and empowerment on one side, and of consultancy tasks on  other side, 
remains a concern.  
 
Although scholars have thoroughly examined the alignment of NGO priorities with those of 
government, evaluations of NGO contributions to state development are rare.  This research has 
illustrated that respondents held conflicting opinions about NGOs’ contributions to state policy. 
While NGO directors highlighted the potential for input on national development priorities, 
government officials tended to view those inputs negatively.  Although NGOs provide 
significant resources to a country’s development, ranging from financial to technical supports, in 
Vietnam they seem to remain unwelcome visitors with only uncertain mechanisms to ensure that 
their voices are heard, and their programs recognized.   
 
Hudson (2001) writes that NGOs link grassroots communities with upper levels of governance, 
ensuring their voices are heard within current existing legal frameworks.  This study specifies the 
several tools NGO employed for policy advocacy (the advantage of their grassroots experience, 
strong networking capability, and capacity building approaches).  However, the effectiveness of 
those tools is uncertain.  Success stories are documented, but NGOs routinely face difficulty 
accessing policy makers.  No formal or institutionalized mechanisms exist to ensure their voices 
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are heard.  Interviewees recommended that NGOs need to illustrate more progress in policy 
areas. 
 
This research found that NGOs are interested in conducting research to show convincing 
evidence of program effectiveness. But researchers have expressed concerns about the quality of 
NGO research projects (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 2005), and 
suggest that NGOs should work closely with universities and research institutions to meet 
standards for academic rigour (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016).  Storeng and Palmer (2019) 
illustrate a conflict of interest between NGOs (and their donors), who want to show that their 
investments generate positive results, and researchers, who want to report what have been 
observed and evaluated.  This study found that NGOs in Vietnam are subject to strong mandates 
to conduct research and to strengthen collaboration with academic institutions.  Yet because 
donors do not value NGOs as research institutions (Delisle, Roberts, Munro, et. al., 2005), they 
are unlikely to earmark funds for such activities.  Respondents reported that NGOs require donor 
support to ensure funds for research, not just for funding activities in the field.  
 
NGOs strive to deliver a variety of macro-level goals (democracy, gender equity, and global 
citizenship), but the success of these initiatives is uncertain.  Scholars are concerned about 
NGOs’ unrealistic goals (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012), long-term social achievements, 
and standing in global health governance (Buse & Walt, 1997).  In this study, NGOs directors 
noted that some NGOs established ambitious objectives without considering their ability to 
achieve them.  Although NGO initiatives are promising, the NGOs generally lack the 
203 
 
competence, expertise, and financial resources to achieve their goals.  NGO delivery 
performance, therefore, remains uncertain.   
 
How NGOs sustain project results is a problem.  Because of funding shortages, NGOs use 
different methods to ensure availability of funds for operations and project implementation 
(Biermann, Eckhardt, Carlfjord, Falk, & Forsberg, 2016, Berry, 2014, Mosley, Maronick, & 
Katz, 2012, Sarriot et. al., 2004, Gellert, 1996).  For instance, NGO fixed-term interventions 
necessitate exit strategies to ensure a smooth transition to local governments (Abramowitz, 2015, 
Ejaz, Shaikh, & Rizvi, 2011).  The interviewees in this research project offered practical guides 
to this finding; NGOs could opt to devise their exit strategies early in programming, or establish 
follow-up funds or devise economic-opportunity activities to financially maintain project results.  
Although the inclusion of follow-up components might signify NGO sustainability, those tactics 
have not been applied yet.    
 
The respondents of this research study recommended that NGOs coordinate or integrate their 
initiatives within existing administrative and political structures.  Pfeiffer and colleagues (2008) 
and Pfeiffer (2003) note that such an approach might secure political support and ensure 
sustainability.  However, when NGOs fully integrate with public administrative systems, they 
may lose their identity as independent, civil society organizations (Cheng et. al., 2010), and they 
may become even more tightly controlled by government.  Interviewees suggested that NGOs 
maintain their core values of empowerment, participatory approach, and long-term sustainability 
to avoid full integration with government.  When NGOs keep their conventional values, they 
separate themselves from government systems which often employ a top-down approach.  
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However, how NGOs keep their conventional values within public administrative circles remains 
a question.  Further studies may be required to provide answers. 
 
NGOs bear “political responsibility” when they implement projects as they are accountable to 
the various stakeholders (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, pp. 46-49).  While NGOs in Vietnam are 
not charged with reporting on local development indicators, they actually do so for the sake of 
local communities.  This action has the potential to endanger partnerships with local 
governments if it exposes less than desired performance.  I have illustrated a political scenario 
where NGOs must balance the interests of local governments, the needs of local populations, and 
their access to continued donor funding. The results reported here suggest that NGOs carefully 
report their own findings and opinions, regardless of government perspectives, in order to secure 
sustainable funding. 
 
From a wider perspective, NGOs favour balancing other aspects of their operations.  This 
research has illustrated that NGOs adjust their priorities to fit several internal and external factors 
influencing their operations.  Such prioritization balances interests among wider structures, 
political and socio-economical contexts, and facilitates ongoing material incentives in the 
funding landscape.  However, when devising ways of implementing projects, NGOs face several 
dilemmas, ranging from violating their core values to undermining their partnerships with local 
governments.  It seems that the harder NGOs work to survive, the more problems arise.   
 
This research has revealed two dimensions of NGO operations.  On the one hand, NGOs 
promote horizontal, bottom-up approaches to community development and the use of local 
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knowledge, which they claim are their strengths (Islam, Siti Hajar, & Haris, 2013, Akukwe, 
1998).  On the other, headquarters offices may impose operational policies and procedures on 
their field offices, ignoring local knowledge and constraints.  NGOs aim to standardize their 
operations globally, but their implementation is highly local.   
 
Headquarters policies and procedures impact NGOs’ field offices’ performance and survival.  
However, the relations between headquarters and their field offices have not been discussed in 
the scholarly literature, perhaps because the activities and concerns of country offices are 
conflated with those of headquarters offices.  This work has determined that although 
headquarters offices have a mission to facilitate field office operations, their guidance may be 
irrelevant—both practically and culturally.  These misguided efforts greatly challenge NGOs 
country offices when they are tasked with balancing stakeholders’ interests, thereby delaying 
field implementation.  Bridging field-headquarter gaps require headquarters’ financial, technical, 
and strategic support, including cultural sensitivity and field understandings.  Effective field-
headquarter transactions enable NGOs’ effectiveness and promote the image of both 
headquarters and local offices.     
 
7.2.2. Funding pressures and uncertainties in engagements with donors 
NGO funding conditions are constrained by several external variables, including Vietnam’s 
economic development, donors’ rescheduled schemes and requirements, the wider bilateral-
political environment, and government-restricted domestic fund raising; and internal factors such 
as headquarters-promulgated strategies, and delivery ineffectiveness.  NGOs are certainly aware 
of the “no funds – no operations, no operations – no funds” formula; in response, they employ 
206 
 
several adaptive approaches to sustaining their funding (Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012).  For 
instance, they approach the flourishing private sector, which emerged as a result of the 1986 
Open-Door Policy, to identify and access funding opportunities.  This finding is consistent with 
the findings of Arhin, Kumi, and Adam (2018), Besel, Williams, and Klak (2011), and Aldaba 
and colleagues (2000) who have shown that NGOs often leverage funds from the private sector 
to navigate periods of financial vulnerability or uncertainty.  NGOs are committed to seeking 
alternative funds for their operations, and the development of a private business sector in 
Vietnam offers a fertile ground for innovative funding prospects.   
 
The findings confirm NGOs’ willingness to access state funds to compensate for funding 
deficits.  However, there is a risk in this approach that reliance on state funds makes them more 
subordinate to government and hence in an even more unequal position in that already sensitive 
relationship.  NGOs also expect to raise funds domestically.  While many foreign NGOs confirm 
their inactive fund-raising status domestically, others are still somewhat able to raise funds 
within Vietnam.  How these “flexible” NGOs can “maneuver” within the restrictive local 
fundraising regulations remains hidden, as admitted by one NGO director.  It is useful for NGOs 
to collaborate to learn about possible initiatives.  Unfortunately, a NGO that is successfully 
obtaining local funding may not share the secret with competitors for the same funding; survival 
is at stake for both parties. 
 
One controversial issue is whether NGOs compromise their ethics and the effectiveness of 
project implementation when they are so focused on funding their own survival.  Focusing on 
funding and development, especially donors grant funds renewal, may distract NGOs from a 
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focus on high-quality project implementation (Mercer, Thompson, & Araujo, 2014, Kamat, 
2003, Cooley & Ron, 2002).  Several NGO directors refused to compromise their values and 
missions.  For example, one NGO in this research would not carry out projects that they do not 
have the expertise because they do not want to compromise the quality of program 
implementation.  Another NGO would not accept funds from donors linked to child exploitation.  
Although NGOs must satisfy donors’ requirements, they also rely on their own capacity and 
strengths, which they believe determine their survival.   
 
NGOs devise ways of coping with funding challenges, ranging from revising program objectives 
(interventions, deliveries) to implementing fund-raising initiatives, including diversification and 
private sector engagement.  My findings also offer several recommendations to donors.  For 
instance, donors are requested to offer a transitional period so that NGOs and the government 
have time to prepare for the rescheduled funding schemes.  Donors are invited to also consider 
sponsoring follow-up interventions for project sustainability.  In particular, donors need to 
coordinate among themselves for effective program coverage.  Moreover, if donors have the 
means to continue funds, they also have the power to reschedule the funds, when relevant.  
Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that NGOs would not dare to provide recommendations for donors 
for fear of their dissatisfaction.  In this research study, although NGOs expect several things 
from donors, they do not seem to submit a proposal.  Therefore, donor engagement in solving 
funding shortages remains unclear.     
 
7.2.3. Key factors of the working environment 
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According to the literature, economic development involves both opportunities and challenges.  
One country’s wealthier status may result in a positive medium-term economic outlook, hence 
benefiting bi- and multi-lateral relationships.  However, countries may face more competitive 
funding schemes, and must balance development outcomes and changes to economic 
environment.  Development also marginalizes certain populations, creating inequality in 
accessing public and social services.  This research provides some perspectives from NGOs.  
Although foreign NGOs in Vietnam are able to explore more funding opportunities than they 
were, they also face more competitive funding requirements.  Although populations that are 
lagging behind economic development, and newly-emerging social issues offer NGOs reasons to 
stay in Vietnam, the NGOs must ensure that their programs effectively meet the needs of 
disadvantaged communities.  Vietnamese economic development has amplified pressures on 
NGO operations.    
 
Specifically, when Vietnam’s economy actively integrated with the global market, the 
government developed multiple partnerships with many nations.  A large part of NGO funding 
comes from donor governments, and Vietnam’s bi- and multi-lateral relationships tend to drive 
the dimensions of funding for the country, including foreign NGOs.  The dependence on foreign 
funds makes the nation’s and NGOs’ funding landscapes more vulnerable to donors’ policies and 
requirements.   
 
Coupled with the nation’s economic development, donors de-list Vietnam from their priority 
lists, impose higher grant requirements (such as a shortened timeframe, an insistence on tangible 
results, shrunken funds), and drive project priorities.  As securing funds for their operations 
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becomes more difficult, NGO’s survival becomes uncertain.  While NGOs have limited control 
over donors, the one thing that they can do is focus with greater energy on delivering quality 
outcomes. Thus, as respondents have noted, they strive to develop model innovative projects that 
build on their current competencies, produce long-term results, and are implemented cost-
effectively. 
 
NGO operations tend to suffer from staffing challenges due to newly-emerging issues arising 
with rapid economic development.  Labor market competition in Vietnam has accelerated due to 
the emergence of a for-profit sector and increasing numbers of local NGOs.  The literature shows 
that NGO staff qualifications can be affected by resource constraints (Gilson, Sen, Mohammed, 
et. al., 1994), and by the challenging settings that often characterize NGO activities and 
associated physical and infrastructural challenges (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012).  How to 
recruit and sustain qualified staff is a critical issue for NGOs.    
 
This research has found that the translation for the terms “non-government organization” and 
policy “advocacy” may matter.  If translated straightforwardly, both terms mean counter-
arguments.  Counter-arguments are labelled “sensitiveness” in Vietnam context, and, therefore, 
government staff and communities are fearful of working with NGOs.  Counter-arguments are 
also regarded as social evils, which are outlawed.  Therefore, translations of key concepts needs 
to be done carefully and communicated effectively to avoid misunderstandings.   
 
7.3. Root causes of the indeterminate social standing 
7.3.1. NGOs “hide” themselves in a comfort zone  
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One theme that cuts across several layers of NGO operations is the idea of a “safety zone”.  
Given the uncertainties that have been outlined, NGOs become conservative in how they operate.  
They are reluctant to undertake some actions, or to work towards certain goals.  However, this 
reluctance affects their ability to be innovative and effective.  Indeed, NGOs may be seen as 
hiding themselves within their perceived “safety zones” to avoid state interference.    
 
For example, NGOs in Vietnam have been reluctant to embrace more entrepreneurial business 
models. Topor and Boroiu (2011) examined business-oriented models in Romania where NGOs 
diversify finances through business-oriented activities.  The research project in this dissertation 
has widened this perspective, discussing the entrepreneurial mindset under both effectiveness 
and fiscal angles, and explored the possibility that NGOs might become a special class of 
entrepreneurs.  Yet, Kamat (2003) notes that community empowerment for social justice 
involves promoting the poor’s rights against economic elites, and cautions that the shift to an 
entrepreneurial model may disconnect NGOs from the political possibilities of changing society 
because of the apolitical and managerial approach to community development.  This research 
shows that NGOs still managed to align with a social development agenda while acting in ways 
consistent with the business-oriented principles of organizational efficiency and value-for-money 
finance.  Respondents believe that this approach to project implementation results in 
effectiveness.  However, NGOs may be too conservative and too reluctant to take the new role of 
entrepreneurs.      
 
The effectiveness of NGOs’ projects on local social and health systems has been an area of 
concern for many scholars (Pfeiffer, 2003, Pfeiffer, Johnson, Fort, et al., 2008).  My work has 
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illustrated causes of NGOs’ ineffectiveness – they based interventions on assumptions.  For 
example, at times, they may make assumptions about community needs, delivery methods, and 
effectiveness, and they lacked post-evaluation, follow-up activities.  NGOs’ interventions would 
likely be strengthened if they improved their work approach, which might require time, solid 
financing, and most importantly, an evidence-based work approach.  A question remained, 
however, about whether NGOs could be ready to cope with challenges so as to better able to 
implement projects.    
 
Researchers have noted that NGOs lack rigorous techniques for measuring project effectiveness, 
including the critical assessment of research results (Olivier, Hunt, & Ridde, 2016, Ghere, 2013, 
Pillai, Wei, & Maleku, 2013, Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012, ISSEE, 2010, Delisle, Roberts, 
Munro, Jones, & Gyorkos, 2005, Pfeiffer, 2003, Cumper, 1986).  This study shows that although 
NGOs have devised several methods to demonstrating project effectiveness, they are not using 
the right indicators.  NGOs tended to tailor the indicators to fit their successes.  This approach 
might immediately satisfy NGO directors, and probably donors, but might not support 
strengthening the capacity of NGOs.  NGOs would be well advised to move beyond their 
traditional conservative measurements and really measure their effectiveness.  
 
Scholars have written that NGO projects do not respond to the most-pressing community needs 
(Galway, Corbett, & Zeng, 2012).  This research supports this argument, with the further 
comment that NGOs will “safely” select beneficiaries to favour donor-expected success at the 
expense of equity.  The intentional selection of beneficiaries might exclude groups in need, and 
hence increase social gaps.  The need to balance donor requirements and grassroots mandates is 
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in fact a challenge to NGOs.  This research has illustrated that NGOs tend to select a safer path 
in order to ensure their survival.      
 
Bernard and Grewal (2014) suggest that NGOs need to explain themselves and clarify their goals 
and operations if they want to gain a better standing in global politics. However, this research 
project has shown that NGOs might be unready and thus unwilling to escape their “safety zones” 
and educate stakeholders about themselves.  I think that it may be difficult to do this in the 
Vietnam context, but NGOs have not investigated any activities to educate stakeholders about 
their priorities, modes of operations, and missions, so their roles and effectiveness remained 
closed to public audits.  NGOs may overcome this obstacle to really promote themselves in 
global politics.   
 
This research has demonstrated that NGOs in Vietnam have not paid enough attention to 
increasing stakeholders’ knowledge about their roles and mandates.  The NGOs included in this 
research did not spend much time or effort clarifying their roles, their ways of project 
implementation, and their finances to local governments. Similarly, Ahmed and Potter (2006) in 
their work have argued that organizational roles are socially constructed, and stakeholder-NGO 
interactions depend on how each defines the other’s roles.  In this research, stakeholders include 
government departments and local governments, donors, and communities. The research has 
illustrated that government departments and local governments, donors, and communities all lack 
complete knowledge or understanding of the roles and mandates of NGOs in Vietnam, and this 
has negatively impacted their ability to work together.  Respondents in this research project have 
recommended that this barrier will only be overcome if NGOs take the initiative to promote their 
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image by educating stakeholders on the value of their activities and what NGOs do and do not 
do.  With their expertise in communication and information campaigns, NGOs should be able to 
competently transform stakeholders’ awareness and knowledge, and thus improve relationships.    
 
In addition, if NGOs presented themselves to stakeholders, they might also learn about 
stakeholders’ concerns and modes of operation.  For example, they could learn how government 
departments operate.  Government-NGO relationships became more vulnerable when NGOs 
were under-informed about government departments’ operations.  This deficiency tends to 
exacerbate NGO implementation problems, as well as their relationships with public sector 
agencies.  Therefore, through opening better channels of communication, as advised by 
interviewees, NGOs can ensure that they learn about and fully understand state departments’ 
operations and administrative procedures, and concurrently educate the government about the 
details of their own operations.  Mutual understanding would facilitate healthy partnerships.  
 
Coupled with their self-promotion efforts, NGOs might also clearly define their lines of 
accountability.  This research supports the finding by some researchers that despite NGOs’ 
clearly-defined accountability to donors, their downward accountability to communities is 
comparatively weak (Atkinson & Scurrah, 2009, Clark, 2001, Fox, 2000).  Further, this project 
has shown that although upward accountability is usually clearly required by grant contracts, 
their downward accountability to communities is less clearly determined, despite several 
measures required by governments and donors: e.g., complying with internal control measures, 
complying with state financial audits and reporting requirements.  NGO directors could not show 
how these measures associated with the downward accountability.  Moreover, those measures 
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were vaguely noted in NGO official documents, in statements such as “a more transparent and 
accountable relationship will be further developed and applied.”  This suggests that NGOs may 
remain unable to clearly demonstrate their accountability to grassroots populations.   
 
In summary, NGO operations, including goals, strategies, effectiveness, roles and mandates, 
accountability, and finance, should be clear to government and other stakeholders.  This clarity 
would certainly improve mutual understanding, bringing about healthier relations and greater 
trust from stakeholders.  However, these advantages will not occur if NGOs stay in their 
“comfort zones” and are unwilling to promote their identities and to present their work for public 
scrutiny.  Yet NGOs may find it hard to do so because of the structural position of NGOs.  The 
government imposes regulations on NGOs; several aspects of NGO operations are labelled 
“sensitive” by the government; and gaps exists in policy development and implementation.  
NGOs also rely on donors for grant funding, the donors may lack understandings of field-based 
matters, and they may impose their own priorities and reporting requirements.   
 
Scholars have noted that government-NGO relationships are characterized by unequal power, in 
which NGOs must obey state priorities and frameworks (Anku-Tsede, 2014, Mercer, Thompson, 
& Araujo, 2014, McLoughlin, 2011, Fisher, 2003, Gary, 1996, Lubin, 1987).  Durham and 
colleagues (2015) and Aldaba and colleagues (2000) argue that governments have the financial 
and managerial capacity to determine the dimensions of any links they establish with NGOs.  In 
Vietnam, although foreign NGOs cannot access government funds, they are subject to 
government control.  This research project suggests two concrete factors that determine NGOs’ 
compliance with government sovereignty.  First, government uses its discretion to constrain 
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NGO operations and even to deny their initiatives.  Second, NGOs may want to hide away from 
government scrutiny.  Once again, NGOs will need to find the will to raise their voices if they 
want to improve their standing in current Vietnamese society.  
 
Lastly, the findings indicate that NGO collaborations with each other increase their access to 
information and resources, their legitimacy and power, and commitment to community well-
being (Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012, Yanacopulos, 2005).  As many scholars have observed, 
thanks to a willingness to collaborate, NGOs are able to leverage greater program impact on 
community well-being, and cope with challenges in the working environment (Ahmed & Potter, 
2006, Chapman & Fisher, 2000).  This research is consistent with these observations, confirming 
that NGO collaborations have generated better impacts and been able to support their legitimacy.  
This research project offers several practical suggestions on why and how NGOs might 
collaborate effectively, ranging from micro-level activities (the steps of undertaking 
collaboration, delivery tactics) to macro-level issues (the sharing of ways for fund 
diversification).  These suggestions might strengthen collaborating processes for positive impacts 
on community well-being.   
 
Although coalitions of NGOs constitute an important dimension of NGO operations, these 
coalitions may not always survive political pressure, resource shortages, short-term orientation, 
and failures of leadership (Hu, Guo, & Bies, 2016).  This study finds that although 
acknowledging that collaboration generates positive results, most decisions made during 
collaboration meetings do not result in concrete action.  Even NGOs’ participation with fellow 
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NGOs is intermittent because of self-interest.  When a NGO shares its tactics, funding, and 
“secrets” of implementation and partnerships, it may become less competitive in acquiring funds.   
 
7.3.2. Uncertain politics and government control 
As Tandon (1989, pp. 21) has pointed out, governments direct and determine the one-way nature 
of government-NGO relations in Asia.  Fisher (2003) stresses that NGO policies may sometimes 
be “schizophrenic” and may actually “conceal co-optation” (pp. 22).  The research supports these 
statements, and offers as evidence several policy-associated obstacles that NGO operations face, 
ranging from government departments’ lack of knowledge of NGO operations, to complex and 
restrictive government regulations that frequently compromise NGO activities.   
 
This research demonstrates that Vietnam lacks knowledge or understanding of how NGOs 
operate, a deficiency originating from the country’s political monopoly.  The classification of 
NGOs as “sensitive” - sources of concern or even distrust - represents a political, top-down 
approach to NGO operations.   
 
The government’s stance makes it unlikely to accept actions supporting or facilitating civil 
society operations.  Regulation 102-QD/TW6, the most serious relevant policy, does not target 
NGOs, but it does ban political party members from discussing and facilitating civil society.  
Thus, the country’s political structure effectively isolates NGO operations.  In a single-party 
political system, this ban is serious because it not only impairs efforts to facilitate NGOs 
operations, but also obstructs full understanding of NGOs and their work.  Although NGOs have 
attempted to overcome social and political obstacles to advance the well-being of the 
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communities they serve, no state agencies dare support or discuss their efforts.  This “willful 
ignorance” represents the greatest political barrier against effective integration of NGO 
operations into contemporary development programs.   
 
Decree 12/2012/ND-CP5, Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg.6, and Decree 93/2009/ND-CP7 all frame 
NGO operations in highly restrictive ways.  This study shows that arbitrary enforcement of 
regulations, variable policy implementation, poor coordination among levels of authority, and 
unclear policy directives affect their operations, funding, and programs of NGOs.  This creates a 
policy environment where NGO operations are highly vulnerable to unpredictable political 
interference.  The vulnerability is made even more serious because officials lack knowledge of 
NGO motivations and activities due to Regulation 102-QD/TW8.   
 
Dupuy, Ron and Prakash (2016) argue that low and middle-income countries may regard 
international assistance, including from NGOs and civil society, as an important resource for 
development. They comment further that governments may, however, consider NGOs a threat to 
the state’s political control and may impose restrictive regulations on NGO operations and 
funding flows.  This research is consistent with these authors’ findings, adding that a government 
 
5 Decree 12/2012/ND-CP issued in 2012 is about the registration and management of foreign NGOs in Vietnam. 
6 Decision 76/2010/QD-TTg. regulates the content, agendas, procedures and organization of events engaging 
“foreign factors”.   
7 Decree 93/2009/ND-CP issued in 2009 is about the management and utilization of foreign NGOs funds. 
8 Regulation 102-QD/TW states that political party members would be expelled from the party if addressing or 
discussing civil society. 
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might shift its willingness to engage with NGOs from time to time, e.g., changing conditions 
from favourable to restrictive.  In Vietnam, coupled with quick shifts in the policy environment, 
NGOs’ limited participation in policy processes also affected their own operations.  Ultimately, 
the government’s policy shifts and its lack of transparency deepened the unpredictability of 
policy impacts on NGO operations.  
 
This research also supports Murtaza and Austin’s (2011) assertion that governments continually 
impose regulations on NGO operations even if NGOs offer great support to state development.  
This study has shown that even when NGOs support state priorities, they still face difficulties 
stemming from undisclosed government development goals, tightened regulations, and 
conflicting approaches. The alignment of NGO strategies and development goals with 
government remain a constant challenge.  
 
Vietnam plans to participate in newly-emerged treaties such as the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the participation normally 
requires the existence in-place of an official means of holding referendums, a policy of access to 
information, and assured rights to association.  This research project has shown that in Vietnam 
government prioritizes economic development over social development. The Law on Charity and 
the Law on Associations were therefore never promulgated, which negatively impacted NGO 
operations.  NGOs require these elements of democratic society for their development, and they 
expect that the government will lift its existing barriers to join the mainstream in the world 
economy.  However, this project has illustrated several political obstacles to achieving these 
freedoms.  The government seems to fear that NGOs will generate an unstable society and 
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unsettle the country’s politics.  How Vietnam will balance these fears with the pull towards more 
democratic practices remains uncertain.     
 
7.4. Consequences 
7.4.1. Unhealthy government-NGO relations  
Murtaza and Austin (2011) argue that governments continually introduce regulations over NGO 
operations despite recognizing NGOs’ contributions in development.  This research project finds 
that although the Government of Vietnam greatly welcomes NGO engagement, they remain 
cautious about NGO operations -- applying a half-willing, half-alert approach to NGOs.  On one 
side, regulations of NGO operations are restrictive.  On the other side, loose, arbitrary policy 
implementation may create room so that a NGO can “maneuver”.  Conversely, NGOs endeavour 
to observe state regulations, and concurrently strive to “maneuver” within the already-reserved 
room, or even to widen their flexibility.   
 
Scholars have examined government-NGO trust and mistrust.  While trust is enabled by well-
defined commitment and equal dialogues, mistrust is caused by discrepancies between generally 
supportive policies and unsupportive practices (Batley, 2006).  Trust also facilitates shared 
responsibilities, commitment and willingness in government-NGO partnerships (Solana, 2014, 
Paudel, 2013, Roka & Fernando, 2013, Bustreo, Harding, & Axelsson, 2003, Haque, 2002). 
Trust represents a key element in government-NGO partnerships.   
 
This research study has illustrated that NGOs and government being knowledgeable about each 
other’s operations may be critical to developing an effective partnership.  When NGOs 
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understand government departments’ operations, they can comfortably collaborate with the right 
departments, partner with appropriate partners, finance projects, and comply with government 
policies.  Also, government-NGO trust is promoted and benefits if the government becomes 
knowledgeable about NGOs.   
 
However, this study has shown that the government remains sensitive regarding civil society 
engagement in social organizing, and in consequence, NGOs are reluctant to have their 
operational values (roles, effectiveness, transparency) publicly updated and audited.  In addition, 
poor government-NGO exchanges of policies and knowledge likely leads to poor government-
NGO relationships.  Interviewees in this research recommend that in order to address these 
problems, NGOs should prioritize leaning about government operations and procedures so as to 
enable effective deliveries.  They also mentioned that effective mechanisms should be devised to 
promote exchanging policy updates and knowledge and to ensure healthy partnerships.    
 
Because governments and NGOs have different perspectives on policy development and 
implementation, they need strong commitment to achieving common goals.  This research has 
shown that where restrictive regulations predominate, and a top-down approach to policy 
development exists, the establishment of trusting relationships is unlikely.  Government-NGO 
partnerships lack this kind of trust, and are therefore difficult to sustain.  
 
Besel, Williams, and Klak (2011) indicate that NGOs often survive funding limitations through 
“formaliz[ing]” (pp. 58) relationships with government institutions and ensuring compliance 
with states.  However, this research project has found that in Vietnam, the government denies 
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foreign NGOs’ access to public funds, and requires that NGOs be financial donors to the 
country.  The regulations place heavier financial pressures on NGOs and makes government-
NGO partnership seriously vulnerable to financial survival difficulties.   
 
This project shows that NGOs expect to mainstream their funds and programs in public systems, 
when both government and NGOs share responsibilities to manage implementation and 
expenditures.  This coordination might happen in clearly-defined partnerships and already-
existing policy dialogues between government and NGOs (Batley, 2006).  In Vietnam, both 
government and NGOs are unlikely to be prepared for the partnerships and the policy dialogues.  
How to mainstream NGO operations in these kind of state systems needs clarification.  
 
Scholars have written about government’s willingness to partner with NGOs.  Willingness 
ensures commitment to effective implementation and goal achievement (Paudel, 2013, Ahmed, 
1999, Brinkerhoff, 1995).  Amirkhanian and colleagues (2004) find that unwilling government 
departments are a challenge for NGO operations in Central and Eastern Europe.  Even in more 
democratic societies where voluntary activities are promoted, NGO roles are not always well-
recognized or respected, and they may have trouble partnering with unwilling government 
departments (Ahmed & Potter, 2006).  This is consistent with the findings reported here.  This 
research project has identified key reasons for this unwillingness, ranging from NGO-originated 
factors (e.g., the non-refundable nature of aid, strict financial management, history of 
engagement, weak effectiveness) to partner side factors (e.g., tight schedules).  These identified 





7.4.2. NGOs fail to produce lasting results 
NGO projects have been criticized for lacking sustainability, and this is normally discussed in 
terms of their dependence on external funds (Hudson, 2001), weak evaluation methods (Pillai, 
Wei, & Maleku, 2013, Sarriot, Winch, Ryan, et. al., 2004), small scope and size (Crane & 
Carswell, 1992), and short-term approaches (Pfeiffer, Johnson, Fort, et. al., 2008).  Currently, the 
literature has not engaged with the implications of governments’ policy on sustainability.  This 
research project has highlighted that in Vietnam, policy gaps exist in awareness, in 
implementation, in coordination, in consistency, and clarity.  Due to these gaps, NGOs’ prestige 
might be damaged due to delayed disbursements, and NGOs’ project sustainability is 
compromised due to burdensome administrative procedures and reporting requirements. These 
gaps might place NGOs at risk of losing donor funds.  In circumstances of such financial 
uncertainty, NGOs cannot implement long-term large-scale approaches or rigorous evaluation 
approaches.   
 
Further empirical research and methodological advances are required to quantify the variables of 
the policy environment and their implications for NGO sustainability.  In a wider picture, the 
government-NGO relationship framework, particularly in developing country settings, must be 
consolidated, and the variables (capacity, willingness) quantified.    
 
7.5. Summary 
Although NGOs have the legal ability to operate in Vietnam, they do not occupy an official 
position or have formal standing vis-à-vis either government or beneficiary communities.  This 
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non-official status offers NGOs rooms for maneuvering, yet it is difficult for NGOs to grow in 
terms of scope and impact without an official status.  This uncertain position is rooted in two 
main causes (Figure 11).  First, the communist government restrictively controls civil society 
sector growth.  They have never accepted any actions promoting, supporting or facilitating civil 
society operations.  Second, NGOs tend to take a very low profile so as to avoid excessive 
government scrutiny.  In effect, they create a secured social and political space where they can 
operate with minimal interference.  That they vaguely establish program frameworks, or 
reluctantly undertake actions, is related to the need to avoid such interference.  NGOs want to 
ensure smooth operations at the expense of a more explicit and straight-forward approach.  Both 
causes are further complicated by uncertainties in delivery implementation, funding conditions, 
and several other environmental factors.   All these factors, and their relations with each other, 
can be depicted in a diagram that expresses NGOs’ ambiguous, non-official status in Vietnam.  
As a result of the lack of clear standing in society, NGOs risk losing funding opportunities and 
other supporting measures (policy, techniques) to produce and/or support lasting positive 
outcomes.  In addition, the government and NGOs have not adequately built their knowledge of 
each other, hence undermining effective cooperation, and trust.      
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CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. Summary of research  
Current literature debates NGO roles in global health governance, considering the relations with 
governments, donors, local populations, and other institutions.  The literature acknowledges that 
the NGO sector has grown substantially over the past several decades, helping secure 
commitments to and achievement of development goals (Mussa, Pfeiffer, Gloyd, et. al., 2013, 
Buse & Walt, 1997).  The literature also shows gaps in understanding how NGOs operate.  
Because NGOs, either at a local, smaller-scale level or at an international, greater-scale level, 
occupy a connecting middle ground between government, international donors, and local 
communities, they struggle to balance multiple interests in various social, political, economic 
and funding contexts, while striving to wield power and influence in the complex arena of 
governance at local and global levels.  Although scholars offer solid descriptions of NGO 
structures and practices, they make only limited references to the uncertainty associated with 
NGO operations.  These uncertainties, however, may shape NGO strategies, programs and even 
their survival within particular contexts (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012, MacPhail, 2010).  
A better understanding of the causes and consequences of these uncertainties would permit a 
fuller picture of NGO operations, and also offer a path forward to a more effective, and 
recognized role in development and governance. 
 
In response to this knowledge gap, this research has explored how uncertainty shapes NGO 
operations in relation to other institutions, and at multiple levels.  Specifically, contextualized in 
the developing country of Vietnam, the research has addressed the following questions: 
▪ What are the uncertainties that foreign NGOs face? 
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▪ What roles or modes of operation do foreign NGOs undertake as a consequence of 
these uncertainties?  
▪ How do the objectives of foreign NGOs align with Vietnam’s national development 
agendas? 
▪ What modes of coordination are recommended for foreign NGOs and the government 
departments in Vietnam, and what lessons are there for other emerging economies? 
 
This project serves two purposes.  Theoretically, it contributes to literature on relations between 
the NGO/CSO sector, governments, and other social sectors.  In the context of developing 
countries, where economic development may be prioritized over social and health development, 
and where the civil society sector is unrecognized in national development, these relations are 
vulnerable to competing political visions.  An understanding of the uncertainties affecting NGOs 
supports better and less contested relationships across sectors and could be used as a guide for 
further studies.  Practically, this research has gathered several recommendations made by NGO 
practitioners, and these can be shared among practitioners to foster their application. Although 
this work did not aim for generalization beyond the particular case of Vietnam, the 
recommendations might be applicable to non-profit organizations in other contexts. 
 
As is the tradition in this literature, qualitative methods were used to answer the research 
questions (Porter, 2013, Adato, Roopnaraine, & Becker, 2011, Markowitz, 2001, Lewis, 1999).  
Specifically, the overarching question of how uncertainty shapes NGO operations typically 
involves the connections among several structures and processes.  A qualitative approach was 
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judged to be best fitted to examining such linkages, especially when placed within the 
complexity of a socialist-oriented market economy. 
 
In this qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews and document reviews were the primary 
methods of data collection.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty 
representatives of participating NGOs, and with seven other high-ranking government officers 
who work at both central and provincial levels.  While NGO representatives commented on 
policy impacts and organizational development, government officers shared opinions on policy-
making processes, NGO implementation and coordination, and partnerships.  In addition, this 
project also examined documents on NGO strategies and government policies (decisions, 
proposals, reports).   
 
These data show that NGOs involved in this research have their own missions, visions, and 
values, and they do not communicate these to the public.  What constitutes the NGOs’ 
accountability, and whether the NGOs are responsible for their mandates, is unclear.  NGOs will 
not be able to claim their social standing unless they are better able to communicate and refine 
their mandates and images.     
 
The data also demonstrate deficits in NGOs’ funding, programming, and staffing.  First, NGOs’ 
struggles for funding represent a difference between their identities and mandates on one side, 
and funding sources on the other side.  NGO operations need funds, and the NGOs in this 
research apply several approaches to achieving better funding status, ranging from building staff 
capacity to actively seeking funding alternatives.  However, the measures that they adopted for 
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improving funding status may violate their identities and mandates.  Therefore, NGOs’ funding 
status remains uncertain.  Secondly, the data show NGOs’ deficits when they develop, manage, 
and implement programs.  Whether it be new concepts or comprehensive, multi-component 
programs, the NGOs’ interventions are perceived by local governments and local populations to 
be unclear.  NGOs examined in this research do not seem to find a way out of this programmatic 
difficulty.  Thirdly, researched NGOs show deficits in staffing their operations; lack of fund 
allocations impedes their staff initiatives from happening.  This study suggests that researched 
NGOs also lack directions for effectively staffing their operations.  The NGOs’ ineffectiveness, 
coupled with unclear workplace policies and short-term project-based recruitment, erode staff 
commitment.   
 
The country’s economic development, which greatly influences its international relations and 
population health priorities, is among several external factors that impact NGO operations.  In 
addition, the Government of Vietnam’s unpredictable and ambiguous regulative policy 
development and implementation, and its wider political connections, are barriers to effective 
programming, and may even endanger NGOs’ financial survival (Fisher, 2003, Tandon, 1989).  
In which dimensions these challenges will evolve remains unforeseen when politics are involved.   
 
Given uncertainties in their internal and external environments, NGOs in this research become 
very conservative, seeking a “safe space” where they can operate without drawing undue 
political attention or government scrutiny. However, this practice impedes innovation and 
efficacy.  Moreover, they cannot take any actions towards those challenges.   Because NGOs do 




This research shows that NGOs assume roles of helping the government achieve development 
objectives.  Interestingly, despite attempts to support government initiatives, the involved NGOs’ 
contributions to country development are rarely recognized by either the public or by 
government.  On the contrary, several respondents expressed doubt about the real impact of 
NGO inputs into state development priorities.  NGOs overall remain unwelcome or unrecognized 
visitors to government.  NGO alignments with government remain always uncertain. This 
research makes it clear that involved NGOs must do a better job in both communicating their 
successes as well as advocating for better development policies.  One way to do this, according 
to my respondents, is to collaborate among themselves to generate a stronger voice and greater 
policy impact. 
 
Strong NGOs cannot function without government support.  At a policy level, the government 
should promulgate enabling rather than restrictive policies for NGOs.  Moreover, it should 
strengthen legal frameworks for charity and civil society organizations (e.g., the Law on 
Charities, the Law on Associations).  At a practical level, the government should strengthen 
awareness about NGOs amongst their several departments and local governments, and simplify 
bureaucratic procedures for compliance.  In terms of finance, the government may allow 
financial measures that offer a means of diversifying NGO sources of funds and enhancing their 
community projects. 
 
The study suggests that donors need to reform the way they work with NGOs. Certainly, given 
the growth of the economy and transition of Vietnam to the status of a middle income state, they 
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must initiate  plans to shift priorities and perhaps downscale operations.  A particular need is for 
them to coordinate amongst themselves to avoid overlaps and gaps.  One solution is for donors to 
offer flexible, non-restrictive funds to fully cover program activities, administration, and post-
evaluation activities.  Programmatically, although donors might have their own priorities, the 
priorities should effectively support NGO development in Vietnam.  Donors might promote and 
advocate for civil society in Vietnam.  My findings suggest that government-donor-NGO 
communications could be improved to facilitate funding support for Vietnam.  Better 
communications promise to securing flows of funds to Vietnam, and increasing the effectiveness 
of using those funds.  
 
The lessons drawn from this dissertation are intended for foreign NGOs, with their own strengths 
and weaknesses, and internal and external connections, in the Vietnam context.  Whether these 
lessons are applicable in another context requires justifications.  For example, in countries with 
enabling policies together with clear legal frameworks for NGO operations, the lessons for the 
government may unlikely be applied.  In contrast, where the governments impose restrictive 
policies on NGO operations, the lessons may be applicable upon relevant adjustments according 
to the specific relationships between NGOs and the governments.    
 
8.2. Contributions to knowledge 
Although current literature suggests that uncertainty plays a significant role in NGO operations, 
few studies have evaluated this determinant.  Uncertainty represents “ubiquitous” conditions 
when solutions are needed to bridge knowledge gaps in unknown areas (MacPhail, 2010, pp.58).  
NGO operations and survival are influenced by several factors internal and external to 
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organizations.  How NGOs develop and how these factors relate to NGO  evolution remain 
unanswered. 
 
This dissertation examines uncertainties surrounding NGO operations.  These uncertainties 
reflect the NGOs’ “lived experience” (Cooper & Pratten, 2015) when several factors impacting 
NGO operations (funding situations, political imposition, “sensitive” issues) are not stable.  The 
uncertainties also demonstrate Whyte and Siu’s (2015) concept of “contingencies” wherein the 
success of NGO implementation relates to and depends on forces over which they have little 
control.  NGOs in Vietnam fail to take advantage of their own strengths (grassroot mandates, 
participation, communication) to overcome those uncertainties. 
 
This dissertation builds upon scholarship that has addressed how particular uncertainties impact 
NGO operations.  Scholars state that NGOs have been greatly influenced by several uncertainties 
external to operations, including funding conditions and donor engagement (Arhin, Kumi, & 
Adam, 2018, Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012, Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012, Besel, 
Williams, & Klak, 2011, Cooley & Ron, 2002, Aldaba, Antezana, Valderrama et. al., 2000, 
Gilson, Sen, Mohammed, et. al., 1994).  In addition, governments have imposed several 
measures to control NGOs and civil society, or have even regarded NGOs as a threat to society 
and civil order (Dupuy, Ron & Prakash, 2016, Murtaza & Austin, 2011, Fisher, 2003, Tandon, 
1989).  This research has taken these arguments further, stressing that it is political uncertainty 
that has most affected NGO operations in this particular context.  In Vietnam, the government 
has been ruled by the communist party, which has never accepted any actions promoting, 
supporting or facilitating civil society.  It is this rule that generates the lack of NGO knowledge 
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among communities and government departments, and that does not support NGOs having a 
stand in society.  Moreover, political directives shift from time to time, and are not open to the 
public.  Whether and in what dimensions current regulations might change remains unknown to 
the NGO staff interviewed.   
 
Scholars have thoroughly examined various uncertainties internal to NGO operations, ranging 
from delivery methods to implementation effectiveness, including personnel issues (Chowdhury, 
Jahan, & Rahman, 2017, Hoque, Clarke, & Huang, 2016, Abramowitz, 2015, Suleiman, 2013, 
Ahmed & Potter, 2006).  This research study takes that work further, highlighting that involved 
NGOs have wanted their operations to be secure (in the sense of avoiding interference), and so 
have tended to hide themselves in “safety zones” – they are conservative in conducting projects. 
This self-preservation practice has prevented the NGOs from undertaking strong action, and also 
made them less likely to draw government attention.  Moreover, NGOs in this research are 
reluctant to educate stakeholders about NGOs’ missions, visions, values, roles, and 
accountability.  Ultimately, in this study NGOs have never raised their voices to improve their 
standing in society.  Although all these conservative actions might ensure smooth operations, 
they prevent NGOs from moving up to the next level of governance and restrict their ability to 
achieve major impacts.   
 
The literature seldom addresses where NGOs stand in society.  Buse and Walt (1997) are 
generally concerned about NGO standing in global health governance.  Bernard and Grewal 
(2014) suggest that NGOs make the public clear about NGO operations so as to gain better 
standing in global politics.  This research project builds on these ideas, and asserts that social 
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standing is the main challenge facing NGO operations.  Current social structures and regulations 
in Vietnam do not offer a definition of NGOs, even though the political system imposes public 
understanding of NGOs.  NGOs in this research have done nothing to correct this omission, and 
so they are misunderstood and at times distrusted.  Moreover, although NGOs have been 
approved to operate in the country, their position in society is unofficial – they are not eligible to 
join the government-recognized list of political and social agencies, and they do not fit within 
any formal state structures.  The political party and the government neither deny nor recognize 
the development of these organizations.  Their politically-driven temporary status has inhibited 
NGOs from developing. 
 
The current literature highlights several aspects around government-NGO partnership 
frameworks (Solana, 2014, Haque, 2002), and describes both negative and positive impacts of 
government-NGO relationships on population health (Cook, Wright & Andersson, 2017, Anku-
Tsede, 2014, Hsu & Hasmath, 2014, Akco, Dagli, Inanici, et. al., 2013, Zaidi, Mayhew, & 
Palmer, 2011).  This research project is consistent with and expands on this earlier work, noting 
that government-NGO partnerships can never be separated from the political environment.  
Specifically, this study has illustrated that the problematic relationship originates from the lack 
of a formally-recognized position for NGOs in society.  In other words, once NGOs have been 
marked with an unofficial status in society, it is difficult for healthy government-NGO 
partnerships to develop.  Efforts to improve government-NGO partnerships need first to secure 




Studies have assessed NGO effectiveness in relation to their funding status (Hudson, 2001) and 
implementation approaches (Pillai, Wei, & Maleku, 2013, Pfeiffer, Johnson, Fort, et al., 2008, 
Sarriot, Winch, Ryan, et al., 2004, Crane & Carswell, 1992).  Hushie (2016) notes that 
government commitment may ensure project effectiveness.  This research project expands on 
this opinion, arguing that with their vulnerable standing, complicated by an unclear policy 
environment, NGOs risk losing donor support.  NGOs cannot sustain project results when their 
status remains unofficial.   
 
Clearly, NGOs in this research face uncertainties in the environment (government policies, 
political conditions, funding) and in aspects of their operations (effectiveness, staffing, 
financing).  These uncertainties deeply impact the NGOs’ prestige, effectiveness, and the quality 
of their relations with governments, which, in turn, influences NGOs’ survival.  The chicken-
and-egg situation between these variables suggests that NGOs must act to overcome such 
uncertainties.  Being conservative and reluctant in implementing projects cannot protect NGOs 
from unstable conditions, and contingencies.  This dissertation suggests that each individual 
NGO, with its own strengths and weaknesses, and internal and external connections, develops 
strategies to cope with uncertainties.   
 
8.3. Contributions to practice 
Several lessons result from the development and implementation of research on NGOs’ 
uncertainties.  First, the selection of a qualitative approach allowed the analysis to locate NGOs 
within their contexts and connected to several aspects facing their operations.  In addition, this 
selection offered opportunities to gather and compare data from different sources, hence 
234 
 
providing quality assurance.  Therefore, the qualitative approach has been a useful approach for 
studying NGOs’ uncertainties.  Second, the research project, which has involved overseas field 
activities, needed to be well-resourced in terms of funds, scheduling, ethics clearance, and local 
connections.   Third, cross-checking data with several sources of information, combined with re-
visiting the literature, has offered a valuable way to assess data quality.  Such procedures 
strengthen data analyses.  Fourth, despite intensive research, several questions about 
uncertainties around NGO operations remain unanswered. Assessment focusing on those 
questions may offer a path forward for maximizing NGO effects in coordinating the achievement 
of sustainable development goals.  Therefore, NGOs deserve more research initiatives that 
engage both scholars and practitioners.   
   
This research is subject to certain limitations.  First, although I had several interview 
appointments with NGO directors and government officers, I did not schedule appointments with 
donors, beneficiaries, and NGOs’ overseas headquarters.  Data collected from these groups 
would offer more complete information about NGO operations in Vietnam.  Second, this 
research project gathered data through interviewing individuals in director positions.  Although 
these informants shared a wealth of information on policy development and implication, their 
packed work schedules inhibited greater expansion on many topics.  In addition, the 
“sensitiveness” of the civil society sector might have prevented them from fully expressing 
opinions.  Third, although the qualitative approach allowed exploring processes and connections, 
it did not support quantifying variables such as willingness and trust.   
 
8.4. Recommendations for further research  
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Several specific questions arose during data analysis.  The first group of questions mainly 
concerns “conventional” NGO values of how NGOs ensured they followed their grassroots 
mandates and where NGOs stood in society.  The second group of questions regarded 
implementation effectiveness, including collaborations within the NGO sector and with partners 
(government departments, associations, local community groups).  The third group of questions 
involved alternatives, e.g., how foreign NGOs might hand over their projects to local 
organizations, or how donors would actively contribute in NGO projects.  Answering these 
questions required scholarly knowledge to capture the wealthy sources of literature and 
professional experience.  Further research on the following topics is needed. 
 
First, this dissertation recommends examining NGO modes of operation.  The research found 
that NGOs might transition to a value-for-money entrepreneurial model.  NGO directors 
confirmed that a business orientation facilitated capturing the best resources and producing 
evidence-based outcomes for disadvantaged populations and would concurrently align with their 
social development approach.  However, whether the business-oriented model would support 
NGO-program effectiveness and fiscal survival remained unclear (Topor & Boroiu, 2011).  
Moreover, Kamat (2003) has warned that the shift to an entrepreneurial approach would 
disconnect NGOs from their political capabilities to change society.  Further evaluation remains 
to be conducted in this regard.   
 
In addition, several other sources have suggested that NGOs should be professional 
organizations, each focusing on a few specific program strengths, geographic locations, and 
beneficiary selections.  In practice, as professionals, NGOs could concentrate resources on 
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producing better impacts and adding value to communities.  Professionalization has been among 
strategies that NGOs have used widely to cope with environmental changes (Tam & Hasmath, 
2015, Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998, Scott, 1995).  However, NGOs’ leaders need to evaluate 
internal-external interactions relative to the professionalization.  Therefore, whether NGOs 
should develop to become professionalization remains questionable.  
 
Second, this research has recommended strengthening NGO capacity.  The data shows that 
strengthening the capacity in target communities is among NGO delivery methods.  The 
literature confirms that NGOs have built the capacity of their partners, local governments, and 
individual beneficiaries through several initiatives (Freed, Dujon, Granek, & Mouhhidine, 2016, 
Suleiman, 2013).  However, little is known about how NGOs are able to build stakeholders’ 
capacity.  For instance, this research agrees with scholars who think that NGOs lack sufficient 
tools to effectively manage and appraise organizational performance (Amirkhanian, Kelly, 
Benotsch, et. al., 2004, Wiggins & Cromwell, 1995).  Systematic strengthening would promote 
NGOs’ standing in the global governance community, but how to and who should build NGO 
institutional capacity (human resource, organizational performance) requires further study.  
 
Third, this study suggests that donors can play additional roles beyond simply providing funds.  
For example, they can facilitate fund releases and disbursement through flexible, non-restrictive 
means.  They can coordinate amongst themselves to avoid overlaps.  In addition, they can engage 
more in facilitating program implementation, such as accessing government officers, and easing 
government-NGO relationships.  The literature also recommends donor engagement in 
supporting NGO operations.  For instance, Seims (2011) has suggested that donors might support 
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strengthening NGO structures and operational strategies to improve delivery effectiveness.  
However, this thesis agrees with Cooley and Ron’s (2002) argument that NGOs dare not target 
donors for fear of triggering their dissatisfaction.  In this research, although examined NGOs 
expected several things from donors, they did not tender their requests directly to donors.  Thus, 
how donors would engage in the above processes remains unclear.  Future studies might usefully 
prioritize promoting donor awareness and clarifying mechanisms for their involvement. 
 
Lastly, this research has focused on foreign NGOs that have had a long history in Vietnam and 
enjoyed well-sourced international alliances.   Local NGOs, despite representing a much smaller 
community with a much-shorter history of development, might potentially become key local 
development organizations in-place, because some foreign NGOs might favour handing over 
projects to local NGOs.  Currently, although knowledge about foreign NGOs is limited, 
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APPENDIX 1 – ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
After graduating as a medical doctor in Vietnam, I worked for three years as a family doctor in a 
poor neighbourhood in a small city there.  This work really turned my career from being a 
medical specialist into a community health worker.  This experience led me to apply for an 
Australian Development Scholarship to undertake a two-year Master of Public Health program at 
La Trobe University in Australia.  This program offered me access to public health learning and 
networking opportunities.  I completed this program in end of 2001. 
 
After returning to Vietnam, I was offered the opportunity to work with several international Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs).  I spent my first ten years in NGO employment 
implementing project activities in the field, where donors, at times, came to offer funds and 
request spending plans.  On these occasions, I learned that NGOs may refuse to accept donors’ 
funds, and some NGOs’ leaders determined to work only with easy-going donors.  The following 
ten years found me taking senior positions and engaging more in strategies, management and 
finances in the NGO sector.  We discussed strategic directions such as whether or not to apply a 
fee-for-service model.  In 2010-2012 the economic recession negatively affected our 
organizations’ funding.  Several donors de-listed Vietnam as a priority country, and as a result, 
several NGOs closed their offices in Vietnam.  In order to improve organizational effectiveness, 
many organizations that remained in the country decided to restructure staffing, financing and 
programming.  Still other NGOs tightened financial outflows by imposing more oversight over 




After many years of work with international NGOs in Vietnam, I began to question the tensions 
between a government that wanted international NGOs to align with its policies, priorities and 
directives, while at the same time NGOs were committed to human rights and other priorities 
that were inconsistent with those of government.  NGOs in this context were in a position to 
challenge the government where necessary.  The government, in turn, restrictively regulated the 
operations of NGOs, but at the same time, welcomed new NGOs to the country.  
 
I also witnessed conflict of interests between government and NGOs.  The government preferred 
a top-down approach to communities, while NGOs were interested in involving communities in 
planning and implementation processes.  Local governments wanted to mainstream NGO 
funding into the state’s financial flows, but NGOs requested specific spending accounts and 
audits that fell outside of the local governments’ scope of work and financial practices.  NGOs 
preferred to implement activities that built government staff capacity and empowered 
communities, but the governments expected to use the NGO funds for construction projects.   
 
My questions also centered around NGOs’ half-hearted strategies at the community level.  NGOs 
wanted to generate lasting results for communities, but they would not accept accountability for 
the local people.  NGOs wanted to showcase implementation effectiveness, but they were not 
ready to accept failures.  Although NGOs recognized the value-for-money approach that 
business-oriented sectors employed, they could not apply this approach in their operations for 
fear of violation of NGO identities.  They wanted, but dared not, to complain about donors’ 
heavy demands.  They wanted to both challenge and maintain good relations with the 




Over time I found that my work with NGOs was frustrating.  Their project objectives were 
sometimes overstated and unachievable.  Although the organizations suffered from funding 
uncertainties, their leaders might accept to spend on a purchase or service, that may not directly 
relate to organizational effectiveness, without reasonable explanations.  Despite spending 
millions of dollars on the country’s development, NGOs were never recognized by government.  
On the contrary, government further tightened NGO operations.  NGOs were invited to few 
important national events.  I asked myself whether NGOs could transform local communities as 
stated in their missions, and whether NGOs were really welcomed in Vietnam as announced in 
government bulletins. 
 
I wondered what operational strategies NGOs in Vietnam and in other emerging countries could 
employ to benefit local communities, and how the NGOs collaborated with local governments.  I 
thought that one place to start would be to evaluate the roles and effectiveness of international 
NGOs in Vietnam and to make recommendations to improve the government-NGOs 
collaboration.   
 
After many years of direct work in community settings, I decided to make a career move by 
pursuing academic credentials in public health, and to focus my questions and concerns about 
NGOs in the context of an advanced research degree.  The PhD program in Global Health in the 
University of Waterloo allowed me to integrate my professional experience with formal 
academic training and complemented my knowledge in the non-profits sector.  This thesis is the 
result of joining my professional experience with academic, research-focused learning. 
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APPENDIX 4 – INTERVIEW GUIDES 
1. What are your general thoughts about uncertainty? 
Probes: How about predictability and unpredictability when you work? 
2. What are the uncertainties when your organization operates in Vietnam? 
Probes:  What factors really facilitate your works? What factors don’t facilitate your work? What 
factors come from inside the organization (and regional office/headquarter)? What comes from 
outside?  Would you share any relations between those factors? 
3. Please tell me about your projects/deliverables in Vietnam? 
Probes:  Present projects/activities/initiatives or within 5 years 
4. What are the impacts of the uncertainty on the strategic implementation plans of your 
projects?  
Probes:  What projects would you deliver in ideal/favourable conditions (at your expectation)?  
What changes (at strategic level, at implementation level) did you make on any projects as result 
of those uncertainties? 
5. What are NGOs’ roles in Vietnam? 
Probes:  What roles should your organization play/do not play in Vietnam? What roles should 
your organization make as result of the real conditions? Please share any changes between the 
should-be, the preferred, and the real roles that the organization is playing. 
6. How do you evaluate your organization’s contributions to the development of the 
country?   
Probes:  How are the organization’s strategic objectives made? How do they fit into the 
country’s development? How do you know that?  How has your organization been involved in 
country’s development plans?  What works and what does not? 
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7. What do you recommend for better results of the coordination between the government 
and NGOs in Vietnam? 
Probes:  What does NGOs in Vietnam do for better coordination?  What do NGOs’ respective 
regional office/headquarters do?  What does government do? What do funding agencies do with 
the NGOs projects in Vietnam?   
 
   
